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ABSTRACT
     In the first chapter I study the effect of Proposition 13 on household mobility. Proposition 13, 
approved in California in 1978, limits the annual increase in property taxes for households staying 
in their  homes.  Because this  is an annual  limit,  the annual  tax savings increase  over time. On 
moving, a household loses this favorable tax treatment. I estimate the extent to which these tax 
savings reduce household mobility. The study contributes to previous studies because: (1) I use a 
duration model to describe the decision to stay in one’s home, and (2) I correct for a series of data 
imperfections. My analysis ﬁnds that the hazard rate of duration decreases by 3.6% for each $100 
of annual taxes which are saved if the household stays in his home. 
     In the second chapter I derive the optimal income tax schedule on imperfect labor markets with 
search.  In  the  search  framework  workers  and  vacancies  decide  how intensively  to  search  for 
partners, and whether to match with a potential partner when they meet one. Externalities created 
by workers and vacancies, in their choice of how intensively to search, create frictions on the labor 
market.  This  leads  to  suboptimal  matches  between  workers  and  vacancies,  and  as  a  result 
suboptimal levels of output. I characterize the optimal income tax system, designed to both control 
for externalities and raise positive government revenue.
     In the third chapter I study the incentives of competing retailers to sign exclusive contracts for 
the provision of credit card services. In my model both the upstream market of credit card provision 
and the downstream retail market are competitive. All players on the market - credit card providers, 
merchants, and consumers/cardholders - act strategically. I ﬁnd that exclusive contracts increase the 
perceived  by  consumers differentiation  between  retailers,  and  merchants’  profits.  Exclusive 
contracts, however, are only feasible if a merchant can credibly threaten to expand into the credit 
card industry.                                    
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Chapter 1
The Eect of Proposition 13 on Household Mobility:
A Hazard Rate Approach
1 Introduction
Under Proposition 131, enacted in California in 1978, the increase in the assessed value of a
home is limited to no more than 2% per year while the homeowner remains in the home; the
assessed value returns back to market value only upon sale or reconstruction (with future
assessments likewise restricted to the 2% annual limit). Because the market value of most
California properties has increased in many years at annual rates in excess of 10%, the
dierential between the owner's taxes and the taxes the same owner would pay, if he were
to move to a similar house, increases the longer the homeowner stays in the house and can
become quite large. The loss of property tax relief on moving increases the cost of relocation,
and is thereby expected to delay relocation. In this paper I estimate the extent to which
the tax relief constraints mobility, and I nd that the hazard rate of duration decreases by
about 3.6% for each $100 increase in property tax relief.
My nding has important policy implications as removing the property tax relief is likely
to increase welfare. Economists view a household as choosing his house size and location to
maximise his utility. When a household moves, his new home reects his contemporaneous
circumstances. As time moves forward and his circumstances change, the cost of moving
may prevent him from moving although his pre-existing house is no longer the house he
would buy if he were to freely re-choose his house. If he does not move, we can think of the
household as being in short-run equilibrium but out of long-run equilibrium. By increasing
the cost of relocation, the property tax relief hinders his re-optimization. It also hinders
1Proposition 13 is a ballot initiative to amend the constitution of the state of California. The initiative was enacted by
the voters of California on June 6, 1978, and is embodied in Article 13A of the California Constitution. It generated several
changes in the property tax system, applicable for both residential and business property: (1) the maximum property tax rate
is set at 1% of the assessed value; (2) the assessed value of each property was rolled back to its value in 1975-76 and since then
increases by no more than 2% per year until the house is sold; (3) upon sale or reconstruction the property is reassessed at its
full market value, and thereafter assessed value growth is limited to a maximum of 2% per year; and, (4) property transferred
to a spouse, between parents and children, etc., is not reassessed.
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Teibout-type2 sorting between jurisdictions, leading to an inecient matching of households
with public service expenditures3.
Conceptually we can distinguish between two types of moves: cross-state moves and in-
state moves. Cross-state moves usually occur after a job change or some other large change
in personal circumstances (e.g. retirement) causes the household to get large benet by
changing his location4. In contrast, in-state and particularly local moves may occur after a
small change in household circumstances causes a household to wish to change his housing
bundle. Potential tax eects are more likely to aect the latter group and Table 1 below
shows that this group constitutes between 82% and 88% of all movers5.
Table 1. Distance of relocation for owners.
Previous location % Previous location %
Same MSA, central city (to central city) 14.69 Dierent state, central city 3.68
Same MSA, central city (to suburb) 11.82 Dierent state, suburb 5.37
Same MSA, suburb (to central city) 4.52 Dierent state, non-metro 1.47
Same MSA, suburb (to suburb) 50.62 Outside U.S. 0.91
Same MSA, total 81.65 Out of state, total 11.43
Same state, dierent MSA, central city 2.04
Same state, dierent MSA, suburb 3.70
Same state, non-metro 1.18
Same state, total 88.57
Note: The table presents frequencies on `Location of previous unit' for owners (information on renters is not
included). The question was asked by the American Housing Survey to a subsample of 15,901 recent-movers
households (households that bought their home in the last 12 months preceding the month-year of the survey),
representing 36 MSAs in 25 States covered in the period 1984-1994.
Table 2 provides some indication of the frequency of moves and the size of the property
tax relief provided by Proposition 13 in California. Column 3-4 show that a quarter of
all homeowners change residence within three years with the median homeowner relocating
every 8th year. Column 7 shows that the median homeowner in California experiences a tax
relief of about $560.
2Tiebout predicts that residential sorting can lead to ecient provision of local public goods; if relocation is costless,
and if sucient choice of communities is available, households move to the community that provides their utility-maximizing
combination of taxes and public services.
3Farnham and Sevak (2006) nd that the presence of tax rate and (particularly severe) assessment limits constrain scal
sorting. Mullins (2003) suggests that Proposition 13 contributes to an inecient housing market because it provides dis-
incentives for selling property. Tugend (May 2006) suggests that the problem of unavailability of housing for new buyers is
exacerbated by specics in the supply and demand of housing in California. Geographical limits and enacted environmental
and growth legislation from cities and counties make new development increasingly expensive, while high migration and birth
rates contribute to higher demand for housing.
4Cross-state moves are driven by dierentials in economic opportunities, in cost of living, and in social-group-specic scal
benets (welfare programs, estate/inheritance/gift taxes)(Boehm et al. (1989), Cebula (1974, 1978, 2006), Davies et al. (2001),
Conway and Houtenville (2003)).
5Quigley and Weinberg (1977) nd that for the periods between the end of the second world war and 1970, on average 19%
of the metropolitan households change residences within a year and 70% of these relocations are within the county. Clark and
Dielman (1996) also nd that most moves are made over very short distances.
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Table 2. Distributions of key variables (period of observation 1984-1994)
Property tax relief
Duration Duration Eective for households
for non-movers for movers property tax rate in California
All Age<55
CA NonCA CA NonCA CA NonCA households households
Mean 12.190 12.068 10.337 11.519 0.0053 0.0148 766.557 677.472
SD 11.026 11.903 10.394 11.730 0.0027 0.0251 733.411 636.047
100% Max 73 82 71 86 0.0100 0.3830 5736 4811
99% 44 49 47 53 0.0100 0.0821 3602 3014
95% 34 37 33 37 0.0096 0.0336 2210 1921
90% 29 30 25 29 0.0091 0.0263 1675 1460
75% Q3 18 18 14 15 0.0077 0.0169 1035 911
50% Median 9 8 6 8 0.0052 0.0110 563 506
25% Q1 3 3 3 4 0.0029 0.0073 248 234
10% 1 1 1 1 0.0019 0.0035 97 89
5% 1 1 1 1 0.0014 0.0011 46 45
1% 1 1 1 1 0.0003 0.0000 17 17
0% Min 1 1 1 1 0.0000 0.0000 0 0
Note: The rst two columns represent distributions of duration (in years) for households who have not left their
home by the last time they were surveyed. The third and fourth columns represent distributions of duration
for households who were observed to move out within the period of observation. The fth and sixth columns
represent distributions of eective property tax rates, calculated as self-reported property tax payments divided
by self-reported estimate of current market value of the home. The seventh column represents (based on my
own calculations) the distribution of eective tax savings (in USD) experienced by all California households.
The last column shows distribution of tax savings only for households with oldest spouse of age 54 or younger.
I identify three main contributions to the analysis in the previous literature. To justify es-
timation I rst provide a theoretical model of the household's decision to relocate. In this
model the household's moves are positively related to the degree to which a household's
consumption of housing services deviates from an optimal bundle of such services, and neg-
atively related to the various adjustment costs associated with changing from one dwelling
to another.
Next, I estimate the model around the measurable variation in the hazard rate of duration.
Survival analysis, provides a very suitable framework for estimation given the properties of
the duration variable.
To correctly identify the sign and magnitude of the eect of the tax savings on mobility, I
also address a number of data and methodology issues, akin to the ones hindering empirical
analysis of Tiebout sorting. I correct for aggregation bias, for omitted variables bias, for
measurement error bias in household income and house values, and for the co-determination
of property taxes and public service provision.
In my analysis I nd that the hazard rate of duration decreases with about 3.6% for each
$100 increase in the tax savings. Furthermore, I nd that the hazard rate increases with
time, and the rate of increase of the hazard rate is the same for households residing in and
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out of California. The data also reveals that the negative eect of Proposition 13, on the
mobility of households targeted by Propositions 60 and 90 (See Footnote (16).), has been
eectively softened. A more detailed analysis also shows that the main eect of Propositions
13, 60, and 90 on household mobility has been experienced by households that occupy more
expensive dwellings; the mobility patterns of households that experience low levels of tax
relief are virtually unaected. Unlike in previous studies, the data also demonstrates a
higher propensity to move for California households. This further conrms that the eect of
Proposition 13 on mobility has been successfully separated from the eects of other factors.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses in more detail the
advantages of duration analysis, over more standard methods of estimation, in studying
this particular problem, as well as what methodological issues arise in estimation and how
these issues have been addressed in this paper. Sections 3 introduces the theoretical model
and claries the transition to empirical estimation of this model. Section 4 discusses the
estimation strategy. Section 5 discusses the data and the key variables to be used in the
analysis. Sections 6 and 7 report on the empirical ndings and robustness checks. Section 8
concludes the paper.
2 Data and methodology issues and their relation to the litera-
ture.
For the purposes of this study, estimation using the framework of duration (survival) analysis
has numerous advantages over standard methods of estimation. First, a hazard rate empiri-
cal model preserves the framework of the theoretical model. Second, the variable `duration'
can be treated according to its information structure. Duration takes only positive values
- empirical models that assume duration is normally distributed (Wasi and White (2005),
Ferreira (2007)) are therefore less suitable. Furthermore, in measuring duration two decid-
edly dierent types of households are observed: households which move during the period of
observation (non-censored observations), and households which do not move within the pe-
riod of observation (right-censored households). Excluding households which relocate from
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the sample (Wasi and White (2005), Ferreira (2007)) will tend to overestimate duration,
while treating right censored duration as exact (Wasi and White (2005), Ferreira (2007))
will tend to underestimate duration. The third advantage of using survival analysis is that
the estimation process also reveals the duration dependence of the hazard rate. This is im-
portant for our analysis because the tax saving experienced by a household is determined
both by the value of the house and by the duration. A larger house and a longer duration
both contribute towards higher tax savings. Estimating the hazard rate allows for these two
channels to be separated.
To correctly identify the sign and magnitude of the eect of the tax savings on mobility,
I also address a number of data and methodology issues that arise in the analysis. First, I
identify the motivations of potential movers by using cross-sectional data at the household
level. This helps me avoid any aggregation bias6 that may be introduced in studies analyzing
the behavior of population aggregates rather than individual households (e.g. Stochs, Childs
and Stevenson (2001)).
Second, there is a potential collinearity between tax levels and the level of public service
provision, with education providing the largest local public expenditure category.7 Recently,
Johnson and Walsh (2008) and Farnham and Sevak (2006) seek to separate the two eects by
estimating using population groups likely to be unaected by local educational expenditures.8
I take a similar approach in my analysis by estimating using the subsample of households
with no children of school age (in addition to estimating on the full sample).
Third, unlike in previous studies (e.g. Nagy (1997), Stochs, Childs and Stevenson (2001),
Wasi and White (2006)), I use the control function approach9 , to control for omitted vari-
ables, measurement error in housing values and measurement error in household income10.
Omitted variables bias results from the fact that the researcher does not observe all the
characteristics of the house and neighborhood that aect household's utility11. Since infor-
mation on these characteristics is stored in the error term of the model, the house value (as
6Farnham and Sevak (2006), Johnson and Walsh (2008).
7Oates (1969), Pollakowski (1973), Lang and Jian (2004), Farnham and Sevak (2006), and Johnson and Walsh (2008) among
others.
8Farnham and Sevak (2006) assume that empty-nest households are indierent to school expenditure, while Johnson and
Walsh (2008) assume this holds for second-home owners.
9The approach was rst developed by Hausman (1978), Heckman (1978) and Smith and Blundell (1986).
10Reliable instruments must be identied. I discuss my approach in Section 4.1. and in more detail in Appendix B.
11Ferreira (2007).
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an explanatory variable) is correlated with the error term in the model. Because the tax
savings directly depend on the value of the home, the estimate of the eect of the tax savings
on mobility is expected to be calculated with bias of unknown sign12.
A second type of bias arises from limitations in the data sources; data on exact sale prices
and exact income receipts is fairly inaccessible. As a result, most of the researchers use
owner-estimated housing values and self-reported incomes to estimate their models13. Both
variables, however, have repeatedly been shown to be measured with error in survey data14,
and can lead to bias if directly used in estimation.
Fourth, and last, I introduce enough variation at the metro area level and state level by
using a data set that includes 36 metro areas from 25 states. The need for enough variation
at the metro area and state levels is twofold. First, some important control variables (as
market availability or price dynamics), are dened only at a more aggregated level, for
instance at the MSA level. To identify the eect of such variables on mobility there must be
enough variation in these variables. Second, if households of only a few states are included as
controls (e.g. Stochs, Childs and Stevenson (2001), Wasi and White (2006), Ferreira (2007))
the selection of the sample may cause it to appear that households in California are, on
average, less mobile than households in other states. Such a result may further be wrongly
attributed to Proposition 13. It is apparent from Table 2 (columns 1-4) that, when we
look across a larger selection of states, the California housing market is characterized with,
on average, faster turnover than housing markets in other states; among the households
which relocate, the median Californian household relocates every 6th year, while the median
non-Californian household relocates every 8th year. This indicates that the eect of the tax
savings on mobility can only be studied via a variable that measures the individual levels of
the tax relief experienced by each household, and this is the approach I take in this paper.
For the reasons given above, my study improves on previous studies. Wasi and White
(2005) use OLS to estimate a linear model of duration (coded in intervals) on the tax
12In multiple regression models the sign of the bias from omitted variables is dicult to determine (See Greene (2003,
pp.148-149)).
13Researchers usually use the following data sources: Census, the American Housing Survey, the Health and Retirement
Survey , and the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics, among others.
14Robins and West (1977), Kish and Lansing (1954), Ihlanfeldt and Martinez-Vazquez (1985), Bentez-Silva et al. (2008),
Kiel and Zebel (1999), Kain and Quigley (1972), Goodman and Ittner (1992), Kochar (2000), Shea (2000), Dahl and Lochner
(2005), Luttmer (2005), Kosfeld et al. (2008) among others.
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saving and nd that duration in owned homes increases by about 0.1 years for every $100
of tax savings. Nagy (1997) estimates a hazard rate on dummies for metro-area-year, but
does not nd a signicant eect. One of the probable reasons is that his data set includes
observations from only a short period after Proposition 13 was enacted. Stochs, Childs
and Stevenson (2001) regress aggregated sales rates on dummies for state, and nd that
California households are less mobile than households in Illinois and Masachusets. Ferreira
(2007) estimates the eect on mobility of two subsequent amendments, Propositions 60 and
9015, which allow households with oldest spouse of age 55 or older to transfer their tax saving
to a house of the same or lower value. Using a probit model Ferreira (2007) nds that due
to Propositions 60 and 90, a head of household of age 55 is more mobile than one of age 54.
3 Theoretical framework
The early theoretical literature on mobility is framed in terms of household dis-satisfaction
and the gap that arises over time between the current level and the optimal level (given the
current household characteristics) of housing and public goods consumption16. A central
line of work is the hypothesis that dissatisfaction with the status quo results from life cycle
eects17. If the life-cycle hypothesis were correct, changes in household composition, income
and job location lead to shifts in the demand for housing, neighborhood, and scal char-
acteristics. This sequence of maximization problems can be expressed with a simple model
in the lines of Conway and Houtenville (2001) and Farnham and Sevak (2006). Suppose
the household maximises utility over the consumption of a numeraire good, C, a vector of
housing and neighbourhood characteristics including time-costs to commuting18, HL, and
state and local public services, G, subject to a budget constraint incorporating state and
local income taxes and other taxes excluding property taxes T, a price per unit consumption
of HL, PHL, and user cost of home ownership p = r +     (as dened by Poterba (1992)),
15Propositions 60 and 90 were approved in 1986 and 1988 respectively to allow households, in which at least one of the spouses
is 55 years old or older, to transfer their assessed value to a new home with the same or lower market value. Proposition 60
allowed such transfers only within county, while Proposition 90 allowed transfers across counties.
16Rossi (1955), Tiebout (1956), Speare et al. (1974), Brown and Moore (1970), Clark and Cadwallader (1973), Brown et al.
(1970), Moore (1972), Wolpert (1964, 1965, 1966), Fredland (1974), Brown (1975).
17Brown et al. (1970), Moore (1972), Wolpert (1964, 1965, 1966), Fredland (1974), Brown (1975)
18Commuting imposes both a monetary and an opportunity cost. The monetary cost enters the budget constraint, while the
time-cost enters the utility function.
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where r is interest/mortgage rate,  is eective property tax rate, and  is capital gain. The
problem that a household solves can be expressed as
max
C, HL, G
U(C, HL, GjW )
s.th. Y   T = C + (r +    )PHLHL+MC;
where W represents a vector of household characteristics, which serve as demand shifters,
Y denotes household's income, and MC denotes costs of moving, implicitly assuming that
a household must relocate to optimize utility. Note that for households with no children
of school age, the local public expenditure G is assumed to drop out of the maximization
problem. If t denotes the number of years since the household moved into the unit (the
duration), the resulting utility of the status quo choice for household i in location k at time
t, given the current value of W, is
Uikt(Yit   Tikt   piktPHLkt HLkt  MC;HLkt; GktjWit): (1)
If 
(k) denotes the set of available housing-community alternatives, the resulting indirect
utility from the optimal choice k0 2 
(k) is
Vik0t(pik0tP
HL
k0t ; HLk0t; Gk0t; Tik0tjYit;Wit;MC;
(k)) (2)
If we assume that the psychological costs to moving, K, are positive, a static model would
have household i relocating only if
Vik0t  Uikt +K; (3)
where the right hand side of inequality (3) serves as a reservation utility for the decision of
household i to relocate after time t19. Changes to income and life cycle changes in W induce
households to re-consider their choice of k, but do not necessarily induce the household to
move. In particular, the tax relief allows for a lower eective property tax rate (tax payment
divided by home market value) at the status quo choice k, and thus aects the decision to
19A parallel to the reservation utility concept is the reservation wage rate in a model of spell of unemployment (see Lancaster
(1979)).
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move (3) through the dierential in user costs (pikt   pik0t)20.
Estimation of equation (3) can not be done directly. If we could calculate indirect utilities,
if we knew the distribution of reservation utilities, F (Uikt +K), and if we knew the rate at
which oers arrive at time t, '(t), we could calculate a sequence of conditional probabilities
that a household leaves the dwelling within period t, and move to another dwelling given
they have not done so by t
(t)t = (1  F (Vik0t))'(t)t; (4)
where (t) is known in the literature as a hazard or failure rate. Once again, it is worth
emphasising that t measures length of time since household moved in the housing unit, and
not just a calendar year.
In the data, however, we do not observe the sequence of reservation utilities for the
household for each period, and we can only specify a regression model around the variation
of (t)21. As Cox (1972) and Lancaster (1979) suggest, it is mathematically attractive to
impose that (t) factors into two functions, one that depends on variations in all factors that
determine the household's decision to relocate,  1(X(t)), and a function that determines how
 changes over time,  2(t).
(tjX(t)) = v 1(X(t)) 2(t); (6)
where X is a vector of regressors explaining the shifts in the probability that a household
relocates, and v controls for unobserved heterogeneity, with E(vjX(t)) = 0. The measure
of duration enters the empirical model through the so called `baseline hazard'  2(t). The
baseline hazard is designed to detect the eects of unobservable factors that cause the house-
hold's propensity to move to change with duration. It is also the sub-function through which
we can detect the eect on mobility from larger tax savings, generated by longer duration.
To estimate the eects of dierent factors (including time) on the hazard rate, the maxi-
20By rule, property tax rates in California must be no higher than 1%. Table 2 (column 5) reveals that the eective property
tax rates enjoyed by the majority of households in California are far lower than 1%.
21The sequence of probabilities (t)t can be deduced using the law of conditional probability, where
(t)t = g(t)t=(1 G(t)) (5)
with unconditional probability of moving in period t, g(t)t, and a rate of survival by time t, (1 G(t)).
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mum likelihood estimator (MLE) is employed. Details on how this is achieved are provided
in the next section and in Appendices A and B.
4 Estimation strategy
To estimate the eect of the tax savings on mobility, I rst calculate the individual probabili-
ties (the likelihood elements) of the observed duration for each household, and then maximise
the product of these probabilities (the likelihood function) using the maximum likelihood
estimator (MLE). Each probability is a function of the hazard rate, and parameterization of
the probabilities is achieved through the hazard rate. The exact structure of the individual
probabilities depends on the structure of the data at hand, and in what follows I begin the
discussion on estimation with a short discussion on data structure.
To examine the eect of the tax relief on household mobility I assemble a data set with
observations on housing units from the American Housing Survey (AHS) (Metropolitan
Areas Sample) for the years 1984-1994. A given housing unit is surveyed up to three times,
approximately every fourth year, and this allows observation of a household up to three times.
Through repeated observations on the housing unit, one can deduce whether a household
has moved out between survey waves. The number of times a unit is surveyed for the period
1984-1994, combined with the household's choice on duration, gives eleven unique types of
housing unit observations as shown on Figure 1. On Figure 1 and in what follows housing
units are indexed by j, households are indexed by i, and the sequence of the surveys is
indexed by m. I further denote the year of the particular survey by bm, the year in which
household i moved into unit j by aji, and the conditioning vector of explanatory variables
for household i observed during survey wave m, by Xmi . Lastly, I refer to household i as
HHi.
To assign likelihood elements to households we need to follow households within housing
units. For the rst unit on Figure 1, the same household is observed in all three survey years,
and during the last survey year the household is recorded to still occupy the unit. Such a
household is represented in the likelihood function with only one likelihood element (one
conditional probability) - an observation that is right-censored in the last (third) wave the
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Observation Periods
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units
1.
2.
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4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
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aji = a11
b1 b2 b3
aji = a22 a23
a36a34 a35
a47 a48
a59
a6;10 a6;11
a7;12
a8;13 a8;14
a9;15
a10;16
a11;17
Figure 1: Observation Units.
unit was surveyed. In the second housing unit, HH2 is observed during the year of the rst
survey and another household, HH3, is observed, during the year of the second survey, to
have moved in the unit at t = a23. There is no information on whether HH2 has moved out
exactly at t = a23 or at an earlier date. It is also unknown whether the unit was occupied
between the dates of exit of HH2 and entry of HH3. What is known with certainty is that
HH2 has moved out at t 2 (b1; a23], and this is all the information that can be incorporated in
the likelihood element for this household. The second housing unit provides two likelihood
elements: one for the rst household, that moved out between the rst survey wave and
the time the second household moved in, and one for the second household that was right-
censored at the third survey wave. Housing unit 9 has been observed only once, and HH15
is represented by one likelihood element with duration censored at the rst survey wave.
Suppose the random variable T measures the length of time (the duration) a person/household
resides in a given housing unit before they move out to relocate. Its cumulative distribution
function and survivor function, which measures the probability of remaining in the same
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housing unit longer than a period t, are respectively
F (tjX) = P (T  tjX); t  0;
S(tjX) = 1  F (tjX) = P (T > tjX);
where X represents a vector of household, housing, neighbourhood and local scal character-
istics. The likelihood elements for right-censored and non-censored households dier. HH1,
for instance, is right-censored and is represented in the likelihood function by the probability
that the households duration is at least b3   a11
P (T > b3   a11jX31 ) = 1  F (b3   a11jX31 ):
If the censored duration for individual i is represented by ci = b aij, where b is the date of the
last survey the household has been observed, then the likelihood element for a right-censored
observation is
P (T > cij Xi) = 1  F (cij Xi); (7)
where Xi is the conditioning vector of explanatory variables recorded during the last survey
in which the household has been observed.
Appendix A shows that the cdf of T can be specied as a function of the hazard rate of T ,
and that the hazard rate can be further specied to depend on observable and unobservable
characteristics. I assume that the random variable T is distributed Weibull, with a hazard
function, conditional on observed explanatory variables Xi and unobserved heterogeneity vi,
(t;Xi; vi) = vi exp(Xi)t
 1; (8)
where the parameter  takes a value  >=< 1 when the process exhibits positive duration
dependence, no duration dependence, or negative duration dependence, conditional on the
observable factors and on unobservable heterogeneity.
Parameterization of the model is done at this step. I specify the following model for the
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hazard rate of household i associated with its current level of the tax savings TSi
i(tjxi; TSi; vi;; ; ) = exp( TSi + xi)t 1v; (9)
where xi is a set of controls for household, housing, neighbourhood, local market, and local
scal characteristics, discussed in more detail in the next section. The hypothesis of interest
is H0:  < 0.
I further assume gamma-distributed unobservable heterogeneity - that is, vi  Gamma(; ),
with E(vi) = 1, V ar(vi) = 1=. Then from equations (7) and (83, Appendix A) it follows
that the nal form of the likelihood element for a right-censored observation is
1  F (cijxi; TSi;; ; ) = [1  exp( TSi + xi)t=] ; (10)
Now suppose a household was observed to exit the initial state at t 2 (b1; b2) or t 2 (b2; b3).
For example take HH4, which is represented in the likelihood function by the following
element
P (b1   a34  T < a35   a34jX14 ) = F (a35   a34jX14 )  F (b1   a34jx14):
The likelihood element for an observation that is not right-censored is
P (b  aji  T < aji0   ajij Xi) = F (aji0   ajij Xi)  F (b  ajij Xi);
where i0 indexes the household that moves in unit j after household i has moved out.
Using equation (83, Appendix A), we can write this likelihood element as
F (aji0   ajijxi; TSi;; ; )  F (b  ajijxi; TSi;; ; ) =
[1  exp( TSi + xi)(b  aji)=]    [1  exp( TSi + xi)(aji0   aji)=]  (11)
If yji = 1 when the observation is right-censored and yji = 0, when the observation is not
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censored, the likelihood and loglikelihood functions are respectively
L() = i

1  F (cij Xi)
	yji F (aji0   ajij Xi)  F (b  ajij Xi)	1 yji
LL() =
X
i

yji lg

1  F (cij Xi)
	
+ (1  yji) lg

F (aji0   ajij Xi)  F (b  ajij Xi)
	
; (12)
where  = f; ; ; g denotes the set of all paramaters to be estimated in the process of
maximising the log likelihood function, with likelihood elements substituted from equations
(10) and (11). The model can be further enhanced by estimating a separate  parameter
for the state of California. assumed that the unobservable heterogeneity is factored out as
in equation (77). Once the parameters are estimated, the hazard rate can be calculated and
the estimates ^; ;  are interpreted as semi-elasticities through the log of the hazard rate
log  = ^ TSi + xi^ + ^ log t+ log ^+ log v^: (13)
4.1 Controlling for omitted variables and measurement error
Suppose tax saving, TS, is correlated with the error term v due to omitted variables or
measurement error; the procedure when income is measured with error is analogous. The
approach is to rst write a control function for the variable correlated with the error term, and
then estimate the hazard rate and this control function simultaneously. The two important
equations in our extended model are
(tjx1; TS; v;1; ; ) = exp( TS + x11 + v)t 1 (14)
TS = x121 + x222 + u = x2 + u; (15)
where x1 is the main vector of explanatory variables, x2 is the vector of `instrumental'
variables, the vectors 1 and 2 are the vectors of parameters to be estimated for each
equation, and u and v represent the unobserved heterogeneity in each equation. Because
TS is measured with error it is correlated with v, and we can not assume that u and v
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are uncorrelated. The standard approach (Wooldridge (2002, p.472)) is to assume that u
and v are jointly normally distributed, and estimate the correlation between the two error
terms, , in the process of simultaneous estimation of equations (14) and (15). Testing for
dependence between TS and v can be easily achieved through a t-test on the signicance
of the correlation coecient . Furthermore, the credibility of the instruments is tested
with an F-test on the joint signicance of the instruments in equation (15) (Deaton (1997)).
Because the procedure is fairly technical, the reader is referred to Appendix B for full details,
including denition and descriptive statistics of the instruments used in the analysis.
5 Data
5.1 AHS data
The primary goal of the American Housing Survey is to measure the quality of the housing
stock in the U.S.. At each survey wave, information is collected on the quality and structural
characteristics of the housing unit, the quality of the neighborhood, housing unit costs (out-
standing mortgage payments, property tax payments, purchase price, current market value,
utility costs), household composition, household income, and the date the household moved
in. The location of the housing unit is identied at the state, county, and metro area level.
The household can be precisely matched to neighborhood characteristics through questions
that the household representative answers on her/his opinion about such neighborhood char-
acteristic, and through additional information the survey representative is required to collect
(through personal observation) on key neighborhood features. Once a household moves out
it is not followed to its new location.
The data set covers 36 metro areas (MSAs) from 25 states, of which 6 metro areas are
located in California22, for the period 1984-199423. For the empirical analysis the sample is
22The MSA's covered are (number of observations in the sample in parenthesis): Anaheim-Santa Ana, Ca (4779); Los Angeles-
Long Beach, CA (3615); San Francisco-Oakland, CA (5818); Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA (4939); San Diego, CA
(4588); San Jose, CA (5668); Atlanta, GA (2976); Baltimore, MD (2764); Birmingham, AL (5018); Boston, MA (4295); Bualo,
NY (4671); Chicago, IL (2691); Cincinnati, OH (2143); Cleveland, OH (4989); Dallas, TX (3804); Denver, CO (2957); Detroit,
MI (6153); Hartford, CT (3049); Houston, TX (2137); Indianapolis, IN (5331); Kansas City, MO (1938); Memphis, TN (5417);
Miami, FL (2441); Milwaukee, WI (4716); Minneapolis-St-Paul, MN (4842); New Orleans, LA (2394); New York-Nassau-
Suolk-Orange, NY (1772); Oklahoma City, OK (4972); Philadelphia, PA (2166); Phoenix, AZ (4581);Pittsburgh, PA (3105);
Providence-Pawtucket-Warwick, RI-MA (5088); Salt Lake City, UT (5685); San Antonio, TX (2687); Tampa-St. Petersburg,
FL (4466); Washington, DC (5590).
23All units were re-sampled (all units in the sample discarded and new units drawn) in 1984 and 1995, and I choose to use a
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restricted to one observation per household, and only to owners who have complete data on
all key variables of interest. This leaves us with 86,728 unique household observations24.
5.2 Variables denition and descriptive statistics
The factors that determine the decision to move through inequality (3) can be divided in
four subsets: (1) property tax liability, aecting the decision to move through dierentials in
the user-cost, r ; (2) housing unit and neighborhood characteristics, aecting the decision to
move through the dierentials in the vector HL; (3) household characteristics, aecting the
decision to move through shifts inW and Y or through dierences in the psychological costs,
K, experienced by dierent demographic groups; and, (4) housing market characteristics
aecting the decision to move through the market availability, 
(k), or through dierentials
in the user cost, r. Denitions of key variables and their descriptive statistics are presented
in Table 3.
5.2.1 Property tax liability
The main variable of interest, TAXRLF55, is calculated as the dollar value of the tax savings
experienced by a California-based household25
TAXRLF55 =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
0 if STATE 6= California
0 if STATE=California
and YEAR1986 and AGE55
MarketValue*1% - AmountTaxPaid else,
(16)
sample for the years 1984 through 1994 for two reasons. First, for the surveys before 1984 information on the housing unit value
has been measured in intervals, and information on housing unit living area (in sq.ft.) has not been reported at all. Second,
the metro areas in the sample for 1995 and after are not surveyed in regular intervals. A large portion of the metro areas are
surveyed only once or surveyed in intervals of 6-8 years.
24From a total of 172,537 household observations collected by AHS for the period 1984-1994, the households which have
complete data on key variables for each year they have been observed are 140,226. Since some of the households are surveyed
more then once, this leaves us with 86,728 unique household observations.
25According to Mullins and Cox (1995), in the period I study, 1984-1994, the sample includes metro areas of only one other
state that imposed an assessment growth limitation - Phoenix, Arizona. Assessment increases in Arizona are limited to the
greater of 10% of value or 25% of dierence between current year full cash value and prior year limited value. However, based
on the Housing Price Index, the nominal growth rate of housing prices in Phoenix for the period 1984-1994 ranged from -1%
to 8% per year. Based on this information I assume that the assessment increase constraint in Arizona is not binding.
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Table 3. Key variable denitions and descriptive statistics.
Property tax liability Mean SD
TAXRLF55 tax relief/savings, as dened in equation (16) (AHS); $678 $636
TAXRLF tax relief/savings, as dened in equation (17) (AHS); $766 $733
TAXRLF*AGE55 AGE55=1 if in CA and AGE 55; AGE=0 else (AHS); $678 $636
AMTX eective yearly property tax payments (in 1000s) (AHS,
BLS);
0.944 0.812
Housing unit and neighbourhood characteristics
DTCH1 =1 if one housing unit in building and also detached (AHS); 0.842 0.364
OLDH how many years since the housing unit was built (AHS); 27.488 19.772
ROOMPER number of rooms in housing unit per household member
(AHS);
6.449 1.718
HOWNH =1 if neighbourhood quality, self rated 8 and higher on a
scale from 1 to 10 (AHS);
0.748 0.434
Household characteristics
AGE age of HH head (AHS); 49.471 16.131
GENDER =1 if household head is male (AHS); 0.723 0.448
WHITE =1 if white or white-hispanic, ref. group: non-WHITE
(AHS);
0.895 0.306
MARR =1 if household head is married, ref. group: `not married'
(AHS);
0.678 0.467
CHILD3 A FIRST CHILD of AGE 2 [1; 3] in HH (AHS); 0.052 0.221
CHILD6 A FIRST CHILD of AGE 2 [4; 6] in HH (AHS); 0.055 0.227
CPLWORK =1 if household head and spouse both have jobs (AHS); 0.341 0.474
ZINC total yearly income of all household members (in 1,000s)
(AHS, BLS);
$37.489 $26.439
CARS number of cars and trucks owned by HH (AHS); 2.001 1.013
Housing market characteristics
MG30YR current (YEAR of survey) 30-Year mortgage xed-rate
(Freddie Mac);
0.097 0.018
NGAINL2 Net nominal rate of capital gain from housing value
appreciation for the last two years before the date of the
survey (OFHEO);
0.070 0.122
SALEPERC (available housing units for sale)/(number of housing units
owned) in MSA-YEAR (AHS);
0.028 0.014
METRO =1 if central city (AHS) 0.235 0.424
STATECA =1 if the HH lives in California (AHS) 0.176 0.381
Measures of duration
DUR1 duration of right-censored observations (in years) (AHS); 12.090 11.754
DUR2 duration of households who moved out (in years) (AHS); 11.301 11.504
Analysis sample n=86,728
Note: All income and price variables are deated using CPI (provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics) except
for the variable NGAINL2. HH stands for `household'. AHS stands for American Housing Survey. BLS stands
for Bureau of Labor Statistics. OFHEO stand for Oce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight.
TAXRLF =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 if STATE 6= California
MarketValue*1% - AmountTaxPaid else,
(17)
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where property tax rate is assumed to be equal to 1% (as noted in Footnote 1, page 1) due to
the provisions of Proposition 13. The condition AGE 55 subsets households in which the
head of the household or the spouse of the head is of age 55 or older. Such subsetting reects
the provisions of Propositions 60 and 90, enacted in 1986 and 1988 respectively, which allow
households with oldest spouse of age 55 or older to transfer their tax savings to a house of
the same or lower value in the same county; households with oldest spouse of age 55 and
older are assumed to experience no constraint in mobility from the tax savings they enjoy
in their present home26.
I further dene the variable TAXRLF (eq.(17)), which assumes that households with
oldest spouse of age 55 or older do not benet from Propositions 60 and 90. Using this
variable in the model, instead of the variable TAXRLF55, and additionally including an
interaction term (TAXRLF*AGE55) of this variable with a dummy for household in Cal-
ifornia with oldest spouse of age 55 and older (past year 1986), allows for simultaneously
testing the eects of Proposition 13, 60, and 90. In particular if the coecient to the vari-
able TAXRLF*AGE55 is positive (while the estimate to TAXRLF is negative) this indicates
that Proposition 60 and 90 alleviated the (supposedly) negative eect of Proposition 13 on
mobility among households of age 55 and older.
As noted in Section 4, since one of the components of the variable TAXRLF55 is the
self-reported market value of the house, and since self-reported market value is measured
with error, I test whether TAXRLF55 is also measured with error.
The variable AMTX represents eective property tax payments (self-reported, actual
yearly tax payment made), and reects the ndings of Farnham and Sevak (2006) that, as a
result of Tiebout type sorting, cross-state, empty-nest movers experience large gains in the
form of reduced exposure to local school expenditure and property taxes, while local empty-
nest movers experience no scal adjustment. The variable aects the decision to move (3)
through the user cost rikt. Since 82% of the moves in the sample are local, we would expect
26Proposition 90 was not mandatory and there is clear evidence that very few counties adopted it. Upon approval only a
few, albeit relatively large, counties in California adopted Proposition 90 immediately, namely: Alameda, Contra Costa, Inyo,
Kern, Los Angeles, Marin, Modoc, Monterrey, Orange, Riverside, San Diego, San Mateo, Santa Clara, and Ventura (Ferreira
(2007)). Today (as of June 2008) only seven counties accept Proposition 90: Alameda, Los Angeles, Orange, San Diego, San
Mateo, Santa Clara, and Ventura (WEISS & WEISSMAN, INC). However, Ferreira (2007) shows that Proposition 60 and 90
have a clear eect on the mobility of 55 years old and older. For this reason in the formulation of this variable it is assumed
that Propositions 60 and 90 oset the eect of Proposition 13 on mobility for this group of households.
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the eect of AMTX on mobility to be insignicant.
5.2.2 Housing unit and neighborhood characteristics
The set of variables on housing and neighborhood characteristics, DTCH1, HOWNH, OLDH
and ROOMPER reect the ndings that such characteristics have a signicant eect on the
choice of a house and location27. One would, for instance, expect households to prefer
detached, one family houses, over all other types of construction. A household occupying a
detached, one family house, would be less likely to relocate.
5.2.3 Household characteristics
The set of variables on household characteristics and life cycle eects - AGE, CARS, CHILD3,
CHILD6, CPLWORK, GENDER, MARR, WHITE, and ZINC - reect the strong agreement
among researchers on what factors, among many, are important. The prevailing results are
that28: (1) a recent change in marital status increases mobility; (2) the birth of the rst
child, the move of the rst child from pre-school to elementary school, and the moment child
rearing ceases are related to signicant changes in housing consumption; (3) increases and
decreases in family size increase mobility signicantly; (4) there is an inverse relationship
between the age of the household head and mobility, with the eect possibly being non-linear;
(5) white individuals have higher mobility rates than African-Americans and Hispanics; (6)
education and income levels have no clear eect on mobility; (7) a job change often acts as
a trigger for a residential move even for a change of workplace within the metro area; and,
(8) dual earner households relocate less often than one earner households.
Since changes in household composition are not observed in our data set, the variables I
create attempt to, as closely as possible, incorporate the ndings in the previous literature:
The variables CHILD3 and CHILD6 are calculated to reect the previous ndings that the
birth of the rst child, and the transition of the rst child from pre-school to elementary
school, are important predictors of change in the level of housing consumption. The variable
27Boyce (1969), Droettboom et al. (1971), Greeberg and Boswell (1972), Moore (1972), Varady (1974), Molin (1999).
28The reader is referred to Quigley and Weinberg (1977) for a very detailed review of early studies that mainly relate
the household's decision to relocate to factors leading to a gap between current housing consumption and preferred housing
consumption, and Dielman (2001) for more recent studies that focused attention on more rened choice making processes within
the household, and on market conditions that strongly constrain the ability of a household to move when they need to adjust
their housing consumption.
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CARS is intended to proxy for the importance of commuting time. The more cars the family
has, the more exible are household members in commuting. The variable CPLWORK is
introduced due to previous ndings that double earner households relocate less often. The
variable MARR acts as a proxy for a household with more than one choice maker (more
then one set of preferences). The variable AGE proxies for various life-cycle eects as well as
psychological costs of relocation. Furthermore, the variable AGE is important because older
households would tend to remain in their homes longer, and accumulate larger than average
tax savings. Omitting the variable AGE from the main equation, may tend to overestimate
the eect of TAXRLF55 on mobility. The variable GENDER can aect the decision to
relocate through the cost parameter K (costs of relocation perceived dierently by male and
female household heads) or through the vector W if the frequency of job change is dierent
for male versus female workers. The variable WHITE is included based on consistent ndings
in previous studies that mobility depends on race.
Finally the variable ZINC serves as a demand shifter through income, Y . Since ZINC
is measured with error (as noted in Section 3), I control for the measurement error bias in
estimation.
5.2.4 Housing market characteristics
The variables MG30YR, NGAINL2, SALEPERC, METRO, and STATECA reect the re-
cent, in the empirical literature, ndings that local and non-local market characteristics,
and local market constraints, aect the incentive and ability of households to obtain their
optimal bundle of housing/location characteristics. Four major results have emerged from
this discussion: (1) costs of moving (as measured by mortgage rates or other nancial or
psychological costs) are inversely related to household mobility29; (2) availability of alterna-
tive dwellings is positively related to mobility30; (3) investment incentives are high in the list
of priorities for buyers, and capital gains dier substantially across time and metro areas31;
and (4) the propensity to move and the resulting market 'turnover' vary considerably from
29Weinberg (1975), Amundsen (1985), Quigley (1987).
30Strassmann (2000), Dieleman et al. (2000), and Grling and Friman (2001).
31Case and Shiller (1988), Poterba (1992), Dieleman et al. (2000).
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place to place 32.
The variable MG30YR is derived from the `15-Year and 30-Year Fixed-rate Historic Ta-
bles' provided by Freddie Mac. It represents the 30-Year xed mortgage rate and is expected
to aect the household's decision to move (3) through the user cost rik0t. However, since the
data does not include a variable that measures the business cycle, MG30YR may take the
role of a proxy for employment rate (for example). Mortgage rates are usually high in `good'
times, when people have high expectations about the future. For that reason the variable
MG30YR may aect the decision to move through the expected future disposable income,
which can not be measured in our data.
The variable NGAINL2 is designed to measure the household's expectations about future
local housing market capital gains, and aects the decision to move (3) through the user
cost, r. It is calculated as the average nominal capital gain from holding a house as an asset
in a given MSA for the last two years
NGAINL2MSA;t =
HPIMSA;t   HPIMSA;t 2
HPIMSA;t 2
;
where HPI represents the housing price index for each metro area, provided by the Oce of
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight.
To control for market supply of housing units for sale in a given MSA-YEAR (MSA-YEAR
 particular metro area in a particular year), the variable SALEPERC is calculated as the
total number of vacant housing units for sale in the given MSA-YEAR over the total number
of owner occupied housing units for the same MSA-YEAR33. A second variable, METRO
(=1 if housing unit is in central city), is formulated to control for the supply of land, which
Brasington (2002) nds is an important determinant for the magnitude of capitalisation of
taxes and public services in housing values. The variables SALEPERC and METRO aect
the decision to move (3) through the distribution of market availability 
(k0).
Finally, the variable STATECA controls for the observed in the data, higher propensity
to move in California.
32Lu (1998), Pawson and Bramley (2000).
33To obtain correct values of the variable, each observation of a housing unit for sale and each observation of owner-occupied
housing unit is inated by its corresponding 'pure weight', PWT (provided by AHS), where PWT measures the inverse of the
probability that the housing unit is sampled. All weighting in the sample, when necessary, is achieved using the variable PWT.
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6 Results
The model is estimated on two separate samples: all households, and households with no
children of school age (66% of all households). The objective is to control for the possible
collinearity between property tax levels and local public expenditure.
For each sample the model is estimated three times: a baseline model with no corrections,
based on specication (9); a model with corrections for omitted variables and measurement
error in TAXRLF55, based on specication (14)-(15); and, a model with corrections for
measurement error in household income, ZINC, based on specication (14)-(15)(but this
time controlling for income and not tax savings). Controlling for omitted variables and
measurement error is achieved via a two-step procedure described in detail in Appendix B34.
In the second step of the procedure, simulation of an error term is used to approximate an
integral. Each model is estimated based on 600 draws (per observation) of the iid, normally
distributed error term35. Furthermore, the standard errors of all estimates in the second
step are corrected for the additional variation introduced by the two-step process using the
covariance matrix suggested by Greene (2003, p.510). The important parameters that result
from this procedure are the F statistic, measuring the joint signicance of the instruments
in the rst step, and the correlation coecient , which measures the correlation between
the error term v in the main equation (14) and the error term u in the control function
(15). The standard error of the correlation coecient is calculated using the Delta method
(Greene (2003, p.913)), and a t-test of the hypothesis H0: = 0 reveals whether the problem
of omitted variables or measurement error is present in the data.
A caveat in the data is a possible inuence of outliers in self-reported dollar-valued
variables (e.g. income, tax payments, home value, etc.). All dollar-valued variables are
top-coded36 by the AHS at the 97th percentile. I further winsorize37 the lower tail of the
34An alternative approach is to estimate the full information maximum likelihood (FIML), which is more ecient than any
two-step estimator, but at the same time far more computationally-intensive. Estimation of FIML was attempted, but due to
the large number of estimates, the large number of observations, and the complexity of the model, the estimation procedure
would either not converge or the Hessian would not be correctly calculated.
35To determine the appropriate number of draws for consistent estimation, I estimated one of the models repeatedly increasing
the number of draws with a 100 at each step. I found that estimates and standard errors settle down in models estimated with
more than 600 draws.
36Any value in the top 3% tail of the distribution takes the value of the 97th percentile. This is done by the AHS to maintain
condentiality.
37Any value in the lower 1% tail of the distribution takes the value of the 1st percentile.
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distributions of these variables at the 1st percentile. All models are estimated on the top-
coded-winsorized samples.
In all models that I present in this and next section estimation revealed that TAXRLF55
is not related to the error term in equation (14) due to omitted variables or measurement
error. For brevity I present results only for the baseline models and models with correction
for measurement error in household income.
The main results are presented in Table 4. Results for a modication of the models in
Table 4, where the metro-state area dummy variables are replaced by an indicator variable
for residence in California, are presented in Table 538.
Tax savings, TAXRLF55, is consistently negatively related to mobility across models. The
magnitude of this eect, however, is not stable because each of these models incorporates a
dierent set of assumptions. We focus on the models in Table 4, as those are more precise
than the models in Table 5 (judging by the magnitudes of the log-likelihoods for each model).
Specications (2) and (4) rely on the assumption of correlation between household income
(ZINC) and the error term in equation (14). This correlation however is not conrmed for
the specication that includes metro-state indicator variables as controls: the correlation
coecient  is insignicantly dierent from zero in both models, given the conrmed by the
F statistic validity of the instruments. For that reason specications (2) and (4) are invalid,
and we focus on specications (1) and (3).
The most important dierence between models (1) and (3) should be revealed through
dierences in the estimated eect of the tax payment, AMTX, on the hazard rate. However,
it appears that the eect of the tax payments on mobility is insignicant in both models.
To a large extent this may result from the predominantly local moves in the sample;
this result complies with the ndings of Farnham and Sevak (2006) that, among empty-nest
households, only households that migrate across states are able to reduce their exposure to
local expenditure and property taxes. Further evidence that the two models are very similar
are the consistent estimates of all parameters and their standard errors. It appears there is
no ground for rejecting model (3) on the basis of collinearity between tax levels and school
38More controls could be included in the models, however, estimation with maximum likelihood requires a careful balance
between specifying a meaningful model and being able to estimate it. The models in Table 4 and 5 represent a measured
selection of controls, which comply with the theoretical framework and the empirical literature on mobility.
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Table 4. Hazard rate determinants: MSA controls; controlling for measurement error in ZINC
HHs with no child of school age Full sample
(1) Baseline model (2) Control function (3) Baseline model (4) Control function
TAXRLF55 -0.000362*** -0.000526*** -0.000365*** -0.000330***
(0.000060) (0.000112) (0.000048) (0.000099)
AMTX 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DTCH1 -0.445*** -0.495*** -0.479*** -0.431***
(0.035) (0.059) (0.030) (0.065)
OLDH -0.031*** -0.035*** -0.028*** -0.029***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
ROOMPER 0.039*** 0.039** 0.069*** 0.066***
(0.010) (0.017) (0.008) (0.017)
HOWNH 0.145*** 0.198*** 0.134*** 0.220***
(0.029) (0.050) (0.023) (0.050)
AGE -0.073*** -0.073*** -0.074*** -0.075***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
GENDER 0.055* 0.066 0.053** 0.187***
(0.032) (0.056) (0.027) (0.059)
WHITE 0.328*** 0.386*** 0.241*** 0.212**
(0.054) (0.096) (0.040) (0.085)
MARR 0.014 0.075 0.038 0.031
(0.038) (0.067) (0.032) (0.071)
CHILD3 0.451*** 0.662*** 0.511*** 0.320***
(0.047) (0.081) (0.043) (0.096)
CHILD6 0.319*** 0.255** 0.400*** 0.364***
(0.072) (0.127) (0.042) (0.090)
CPLWORK 0.173*** -0.031 0.146*** -0.017
(0.034) (0.083) (0.025) (0.067)
ZINC 0.005*** 0.007* 0.005*** 0.007**
(0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.004)
CARS -0.255*** -0.265*** -0.212*** -0.232***
(0.016) (0.038) (0.012) (0.033)
MG30YR 53.178*** 52.956*** 53.112*** 52.924***
(0.908) (1.922) (0.757) (1.900)
NGAINL2 3.730*** 2.637*** 3.629*** 2.531***
(0.133) (0.216) (0.110) (0.220)
SALEPERC 15.731*** 15.533*** 15.740*** 15.543***
(2.446) (4.270) (1.952) (4.143)
METRO 0.074** 0.221*** 0.052** 0.079
(0.031) (0.054) (0.026) (0.057)
MSA dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
 1.976*** 1.959*** 1.991*** 1.983***
(0.023) (0.049) (0.019) (0.046)
(CA) 1.947*** 2.062*** 1.988*** 2.087***
(0.034) (0.068) (0.030) (0.071)
Const -8.543*** -8.547*** -8.684*** -8.768***
(0.184) (0.367) (0.147) (0.338)
 -0.848 -0.835
(0.587) (0.567)
F(6;n) rst step 1583.237*** 2223.398***
LL (log lik) -69722.477 -70181.648 -105990.239 -107109.236
n (# of obs.) 57,758 57,758 86,728 86,728
Note: The variable TAXRLF55 is measured in dollars.  is the parameter of the Weibull distribution measuring duration
dependence of the hazard rate. A separate parameter, (CA), is estimated for California households. Models (2,4,6,8) control
for measurement error in ZINC, using a two-step procedure. The second step of models (2,4,6,8) requires simulation of the
error term, and the models are estimated with 600 draws of the error term per observation. The standard errors for models
(5) and (6) are corrected for the two-step procedure using the approach suggested by Greene (2003, p.510).  is the correlation
between the error terms of the main equation (14) and the control function (15) in the two-step procedure. A t-test on H0:
 = 0 reveals whether ZINC is measured with error. F denotes the F-stat measuring the joint eect of the instruments on
ZINC in the rst step of the two-step procedure. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
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Table 5. Hazard rate determinants: no MSA controls; controlling for measurement error in ZINC
HHs with no child of school age Full sample
(5) Baseline model (6) Control function (7) Baseline model (8) Control function
TAXRLF55 -0.000696*** -0.000629*** -0.000649*** -0.000786***
(0.000060) (0.000100) (0.000051) (0.000081)
AMTX -0.000*** -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DTCH1 -0.412*** -0.378*** -0.385*** -0.378***
(0.031) (0.052) (0.029) (0.044)
OLDH -0.033*** -0.034*** -0.031*** -0.029***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
ROOMPER 0.054*** 0.049*** 0.076*** 0.049***
(0.009) (0.017) (0.008) (0.014)
HOWNH 0.096*** -0.000 0.096*** 0.000
(0.026) (0.034) (0.023) (0.027)
AGE -0.069*** -0.070*** -0.075*** -0.073***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
GENDER 0.075*** 0.129*** 0.065** 0.129**
(0.030) (0.040) (0.027) (0.034)
WHITE 0.408*** 0.674*** 0.365*** 0.674***
(0.049) (0.081) (0.039) (0.061)
MARR -0.010 -0.100** -0.046 -0.100**
(0.035) (0.049) (0.032) (0.041)
CHILD3 0.468*** 0.727*** 0.624*** 0.727***
(0.043) (0.074) (0.043) (0.063)
CHILD6 0.420*** 0.000 0.489*** 0.000
(0.063) (0.097) (0.041) (0.056)
CPLWORK 0.201*** 0.295*** 0.175*** 0.295***
(0.031) (0.055) (0.025) (0.039)
ZINC 0.004*** 0.006* 0.005*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002)
CARS -0.228*** -0.241*** -0.214*** -0.241***
(0.015) (0.034) (0.012) (0.023)
MG30YR 50.252*** 52.706*** 53.065*** 52.706***
(0.522) (1.400) (0.675) (1.091)
NGAINL2 1.992*** 2.224*** 2.461*** 2.224***
(0.089) (0.203) (0.082) (0.170)
SALEPERC 8.022*** 13.435*** 15.554*** 13.435***
(0.804) (1.431) (0.713) (1.173)
METRO 0.087*** 0.154*** 0.101*** 0.154***
(0.027) (0.035) (0.024) (0.029)
STATECA 1.099*** 0.780*** 0.903*** 0.780***
(0.083) (0.154) (0.075) (0.128)
 1.890*** 1.920*** 2.001*** 1.919***
(0.016) (0.052) (0.019) (0.039)
(CA) 1.629*** 1.835*** 1.809*** 1.836***
(0.026) (0.067) (0.027) (0.055)
Const -7.914*** -8.837*** -8.593*** -8.837***
(0.117) (0.346) (0.108) (0.249)
 -0.858** -0.858***
(0.346) (0.238)
F(6;n) rst step 1604.000*** 3543.300***
LL (log lik) -70810.776 -70941.684 -107602.699 -107794.920
n (# of obs.) 57,758 57,758 86,728 86,728
Note: The variable TAXRLF55 is measured in dollars.  is the parameter of the Weibull distribution measuring duration
dependence of the hazard rate. A separate parameter, (CA), is estimated for California households. Models (2,4,6,8) control
for measurement error in ZINC, using a two-step procedure. The second step of models (2,4,6,8) requires simulation of the
error term, and the models are estimated with 600 draws of the error term per observation. The standard errors for models
(5) and (6) are corrected for the two-step procedure using the approach suggested by Greene (2003, p.510).  is the correlation
between the error terms of the main equation (14) and the control function (15) in the two-step procedure. A t-test on H0:
 = 0 reveals whether ZINC is measured with error. F denotes the F-stat measuring the joint eect of the instruments on
ZINC in the rst step of the two-step procedure. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
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expenditure levels.
However, since model (1) is theoretically more correct than model (3)39, I choose model
(1) to discuss the eect of the selected factors on the hazard rate of duration. All estimated
eects are interpreted as semi-elasticities of the hazard rate with respect to the factors that
determine mobility (see equation (13)).
The tax savings has the predicted negative eect on mobility. Since the tax savings is
measured in dollars, the hazard rate decreases by about 3.6% for every $100 increase in the
tax savings. This results in about 20% decrease in the hazard rate for the median California
household.
More information is revealed by the estimates on the duration dependence of the hazard
rate. The eect of time on the hazard rate is measured by the estimate of the Weibull
distribution parameter , and is common for all households. When duration is Weibull
distributed, the hazard rate increases with time if  > 1, and the data consistently shows
that the hazard rate of duration increases over time (^ = 1:976)40; the longer a household
occupies a house, the higher the probability the household will relocate. It comes in support
of the hypothesis that, over time, as circumstances change, a household grows more dis-
satised with their current choice of house and location.
The more important for us result, however, is revealed through estimation of two separate
duration dependence parameters: one for households in California, ^(CA)= 1:947, and
one for households outside of California, ^ = 1:976. The hazard rate for California-based
households increases at the same rate41 as the hazard rate of households outside of California.
It appears that the eect of tax savings on the hazard rate is not propagated through
duration: if you compare two households with the same duration but dierent levels of tax
savings, the inuence of duration on their probability to relocate at that particular moment
is exactly the same for both households. In other words, we can reject the hypothesis that
because savings increase with duration, the duration dimension of the tax saving will have
any inuence on the probability to move. The only thing that appears to be important is
39Data on local school expenditures can be used to purge the eect of local spending from the variable AMTX. Using the
residuals from such a regression to estimate model (3), would make models (1) and (3) more comparable. The assembling of a
data set on local school expenditure is in progress.
40^ is signicantly dierent from 1 because it is more than three standard deviations from 1.
41Note that ^(CA)= 1:947 is only about 1.2 standard deviations away from ^ = 1:973.
26
the level of the tax relief: the eect of tax savings on mobility is stronger for higher levels
of tax savings no matter how much time it took for these tax savings to accumulate.
The justication for such an interpretation of this results comes from the fact that the
value of the tax savings depends both on the value of the house, and on the length of time
a household remains in their home. The two eects are separated by the inclusion of both
variables on the right hand side of the equation estimating the hazard rate. Then, the eect
of the variable TAXRLF55 would more precisely be interpreted as the shift in the hazard
rate from an increase in tax savings for a given duration. This is the eect of higher tax
savings on mobility due to higher value of the house. The eect of the duration component
of the tax savings on mobility is incorporated in the parameter .42
From the last two results it may appear that households in California are less mobile
than households outside of California. However, the estimate of the eect of the dummy
variable STATECA (Table 5, models 6 and 8) on mobility reveals exactly the opposite ef-
fect. California-based households are statistically signicantly more mobile than households
outside of California. This last result in no way contradicts the previous two results; the
propensity to move and the tax savings do not change the hazard rate over time, instead,
for any value of duration, they only act as shifters of the hazard rate.
The estimates of the coecients to the control variables have the predicted signs and
meaningful magnitudes. A few results deserve attention. First, the eect of the current
mortgage rate on mobility is very strong, but consistently positive and signicant. It appears
that mortgage rates indeed serve as a proxy for business cycle eects. The negative eect of
high mortgage rates on the propensity to buy a house is trumped by the prospects for low
unemployment rate and stable future incomes. Third, the variable NGAINL2 has a positive
and signicant eect on mobility. This shows that investment considerations are of high
importance for home owners, and that markets that oer higher capital gains will exhibit
higher rates of turnover.
42Because we explicitly control for unobserved heterogeneity in the model, the parameter  incorporates only the eects of
factors working towards a change in the propensity to move over time.
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Table 6. Robustness of the results to subsamples based on year of observation,
and based on location (controlling for measurement error in ZINC )
HHs with no child of school age Full sample
Baseline model Control function Baseline model Control function
Panel A: Subsample with observations for 1984-1987
TAXRLF55 -0.001763*** -0.001733*** -0.001434*** -0.001786***
(0.000434) (0.000197) (0.000090) (0.000167)
LL (log lik) -42,997 -42,868 -66,412 -65,377
n (# of obs.) 14,036 14,036 21,333 21,333
Panel B: Subsample with observations for 1988-1991
TAXRLF55 -0.000323*** -0.000310*** -0.000349*** -0.000320***
(0.000083 ) (0.000130) (0.000060) (0.000098)
LL -26,894 -26,642 -40,202 -40,336
n 19,904 19,904 29,860 29,860
Panel C: Subsample with observations for Californian households only
TAXRLF55 -0.000534*** -0.000561*** -0.000505*** -0.000548***
(0.000077) (0.000090) (0.000062) (0.000086)
LL -14,459 -14,485 -21,057 -21,102
n 10,477 10,477 15,236 15,236
All models
MAIN CONTROLS Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA dummies No No No No
Note: This table represents the sensitivity of the hazard rate to variation in the tax relief for subsamples of
the data. In Panel A only observations for the period 1984-1987 are included. On Panel C only observations for
California based households are included. The variable TAXRLF55 is measured in dollars. The control function
models control for measurement error in ZINC, using a two-step procedure. The second step of the control function
models requires simulation of the error term, and the models are estimated with 600 draws of the error term per
observation. The standard errors for these models are corrected for the two-step procedure using the approach
suggested by Greene (2003, p.510). ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
7 Robustness checks
The rst robustness check I perform is to split the sample in three by year of observation.
The resulting three subsamples include observations for the periods 1984-1987, 1988-1991,
and 1992-1994 respectively. The models are estimated only on the rst two subsamples
because the third subsample includes only censored observations. The results are presented
in Table 6, Panels A and B. The estimated magnitude of the estimated eect of tax relief
on mobility tends to vary over the years. This may be a result of unobserved local market
factors or unobserved business cycle factors.
A potential concern with our measure of tax relief is the large number of households (non-
Californian) for which tax relief takes a value of zero. I re-estimate the models from Table
5 using only observations for Californian households. The results are presented in Table 6,
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Panel C. The estimated magnitude of the estimated eect of the tax relief on the hazard
rate slightly decreases when we exclude households from controlling MSAs, which should be
expected.
The last subsampling allows for a better understanding on the types of households who's
mobility is aected by Proposition 13. Table 7 presents results on subsamples of households
based on the value of the dwelling the household occupies. The whole sample is divided into
four subsamples, each including 25% of the households, with dwellings of lowest value in the
rst subsample, and dwellings with highest value in the last subsample. Comparing Panels
A, B, C, and D it is clear that the mobility of households that occupy dwellings of lower
than median value has not been aected by the tax relief. Richer households tend to benet
to a larger extent from the tax savings induced by Proposition 13, by accumulating larger
tax savings.
7.1 Assessing the eects of Propositions 60 and 90
In this subsection I present results from models where the main variable of interest, TAXRLF55,
was replaced by the variables TAXRLF and TAXRLF*AGE55. I have two goals in doing
this: (1) redene the main variable of interest and check for robustness of the results in the
previous section; (2) investigate whether Propositions 60 and 90 indeed, as found in Ferreira
(2007), alleviate the negative eect of Proposition 13 on households in California with at
least one spouse of age 55 or older. I re-estimate the models of this and previous section and
the results are presented in Tables 8-10.
Tables 8 (including MSA dummies) and 9 (not including MSA dummies) reveal that the
negative eect of Proposition 13, on the mobility of households targeted by Propositions 60
and 90, has been eectively softened.
In addition to the main results presented in Tables 8 and 9, table 10 also reveals that
the main eect of Propositions 60 and 90 is observed among households occupying the most
expensive houses in California. This is in line with the fact that older households occupy
their houses longer than average and thus would tend to live in more expensive houses given
the incentives presented by Proposition 13.
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Table 7. Robustness of the results to subsamples based on housing value (con-
trolling for measurement error in ZINC )
HHs with no child of school age Full sample
Baseline model Control function Baseline model Control function
Panel A: Subsample with housing values below 1st quartile
TAXRLF55 -0.000548 -0.000254 0.000105 -0.001264
(0.000879) (0.001293) (0.000832) (0.001162)
LL (log lik) -14,775 -14,812 -20,951 -21,025
n (# of obs.) 15,096 15,096 21,493 21,493
Panel B: Subsample with housing values between 1st and 2nd quartiles
TAXRLF55 -0.000516 0.000195 -0.000317 0.000670
(0.000595 ) (0.000880) (0.000520) (0.000797)
LL -17,550 -17,637 -26,629 -26,779
n 14,569 14,569 21,659 21,659
Panel C: Subsample with housing values between 2nd and 3rd quartiles
TAXRLF55 -0.000880*** -0.000943*** -0.000999*** -0.001114***
(0.000221) (0.000350) (0.000186) (0.000292)
LL -19,067 -19,186 -29,506 -29,649
n 14,065 14,065 21,670 21,670
Panel D: Subsample with housing values between 3rd and 4th quartiles
TAXRLF55 -0.000299*** -0.000354*** -0.000299*** -0.000343***
(0.000069) (0.000106) (0.000056) (0.000089)
LL -17,604 -17,717 -27,909 -28,114
n 13,723 13,723 21,519 21,519
All models
MAIN CONTROLS Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA DUMMIES Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table represents the sensitivity of the hazard rate to variation in the tax relief for subsamples based
on house value. The observations in the main sample are sorted in ascending order by house value and separated
in four subsamples. The variable TAXRLF55 is measured in dollars. The control function models control for
measurement error in ZINC, using a two-step procedure. The second step of the control function models requires
simulation of the error term, and the models are estimated with 600 draws of the error term per observation. The
standard errors for these models are corrected for the two-step procedure using the approach suggested by Greene
(2003, p.510). ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
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Table 8. Hazard rate determinants: MSA controls; controlling for measurement error in ZINC
HHs with no child of school age Full sample
Baseline model Control function Baseline model Control function
TAXRLF -0.000547*** -0.000475*** -0.000464*** -0.000418***
(0.000123) (0.000131) (0.000097) (0.000101)
TAXRLF*AGE55 0.000184*** 0.000249*** 0.000174** 0.000245***
(0.000086) (0.000089) (0.000074) (0.000072)
AMTX -0.000 -0.000 0.000* 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DTCH1 -0.485*** -0.454*** -0.452*** -0.463***
(0.070) (0.070) (0.061) (0.059)
OLDH -0.031*** -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.026***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
ROOMPER 0.045*** 0.014 0.061*** -0.005
(0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011)
HOWNH 0.114*** -0.000 0.108*** -0.000
(0.031) (0.031) (0.025) (0.025)
AGE -0.072*** -0.068*** -0.074*** -0.069***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
GENDER 0.121*** 0.118*** 0.117*** 0.110***
(0.038) (0.039) (0.033) (0.033)
WHITE 0.291*** 0.586*** 0.247*** 0.547***
(0.091) (0.101) (0.069) (0.075)
MARR -0.009 -0.237*** -0.048 -0.237***
(0.050) (0.052) (0.042) (0.043)
CHILD3 0.422*** 0.446*** 0.546*** 0.453***
(0.094) (0.096) (0.086) (0.085)
CHILD6 0.331*** 0.154 0.397*** 0.162**
(0.114) (0.119) (0.067) (0.068)
CPLWORK 0.184*** 0.278*** 0.173*** 0.243***
(0.057) (0.074) (0.043) (0.053)
ZINC 0.004*** 0.007** 0.005*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
CARS -0.243*** -0.268*** -0.230*** -0.277***
(0.033) (0.041) (0.025) (0.031)
MG30YR 53.155*** 52.962*** 53.068*** 52.960***
(1.891) (2.020) (1.573) (1.708)
NGAINL2 3.889*** 2.741*** 3.433*** 2.744***
(0.277) (0.258) (0.221) (0.213)
SALEPERC 15.750*** 15.551*** 15.656*** 15.551***
(4.937) (5.075) (3.888) (4.027)
METRO 0.086* -0.071 0.072* -0.054
(0.050) (0.052) (0.042) (0.042)
MSA dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
 1.967*** 1.829*** 1.979*** 1.854***
(0.048) (0.047) (0.038) (0.038)
(CA) 2.004*** 1.932*** 2.071*** 1.952***
(0.073) (0.074) (0.064) (0.063)
Const -8.544*** -8.547458*** -8.609*** -8.479***
(0.375) (0.409) (0.297) (0.313)
 -0.867*** -0.878***
(0.282) (0.225)
F(6;n) rst step 2406.700*** 3379.400***
LL (log lik) -69361.691 -69618.135 -105542.312 -105897.660
n (# of obs.) 57,758 57,758 86,728 86,728
Note: See the Note to Table 9 on next page.
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Table 9. Hazard rate determinants: no MSA controls; controlling for measurement error in ZINC
HHs with no child of school age Full sample
Baseline model Control function Baseline model Control function
TAXRLF -0.000888*** -0.000967*** -0.000768*** -0.000857***
(0.000133) (0.000163) (0.000102) (0.000130)
TAXRLF*AGE55 0.000575*** 0.000613*** 0.000525*** 0.000563***
(0.000086) (0.000094) (0.000072) (0.000078)
AMTX -0.000 -0.413 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.067) (0.000) (0.000)
DTCH1 -0.432*** -0.413*** -0.379*** -0.388***
(0.069) (0.067) (0.058) (0.058)
OLDH -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.031*** -0.031***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
ROOMPER 0.061*** 0.054*** 0.080*** 0.062***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010)
HOWNH 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.106*** 0.102***
(0.032) (0.031) (0.025) (0.025)
AGE -0.074*** -0.072*** -0.074*** -0.074***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
GENDER 0.085** 0.107*** 0.074** 0.088***
(0.039) (0.038) (0.033) (0.032)
WHITE 0.406*** 0.630*** 0.392*** 0.674***
(0.089) (0.097) (0.067) (0.061)
MARR 0.042 -0.089* -0.033 -0.110**
(0.050) (0.052) (0.042) (0.045)
CHILD3 0.488*** 0.618*** 0.626*** 0.642***
(0.095) (0.097) (0.085) (0.086)
CHILD6 0.420*** 0.082 0.494*** 0.159**
(0.114) (0.123) (0.066) (0.071)
CPLWORK 0.209*** 0.211*** 0.181*** 0.122**
(0.057) (0.078) (0.043) (0.058)
ZINC 0.004*** 0.007* 0.004*** 0.008**
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003)
CARS -0.274*** -0.258*** -0.220*** -0.230***
(0.033) (0.047) (0.024) (0.038)
MG30YR 53.084*** 52.712*** 53.050*** 52.706***
(1.629) (2.560) (1.390) (2.250)
NGAINL2 2.698*** 2.260*** 2.561*** 2.247***
(0.205) (0.211) (0.168) (0.180)
SALEPERC 15.538*** 13.433*** 15.547*** 13.434***
(1.784) (1.753) (1.433) (1.405)
METRO 0.100** 0.105** 0.108*** 0.102***
(0.047) (0.046) (0.039) (0.038)
STATECA 0.986*** 0.826*** 0.863*** 0.808***
(0.182) (0.189) (0.151) (0.157)
 1.996*** 1.985*** 1.995*** 2.001***
(0.046) (0.072) (0.038) (0.063)
(CA) 1.845*** 1.917*** 1.861*** 1.916***
(0.067) (0.188) (0.058) (0.076)
Const -8.353*** -8.814*** -8.663*** -8.850***
(0.274) (0.433) (0.221) (0.359)
 -0.889*** -0.886***
(0.334) (0.292)
F(6;n) rst step 2454.700*** 3585.600***
LL (log lik) -70424.886 -70455.700 -107123.944 -107177.487
n (# of obs.) 57,758 57,758 86,728 86,728
Note: The variable TAXRLF is measured in dollars.  is the parameter of the Weibull distribution measuring duration
dependence of the hazard rate. A separate parameter, (CA), is estimated for California households. The models for which
the control function approach is used are estimated in the usual way as the models in Tables 4 and 5 (See the note to Table
5). ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
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Table 10. Robustness of the results to subsamples based on housing value (con-
trolling for measurement error in ZINC )
HHs with no child of school age Full sample
Baseline model Control function Baseline model Control function
Panel A: Subsample with housing values below 1st quartile
TAXRLF -0.000111 -0.000870 0.000522 -0.000221
(0.001478) (0.001409) (0.001380) (0.001322)
TAXRLF*AGE55 0.001150 0.001234 0.001145 0.001218
(0.001360) (0.001291) (0.001268) (0.001187)
LL (log lik) -14,773 -14,830 -20,896 -21,008
n (# of obs.) 15,096 15,096 21,493 21,493
Panel B: Subsample with housing values between 1st and 2nd quartiles
TAXRLF -0.000221 0.001070 0.000239 0.001394
(0.001112) (0.001095) (0.000916) (0.000956)
TAXRLF*AGE55 0.000705 0.001166 0.000696 0.000908
(0.001360) (0.001291) (0.000831) (0.000818)
LL -17,550 -17,628 -26,623 -26,751
n 14,569 14,569 21,659 21,659
Panel C: Subsample with housing values between 2nd and 3rd quartiles
TAXRLF -0.001804*** -0.001133*** -0.001860*** -0.001231***
(0.000453) (0.000462) (0.000360) (0.000369)
TAXRLF*AGE55 0.000220 0.000483 0.000334 0.000343
(0.000383) (0.000390) (0.000340) (0.000343)
LL -19,054 -19,189 -29,468 -29,644
n 14,065 14,065 21,670 21,670
Panel D: Subsample with housing values between 3rd and 4th quartiles
TAXRLF -0.000493*** -0.000556*** -0.001802*** -0.000474***
(0.000137) (0.000144) (0.000120) (0.000113)
TAXRLF*AGE55 0.000165* 0.000258*** -0.004829*** 0.000252***
(0.000096) (0.000098) (0.001063) (0.000082)
LL -17,598 -17,712 -28,180 -28,088
n 13,723 13,723 21,519 21,519
All models
MAIN CONTROLS Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA DUMMIES Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table represents the sensitivity of the hazard rate to variation in the tax relief for subsamples based on
house value. The observations in the main sample are sorted in ascending order by house value and separated in four
subsamples. The variable TAXRLF is measured in dollars. The control function models control for measurement
error in ZINC, using a two-step procedure. The second step of the control function models requires simulation
of the error term, and the models are estimated with 600 draws of the error term per observation. The standard
errors for these models are corrected for the two-step procedure using the approach suggested by Greene (2003,
p.510). ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
8 Conclusion
In this paper I estimate the eect of the property tax savings, induced by Proposition 13,
on the hazard rate of duration. To correctly quantify this eect I overcome a number of
identication issues typical of empirical models in Tiebout sorting. I nd that the hazard rate
of duration decreases with about 3.6% for each $100 increase in the tax savings. Furthermore,
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I nd that the hazard rate increases with duration and that the rate at which the hazard rate
increases with duration for households located in California is not statistically signicantly
dierent from the rate at which the hazard rate increases with duration for households
located outside of California (see Footnote 41 on p.26). It appears that the eect of tax
savings on the hazard rate is not propagated through duration, but only through the level of
the tax saving (which depends on the value of the house for a given duration). The data also
reveals that the negative eect of Proposition 13, on the mobility of households targeted
by Propositions 60 and 90, has been eectively softened. A more detailed analysis also
shows that the main eect of Propositions 13, 60, and 90 on household mobility has been
experienced by households that occupy more expensive dwellings; the mobility patterns of
households that experience low levels of tax relief are virtually unaected. Unlike in previous
studies, the data also demonstrates a higher propensity to move for California households.
This further conrms that the eect of Proposition 13 on mobility has been successfully
separated from the eects of other factors. My analysis gives one more conrmation that
households decisions to relocate are aected by local tax policy. It compliments the results
in Farnham and Sevak (2006) and Johnson and Walsh (2008) that households respond to
local tax incentives in their across-state relocation decisions, by showing that intra-metro
area moves are also aected by local tax policy.
Our understanding of the eect of the limit in increase of assessed value on mobility
can further be augmented by answering two additional questions: rst, how much of the
disincentive to relocate was capitalised in housing values; and, second, to what extent is
the negative eect of the tax savings on mobility exacerbated by a network eect, where
households willing to sell cannot do so, because they cannot nd an adequate house to move
to. Answering these questions is a subject of ongoing and future research.
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Chapter 2
Search, Heterogeneity, and Optimal Income Taxation
1 Introduction
The traditional incidence and welfare analysis of income taxation assumes perfect labor
markets. In recent years, however, widespread unemployment in Europe led researchers
to reconsider the implications of taxes on income within the framework of imperfect labor
markets43. On imperfect labor markets with search44, the search intensity choice of a worker
aects the matching opportunities of the rest of the workers and vacancies on the market: a
worker who searches more intensively makes it easier for vacancies to meet workers, and more
dicult for other workers to meet vacancies. In addition to this, a more productive worker
is a preferred partner for a searching vacancy. Because output is shared after the search
costs are sunk, the worker is not appropriately awarded for her search eorts. This leads
to an equilibrium where low productivity workers search too hard, while high productivity
workers do not search hard enough. As a result, the level of total production is sub-optimal.
This paper explores the role of the tax system to alleviate labor-market imperfections and to
optimally raise revenue. I nd that the optimal revenue-generating income tax schedule takes
into account the externalities imposed by searching agents on the rest of the participants on
the market. In particular, an agent who imposes a net positive externality is awarded by
sharing less of the burden of raising the required by the government revenue. In doing so,
the tax system restores the search intensity eorts at their socially optimal levels, and still
raises, the required for the production of the public good, revenue.
The literature on labor taxation has focused largely on tax reform, whereas I study the
optimal design of the tax system. While recognizing that a more progressive tax system
43Srensen (1997), Van Der Ploeg (1998)). Lockwood and Manning (1993), Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994), Holmlund
and Kolm (1995), Koskela and Vilmulen (1996), and Kolm (1997) study wage taxation in union bargaining models. Hoel
(1990), Pisauro (1991), Fuest and Huber (1997), Stiglitz (1999), and Kleven and Srensen (1999) in eciency wage models, and
Pissarides (1983, 1985, 1990), Millard and Mortensen (1996), Shi and Wen (1999) and Boone and Bovenberg (2002) in search
models. Pissarides (1998) and Srensen (1999) investigate wage taxation in all of these three types of models.
44Imperfect labor markets are modeled in three contexts: union bargaining models, eciency wage models, and search models.
The results of my analysis apply only to search models. As Pissarides (1998) shows, the eects of tax policy and tax reform
are dierent when studied in dierent contexts. For more details on search models see Diamond (1981, 1982a,b), Mortensen
(1982a,b), Pissarides (1984a,b), Hosios (1990), Burdett and Coles (1997), Burdett and Coles (1999), Mortensen and Pissarides
(1999), Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), Shimer and Smith (2000), Shimer and Smith (2001), Boone and Bovenberg (2002).
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may cut unemployment (Koskela and Vilmulen (1996), Pissarides (1998)), but may also
raise costs, the literature on taxation in imperfect labor markets has rarely discussed the
optimal trade-o between the costs and the benets of a more progressive tax system45. A
rare exception are Boone and Bovenberg (2002) who explore optimal income taxation in a
search model with homogeneous in productivity workers and vacancies. They show that the
externality controlling task of the tax system is independent from the revenue generating
task. Furthermore, they nd that the government can successfully distribute the tax burden
between rms and vacancies by taxing each worker(rm) at a rate proportional to the inverse
of its elasticity of supply/demand.
This optimal trade-o between equity and eciency, when designing a tax system, and
the characteristics of the optimal tax schedule are studied very extensively in the context
of perfect labor markets. In these models workers are assumed to dier in productive skill,
which is not observable to the government in the process of designing the optimal income tax
schedule46; the government designs the tax system using endogenous variables like income
and consumption. Because productivity is not observed, a worker can pretend to be of
dierent productivity type to lower her exposure to the tax. The self-selection constraints
that the government has to consider when designing the tax system, lead to a distortion
associated with redistributing any signicant amount of resources from the more able to the
less able. Mirrlees (1971) nds that there is a clear trade-o between eciency and equity,
and less support for the progressivity of the optimal income tax than predicted by Edgeworth
(1897)47. The main feature of the results is that the optimal tax schedule depends on the
distribution of skills within the population, and on the labor-consumption preferences of
the population, in such a complicated way that it is not possible to say in general whether
marginal tax rates should be higher for high-income, low-income or intermediate-income
groups48.
45For exceptions see Srensen (1999), and Boone and Bovenberg (2002)
46Mirrlees (1971), Sheshinski (1972), Cooter (1978), Phelps (1973), Feldstein (1973), Stiglitz (1982), Stiglitz (1987), and
Diamond (1998), among others.)
47Ignoring the incentive eects associated with taxation, Edgeworth tried to show that Utilitarianism implied progressivity:
if all individuals had the same utility of income functions, which exhibited diminishing marginal utility, then the decrease in
social welfare from taking a dollar away from a poor person was more than the decrease in social welfare from taking a dollar
away from a rich person.
48Mirrlees (1971) assumes a utility function U = log(x) + log(1   y), where x is consumption and y is labor supply, and
log-normal distribution of skills, and nds that the tax schedule looks close to linear. However, Sheshinski (1972) and Diamond
(1998) conclude that simulation results are sensitive to both the utility function and the family of distributions of skills assumed,
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Some of the strongest results that emerge from the literature on optimal income taxation
(See Cooter (1978)) are that: a worker with higher productive skill enjoys at least as high
utility as a person with low productive skill; the marginal tax rate on income is less than one;
the marginal tax rate on income is nil at the top and bottom of the skill distribution; schedule
is non-decreasing if higher consumption increases the value of leisure, and the marginal social
value of leisure decreases with ability 49; with respect to income levels there is a zone with
increasing marginal tax rates and a zone with decreasing marginal tax rates; the optimal tax
on any good is inversely proportional to its elasticity of demand50.
I build on the search literature and the literature on optimal income taxation on perfect
labor markets. In my model, workers and vacancies are heterogeneous in productive skill
and the government does not observe the productivity type of each agent when designing
the optimal income schedule. I can identify three main contributions to the literature on
imperfect labor markets.
First, I simplify the workhorse search model of Mortensen and Pissarides51 by formulating
a static, one-shot, game to facilitate interpretation of the results. I further simplify the
model by sidestepping the matching dimension, and focusing on the search externalities
that arise when workers and vacancies decide how intensively to search for partners. These
simplications make the derivations of the optimal tax system tractable, while the main
failure of labor markets, as described in the dynamic models, is still preserved.
Second, I expand on the model of Boone and Bovenberg (2002) by allowing workers and
agenscies to be heterogeneous in productivity type. This extension allows me to more deeply
study the externalities that arise on imperfect labor markets, some of which are missing on
markets with homogeneous in productivity workers. When a worker increases her intensity
of search she makes it more dicult for other workers to meet vacancies (the congestion
externality), and makes it easier for vacancies to meet workers (the thick-market externality).
When workers and vacancies are of dierent productivity types, however, the externalities
imposed by a searching worker are more involved, because by marginally increasing her
which opens up the possibilities of dierent conclusions.
49The rst assumption is a non-negative cross-partial derivative of utility with respect to leisure and consumption, and the
second assumption requires the tax system to distribute leisure in a way that osets unequal consumption.
50Ramsey (1927). In the case of optimal income taxes see Diamond (1998), and Boone and Bovenberg (2002).
51Again, see Mortensen (1982a,b), Pissarides (1984a,b), Mortensen and Pissarides (1999)
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intensity of search the worker also makes it more dicult for the vacancy to meet a worker
of the other type - a congestion externality if the worker is of low productivity type, and a
thick-market externality if the worker is of high productivity type.
Discussing optimal income taxes is also more meaningful when workers dier in produc-
tivity. Note that in a model with homogeneous in productivity type workers and rms,
Mortensen (1982), Hosios (1990) and Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) identify that equating
the agent's bargaining power to the elasticity of the matching function (her contribution to
the match), ensures ecient levels of search intensities on both sides of the market. However,
as demonstrated by Shimer and Smith (2001) and by the analysis in this paper, when workers
and rms are of ex-ante dierent productivity types, a generalized output sharing rule is not
always sucient to decentralize the social optimum. In the absence of externality-correcting
taxes the decentralized equilibrium is often inecient.
The assumption of heterogeneous in productivity type agents also allows me to study the
progressivity of the optimal income tax in the context of imperfect labor markets. I assume
that both supply and demand are elastic. When workers and vacancies dier in productive
skill, they search with dierent intensities, and the elasticities of their search eort, with
respect to the rewards of search, depend on the productive skill of the worker or vacancy.
The set of elasticities can tell us something about the progressivity of the tax system. In
my model the elasticity of supply/demand is lower for the workers/vacancies who search
more intensively in equilibrium. It turns out that in all equilibria higher productivity types
search more intensively, which suggests a progressive element in the optimal tax system if
the relative elasticities are inversely related to relative tax rates.
Third, I provide new intuition on the usefulness of optimal income taxation in alleviating
labor market imperfections in search models. By eciently allocating bargaining power, the
tax system acts as a substitute for complete contracts in protecting the optimal incentives
for search activities, while still raising revenue. More importantly, my analysis reveals how
the externality alleviating role of the tax system interacts with the revenue generating task of
the system. Boone and Bovenberg (2002), in their model with homogeneous in productivity
agents, nd that the externality controlling part of the tax can be separated from the revenue
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raising part of the tax. I study the optimal total tax rate, and show that the externality
controlling part of the tax rate is incorporated within the total tax rate, and is a natural
part of what determines the tax burden faced by a worker or vacancy of a given skill type.
Using Pigou income taxes, I nd that there are two main externalities that arise in my
model. The rst externality is related to the ability of an agent to create a match. A more
able agent is not rewarded fully for her contribution in creating the match, because the
bargaining process depends only on the predetermined bargaining power of each potential
partner. This sends a wrong signal to the worker on the return to search. Pigou taxes reward
agents who are more productive in creating a match and punishes agents who have too much
bargaining power (inconsistent with their ability to create a match).
The second externality that arises in the search process, is related to the eect of the
intensity of search on the distributions of productivity types on each side of the market.
When a worker of high type increases her intensity of search, she changes the distribution of
actively searching workers in a favorable way from the point of view of the vacancy, because
it increases the probability that the vacancy will meet a highly productive worker. The
opposite holds for workers of low type. Because search eorts are held up, high types under-
search and low types over-search in the private equilibrium, leading to suboptimal levels
of production. Pigou taxation restores the socially optimal levels of search intensity while
retaining a balanced budget.
Using linear income taxes to decentralize the social optimum and raise a predetermined
level of government revenue I show that the optimal tax system is composed of an element
that restores the socially optimal level of search intensities, and an element that raises the
required revenue. Since high productivity type imposes a net positive externality, and a low
productivity type imposes a net negative externality, the element that restores eciency on
the search market suggests a more regressive tax system.
The second major result that arises from optimal income taxation with positive govern-
ment revenue is that the relative tax rates are inversely related to the relative elasticities
of search activity. High productivity agents search more intensively in the social optimum,
and because the elasticity of search activity decreases in the equilibrium search intensity, the
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revenue raising element of the optimal tax suggests a progressive tax system.
Whether the optimal tax system on imperfect labor markets with search is actually pro-
gressive or regressive depends on the shape of the search intensity cost function (preferences),
and on the shape of the production function. The slower the search costs rise, and the larger
the dierence between the marginal contribution to a partnership by a high productivity
type and the marginal contribution to a partnership by a low productivity type, the more
dominant the regressive component will be.
2 Model
The economy is populated by workers and vacancies, which within their own group dier
in productive skill. For simplicity the productive skill types on each side of the market
are assumed to be two - high (H) and low (L) type. The exogenous number of workers in
the economy is lk, for k=H;L, and the exogenous number of vacancies is qm, for m=H;L.
Workers and vacancies have two options each period - either to participate on a labor market
and form bilateral partnerships to produce an exogenously determined ow output of ykm > 0,
or to not participate on the market and receive an income of zero. There is no restriction
to the production function of the partnership except the meaning we imply by the notion of
dierence in the productivity of the partnership, yHm > yLm.
In the beginning of each period workers search for vacancies at a self-selected search
intensity k2 [0; 1], which can be interpreted as the probability of search during the period.
By searching workers incur a search cost cw(k), which increases in their intensity of search.
To ensure that a worker selects a unique and positive search intensity in equilibrium, and that
this intensity is lower than unity, the cost function is assumed to be continuous and strictly
convex, with cw(0) = 0, c
0
w(0) = 0, and limk!1 c
0
w(k) = +1. Similarly, in the beginning of
each period vacancies search with an intensity vm, and incur a search cost c(vm) sharing the
same characteristics as the search cost function of workers.
A worker or vacancy who searches with positive intensity meets at most one potential
partner from the opposite side of the market within the period. The probability that a worker
meets a vacancy during the period is , and is positively related to the number of vacancies
40
on the market, and negatively related to the number of workers on the market. Similarly, the
probability that a vacancy meets a worker during the period is , and is negatively related
to the number of vacancies on the market, and positively related to the number of workers
on the market.
Once a worker meets a vacancy the parties perfectly observe the potential output of the
partnership and the shares each of them receives, and match for sure (since the outside
market alternative is absent). At this stage the search process ends and the matched pairs
produce until the end of the period, while the unmatched agents stay idle. At the end
of the period all matches dissolve. The game repeats the next period and workers choose
their strategies independently from the strategies played, and outcomes reached, in previous
periods.
2.1 The matching technology
The probabilities of encounter,  and , are determined by the matching technology, which
describes the relation between inputs, search and recruiting activity, and the output of the
matching process, the number of encounters and matches per period.
The assumption that each prospective worker meets prospective employers with probabil-
ity  implies that the expected aggregate number of unemployed workers who meet vacant
jobs within the period is equal to 
P
k klk. Similarly, the assumption that each vacancy
is visited by workers with probability , implies that the expected aggregate number of va-
cancies who are visited by unemployed workers within the period is equal to 
P
m vmqm.
In equilibrium the number of workers who meet vacancies must be equal to the number
of vacancies who meet workers within the period. The identity 
P
k klk = 
P
m vmqm re-
quires that the probabilities of encounter,  and , are functions of the measures of market
participation,
P
k klk and
P
m vmqm.
The problem is solved by introducing an encounter function N(
P
k klk;
P
m vmqm; ; ),
which measures the number of encounters/matches in the economy per period, and is such
that

P
k klk = N(
P
k klk;
P
m vmqm; ; ) = 
P
m vmqm:
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The encounter function N depends on the number of actively searching workers in the
economy,
P
k klk, the number of actively searching vacancies in the economy,
P
k klk, the
eectiveness of workers to create matches, , and the eectiveness of vacancies to create
matches, . The encounter function is increasing in each of its arguments and can take
various functional forms.
The functional form can be derived from genuine specications of the meeting process.
The most common functional form is the constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglass matching
function, N = A (
P
k klk)
 (
P
m vmqm)
1 , where 0 <  < 1 measures the eectiveness of
workers in creating matches, and 1    measures the eectiveness of vacancies in creating
matches. As Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) note, the meeting process that might generate
such an encounter function is not known. However, Pissarides (1996) and Blanchard and
Diamond (1989) provide empirical justication for a widely used Cobb-Douglass CRS en-
counter function with   0:5. Since a Cobb-Douglass matching function ts the data well,
I assume that the matching function is of the Cobb-Douglass form.
Key Assumption 1: The encounter function takes the form
N = A (
P
k klk)
 (
P
m vmqm)
1  with 0 <  < 1; and A  1
In my discrete setting this function models a matching probability that is less than unity;
an entering the market pair of potential partners increases the number of matches, M , by
less than one.
Denoting  =
P
m vmqm=
P
k klk to measure the market tightness, the ratio of actively
searching vacancies to actively searching workers on the market, we can express the proba-
bilities of encounter as:
 =
NP
k klk
= A
P
m vmqmP
k klk
1 
=M() (18)
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 =
NP
m vmqm
= A
P
m vmqmP
k klk
1 
=
P
m vmqmP
k klk
=M()=; (19)
where M is a function of .
One can then show that the elasticity of the matching function, with respect to the number
of actively searching vacancies on the market, is
1   = M
0()
M()
=
1

; (20)
and represents the eectiveness of vacancies in creating matches.
2.2 Output sharing
When a worker and a rm meet they immediately observe the level of joint output, and
match if each of them receives more from production than from their outside option. I
assume that any partnership produces positive output and that the outside option is zero,
so that all partners match when they meet.
The payo generated by the partnership is split by a Nash bargain. The parties bargain
over the total output ykm, with the worker receiving a wage wkm and the rm receiving a
prot km=ykm wkm, when the output is not taxed. Importantly, the sequence of decisions
is such that wages are negotiated after the search cost (and eorts) of the worker have been
sunk. The intensity of search of each partner has no role in the bargaining process. The
wage and prot that maximize the Nash bargaining function w kmkm (ykm   wkm)1  km are
wkm =  kmykm
km = (1   km)ykm; (21)
where  km 2 [0; 1] denotes k0s share of the total output ykm, and 1    km 2 [0; 1] denotes
the share of the vacancy. In the search-and-matching literature, the share parameter  km is
interpreted as the bargaining power of a worker of a skill type k in a partnership with a rm
of skill type m. Under individual rationality and a Nash Bargain a necessary and sucient
condition for a match to form is that ykm0.
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2.3 Sequence of events
The model is static and the sequence of events within a period is the following: In a stage
zero, the government sets a tax policy, with the zero stage non-existent in a laissez-fair
equilibrium. In the rst stage, workers and vacancies choose intensity of search. In the
second stage, potential partners meet and match. In the third stage, the matched agents
produce jointly, the unmatched agents do not produce and exit the market. In the fourth
stage, all matches formed in stage three dissolve.
2.4 Private expected utility functions
The probability that the rm encountered by a worker is of, say, high type is vHqH=
P
m qm.
The expected utility of a worker of type k within a period is
Uk =   cw(k) + k

M()

vHqHP
m vmqm
 kHykH +
vLqLP
m vmqm
 kLykL

+ (1 M())0

+ (1  k)0
Uk =   cw(k) + kM()E(m) kmykm; (22)
where E(m) denotes the expectation under the distribution of skill types among vacancies
in the economy. A worker chooses her intensity of search , which determines her cost of
searching, c() and the probability of being on the market, . Once on the market, the
worker meets a potential partner with a probability M(), and the type of the vacancy she
meets depends on the distribution of vacancy productivity types in the economy. If, with
probability 1   M(), the worker searches intensively, but does not meet a vacancy once
on the market, she does not produce and exits the market. If the worker searches with
itensity of zero, she receives no income. Since the outside-market option of the worker is
zero, whenever the worker encounters a potential partner she matches for sure. Note that
the utility function of the worker can be viewed as a classical separable utility function in
consumption and labor supplied. The rst part of the function describes the dis-utility of the
worker from giving up leisure, [ c(k)], and the second part of the function is her expected
consumption given how much labor she supplies to the market, [kM()E(m) kmykm].
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Similar logic applies in determining the expected utility of a vacancy. The proportion of
actively searching workers of high type, among all actively searching workers on the market,
is HlH=
P
k klk. The expected utility of a vacancy of type m within a period is
Vm =   c(vm)
+ vm

M()


HlHP
k klk
(1   Hm)yHm + LlLP
k klk
(1   Lm)yLm

+

1  M()


0

+ (1  vm)0
Vm =   c(vm) + vmM()

E(k)(1   km)ykm (23)
A vacancy meets a potential partner with a probability  = M()=, and the type of
worker she meets depends on the distribution of actively searching types of workers. Since
the outside-market option of the vacancy is zero, whenever the vacancy encounters a potential
partner she matches for sure.
3 Optimal search intensity and market ineciencies
In this section I derive the optimal search intensities in the social optimum and decentral-
ized equilibrium, which do not coincide in general due to uninternalized externalities in the
decentralized equilibrium.
3.1 Social Optimum
A social planner maximizes a laissez-fair Utilitarian welfare function - a sum of the expected
utilities of all participants in the economy per period, with respect to search intensities:
W = max
;v
(X
k
lkU
k +
X
m
qmV
m
)
s.th. k  0; vm  0:
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Using (18), (19), (22), and (23), and re-arranging gives52
W = max
;v
(X
k
lk[ cw(k)] +
X
m
qm[ c(vm)] +NE(k)E(m)ykm
)
s.th. k  0; vm  0
(24)
where NE(k)E(m)ykm represents the total social benet (TSB) from search (total output if
search intensities are at the socially optimal levels), and
P
k lk[ c(k)] +
P
m qm[ c(vm)]
represents the total social cost of search (TSC).
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions with respect to k are
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 c0w(k) +M()[E(m)ykm   (1  )E(k)E(m)ykm]  0 for k=H;L (25)
k  0 for k=H;L (26)  c0(k) +M()[E(m)ykm   (1  )E(k)E(m)ykm] k = 0 for k=H;L; (27)
where  and  denote the socially optimal search intensity of a worker and the socially
optimal market tightness. Except for some special production functions k>0, for k=H;L,
and equations (25) hold with a strict equality.
It is still possible, however, that low type54 is not hired in the social optimum, L = 0.
This is the case for some production functions. Consider the following example from Shimer
and Smith (2006): yHH = 1, yLL = , yLH = (1 + ), with a convex search cost function
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W = max
;v
(X
k
lk[ c(k) + kE(m) kmykm] +
X
m
qm[ c(vm) + vmE(k)(1   km)ykm]
)
:
Using the denitions of  and  from equations (18) and (19), one can rewrite the objective function as
W = max
;v
(X
k
lk[ cw(k)] +
X
m
qm[ c(vm)] + NP
k l
X
k
klkE(m) kmykm +
NP
m vq
X
m
vmqmE(k)(1   km)ykm
)
= max
;v
(X
k
lk[ c(k)] +
X
m
qm[ c(vm)] +NE(k)E(m) kmykm +NE(k)E(m)(1   km)ykm
)
:
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@W
@H
= lH( c0w(H)) +N
lHP
k l
E(k)E(m)ykm
+N

lHP
k l
E(m)yHm   lHP
k l
E(k)E(m)ykm

;
noting that @M=@H =  M(lH=
P
k l)(1  ).
54If a worker of a given type is not hired in the economy it must be the worker of low productive skill, because she generates
a lower level of expected output in the economy; for the same cost function, the marginal social benet of search intensity of
low type is always below the marginal social benet from increasing the intensity of high type.
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c(0) = c0(0) = 0. If  is suciently small it is not optimal for low type workers to search at all.
Proposition 1a. In the social optimum the search intensities of workers are determined
by
c0w(H) =M()[E(m)yHm   (1  )E(k)E(m)ykm]
c0w(L) =M()[E(m)yLm   (1  )E(k)E(m)ykm]
for

 Q 1;
H > 0; L > 0
; (28)
c0w(H) =M()[E(m)yHm   (1  )E(k)E(m)ykm]
c0w(0) M()[E(m)yLm   (1  )E(k)E(m)ykm]
for

 Q 1;
H > 0; L = 0
: (29)
To easily interpret equation (28) observe that the eective (socially optimal) wage of the
worker can be written as
E(m)ykm   (1  )E(k)E(m)ykm = E(k)E(m)ykm + E(m)ykm   E(k)E(m)ykm:
A worker of high type (low type) receives a share of the expected per match output propor-
tional to the average ability  of workers to create matches (E(k)E(m)ykm), plus the dierence
(extra income (or loss) for the economy) between the generated output from a partnership
with this type of worker, E(m)ykm, and the output generated by the average partnership in the
economy, E(k)E(m)ykm. Thus, a social planner considers both the ability of the worker to cre-
ate matches and the ability of the worker to favorably (or negatively) aect the distribution
of skills among actively searching workers.
Similarly one can derive the socially optimal search intensities of vacancies:
Proposition 1b. In the social optimum the search intensities of vacancies are determined
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by
c0(vH) =
M()

[E(k)ykH   E(k)E(m)ykm]
c0(vL) =
M()

[E(k)ykL   E(k)E(m)ykm]
for

 Q 1;
vH > 0; vL > 0
; (30)
c0(vH) =
M()

[E(k)ykH   E(k)E(m)ykm]
c0(0) 
M()

[E(k)ykL   E(k)E(m)ykm]
for

 Q 1;
vH > 0; vL = 0
: (31)
3.2 Decentralized equilibrium
A worker of type k maximizes her expected utility by choosing her privately optimal intensity
of search
max
k
Uk =   cw(k) + kM()E(m) kmykm
s.th. k  0;
(32)
where PC k = cw(k) is the personal cost of search, and PB k = kM()E(m) kmykm is the
personal benet from search.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions with respect to k are
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 c0w(~k) +M(~)E(m) kmykm  0
~k  0
( c0w(~k) +M(~)E(m) kmykm)~k = 0;
(33)
where ~k and ~ denote the privately optimal search intensities and market tightness, in the
decentralized equilibrium. The worker takes as given the observed on the market proba-
bility of meeting a vacancy, M(), and does not internalize the externality she imposes on
55The personal marginal benet of search with respect to search intensity is
PMBk = E(m) kmykm + k

M 0()
@
@k

E(m) kmykm
= E(m) kmykm:
The last equality follows from the assumed in the externalities literature notion, that in the competitive equilibrium a worker
perceives herself too small, compared to the whole economy, to be able to aect the probability of encounter for workers, M(),
by her decision to change her private intensity of search, @=@k=0.
48
all actively searching agents on the market by changing the equilibrium market tightness.
Furthermore, since a worker does not take into consideration how her behavior aects the
utility of a vacancy, in her decision to increase her intensity of search she does not consider
how she aects the distribution of productive skills of the actively searching workers in the
economy.
In the decentralized equilibrium all types of workers search with strictly positive intensi-
ties. To see this note that  LL 6=0 (even if  LH=0), and because we assumed that ykm>0, the
personal marginal benet from increasing the intensity of search is always positive. Given
that the marginal cost of search is zero only at search intensity of zero, c0(0)=0, then ~k>0.
Using Kuhn-Tucker condition (33) we can state the most important result for this section
Proposition 2a. In the decentralized equilibrium the search intensities of workers are de-
termined by
c0w(~H) =M(~)E(m) HmyHm
c0w(~L) =M(~)E(m) LmyLm
for

~ Q 1;
~H > 0; ~L > 0
: (34)
Similarly, the search intensities privately selected by vacancies are:
Proposition 2b. In the decentralized equilibrium the search intensities of vacancies are
determined by
c0(~vH) =
M(~)
~
E(k)(1   kH)ykH
c0(~vL) =
M(~)
~
E(k)(1   kL)ykL
for

~ Q 1;
~vH > 0; ~vL > 0
: (35)
In her decision how intensively to search, by not being able to aect the market encounter
rate, a worker employs her strictly dominant strategy (given the optimal strategies employed
by the rest of the workers and vacancies on the market), considering only her personal payo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from her strategy. This is unlike in the social optimum, where the social marginal benet of
the worker accounts for (at least part of) the surplus enjoyed by the vacancy, and the eect
of the worker's choice on the distribution of skill types among workers. Still it is not clear
whether a worker of a given type under or over-searches in the decentralized equilibrium as
this depends on a set of parameters.
Proposition 3. For a given, constant across types, output share,  , workers of high type are
favored in the economy and search more intensively than the less favored, low type workers,
in both the decentralized equilibrium and the social optimum.
4 Employing optimal income taxes to decentralize the social op-
timum
Because output shares are determined after search eorts are sunk, uninternalized exter-
nalities lead to discrepancies between the resulting social optimum and market equilibrium.
In the language of the search literature search eorts are held up. To directly discuss the
externalities that arise we need to be able to directly compare the rst order conditions
(28) to (34), and (29) to (35). This requires a knowledge on the resulting socially optimal
and decentralized equilibrium market tightness, M()QM(~), which is hardly possible. It is
convenient to describe externalities via Pigou taxation, which sets = ~, v=~v, and =~. In
what follows I rst discuss the feasibility of income taxes on imperfect labor markets with
heterogeneous in productivity workers and vacancies. Next, I use Pigou taxation to describe
the externalities that arise, assuming that the government can perfectly observe productivity
types and can use lump sum transfers as an instrument to return the generated revenue(or
to raise the needed net subsidy) from the Pigou tax. Last, I derive optimal income taxes
that serve two purposes: to decentralize the social optimum and raise a positive government
revenue. In this last part, I assume that the government does not observe productivity types
and can not use lump sum transfers.
In the income taxation literature a worker of type k (a vacancy of type m) varies her
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labor supply (labor demand) in response to the imposed income tax. Similarly, in this
model the rst order conditions that determine search intensities can be interpreted as the
labor supply (labor demand) functions of the worker (vacancy) in the market equilibrium
or social optimum. By choosing her intensity of search, the worker actually chooses what
proportion of her one unit of labor to supply to the market. The government (the social
planner) does not observe the labor supply or the contracted wage rate. Instead, the social
planner only observes the total income received from a worker and can only use total income
as a tax base.
Since a worker meets a low or a high type vacancy with certain probabilities, the payo
from a match is match-contingent and the government observes the income of a worker from
the match with the particular vacancy. Ideally we would expect the government to levy
match-based income taxes, and the worker to face some form of an expected tax, based on her
expected income. However, only expected after-tax income plays a role in private strategic
decisions, and in this version of the model, for simplicity I assume that the social planner
observes the expected income per period and uses expected income as a tax base. To see
that this is a plausible assumption observe rst that when high type worker does not pretend
to be a low type worker her expected income is HM()E(m)wHm. When (and if) a high type
worker pretends to be a low type worker her expected income is

L
E(m)wLm
E(m)wHm

M()E(m)wHm=
LM()E(m)wLm, searching with an intensity

L
E(m)wLm
E(m)wHm

to receive the expected income of
low type LM()E(m)wLm
56. The government then observes exactly two levels of expected
income for workers in the economy, HM()E(m)wHm and LM()E(m)wLm, and can design
the tax schedule to oer only two tax levels: wH , when the observed expected income is
HM()E(m)wHm, and 
w
L , when the observed expected income is LM()E(m)wLm.
The feasibility of income taxes on expected income also depends on the information set
shared by potential partners during the bargaining process: each side must perfectly observe
the tax rates used by the government on the match-based income of their partner. This
requires an employer to perfectly observe the search intensity of the worker she bargains
with. Delipalla and Keen (1992), as well as Boone and Bovenberg (2002), show that in
56A high type worker, for example, has to search less intensively than a low type worker to achieve the same expected income
as a low type worker.
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contrast to competitive labor markets, on imperfect labor markets ad valorem and specic
taxes lead to dierent allocative eects; tax incidence is shared only with an ad valorem tax
or with specic taxes on both workers and employers57. Using specic taxes, levied on each
side of the market, the worker and vacancy eectively bargain over the pre-tax output and
pay their taxes based on their pre-tax output shares, which are not altered by taxation. Thus
a bargaining employer need not observe the intensity of search of the worker to determine
the sharing rules. To see this, assume that in a partnership km the worker pays taxes at
a specic tax rate58 wk and the employer pays taxes at a specic tax rate 

m. Then the
after-tax wage, wkm, and after-tax prot, km, are
wkm =wkm   
w
k kM()wkm
kM()
= (1  wk )wkm
km =(ykm   wkm)  

mvm(M()=) (ykm   wkm)
vm(M()=)
=

ykm   wkm
1  wk

(1   m)
The parties bargain over the total after-tax output choosing an optimal after-tax wage rate:
max
wkm
( wkm)
 km

ykm   wkm
1  wk

(1   m)
1  km
: (36)
This problem however is equivalent to the one where the potential partners choose the pretax
wage rate to maximize the post-tax output
max
wkm
(wkm)
 km(ykm   wkm)1  km

(1  wk ) km(1   m)1  km

;
and as a result the pre-tax wages and prots do not depend on taxes59:
57To see this, consider a simple example where demand for labor is given by D = a1   b1w and supply of labor is given
by S = a2 + b2w. When wages are taxed the supply function is S = a2 + b2w(1   ). On competitive markets pre-tax wage
rate is determined where D = S, and increases in the tax rate, while on imperfect labor markets employers do not take into
consideration the search intensity of the worker when contracting the wage rate. As a result, on imperfect labor markets, the
worker bears the whole incidence from the specic tax on wages, and the employer bears the whole incidence from the specic
tax on prots.
58I assume linear tax functions for tractability in the derivation of the optimal income tax schedule, when the social planner
attempts to simultaneously control for externalities and raise positive government revenue.
59Though pretax wages and prots are not aected by taxation this is not true about the eective bargaining power of
each side. The eective bargaining power of the vacancy, for instance, is measured by the share of the post tax output,
(ykm   wk wkm   (ykm   wkm)m), received by the vacancy. Note that the revenue of the vacancy is (1    km)(1   m)ykm,
which after re-arrangement, ((1   km)(m   wk )wkm), leads to
[ykm   wk wkm   (ykm   wkm)m]

(1   km)(1  m)ykm
ykm   wk wkm   (ykm   wkm)m

:
The eective bargaining power of the vacancy is
h
(1  km)(1 m)ykm
ykm wk wkm (ykm wkm)m
i
and since wkm =  kmykm one can show that
the eective bargaining power of the vacancy decreases in m and increases in 
w
k . Higher tax on wages decreases the after-tax
52
wkm = kmykm
km =(1   km)ykm:
Since km is independent from the private behavior of the worker, the government observes
only two levels of the expected revenue to vacancies and chooses only two levels of the tax
rates for vacancies,  H and 

L .
In what follows I adopt the following notation: wk=E(m)wkm=E(m) kmykm is the expected
pre-tax wage rate of a worker of type k=H;L; zwk =kM()wk is the expected pre-tax income
of a worker of type k=H;L; m=E(k)km=E(k)(1    km)ykm is the expected pre-tax prot
rate of a vacancy of type m=H;L; and zm=vm
M()

m is the expected pre-tax revenue of a
vacancy of type m=H;L. One can, then, write the after tax expected utility of a worker of
type k as
Uk =   cw (k) + LS
+ k

M()

vHqHP
m vmqm
 kHykH +
vLqLP
m vmqm
 kLykL

(1  wk ) + (1 M())0

+ (1  k)0
Uk =   cw

zwk
M()wk

+ LS + (1  wk )zwk ; (37)
where LS is a lump sum transfer, when lump sum transfers are an available to the government
tax instrument.
The rst order condition of private optimization, with respect to worker's intensity of
search given the tax function, is
c0w(
~k) =M(
~)(1  wk )wk; (38)
where ~ and ~ denote the privately optimal search intensity and the decentralized equilib-
rium market tightness in the presence of income taxes. One can similarly derive the rst
wage of the worker and lowers her incentive to bargain. Correspondingly the incentive of a vacancy to bargain is lowered when
the tax on revenue is high.
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order conditions that determine the privately selected search intensities of vacancies in the
presence of taxes on expected revenue.
Lemma 4. In the presence of income taxes the decentralized equilibrium search intensi-
ties of workers and vacancies are determined by
c0w(
~k) =M(
~)(1  wk )wk
c0(~vm) =
M(~)
~
(1   m)m
for

~ Q 1;
~k > 0; ~vm > 0
; (39)
c0w(0) M(~)(1  wL )wL
c0(0) 
M(~)
~
(1   L)L
for

~ Q 1;
~L = 0; ~vL = 0
: (40)
4.1 Characterizing externalities through Pigou taxes
Suppose the government, perfectly observes search intensities and uses a Pigou tax on ex-
pected income of workers (wH ; 
w
L ), and a Pigou tax on expected revenue of vacancies (

H; 

L).
Lump sum transfers are an available to the government instrument and the collected revenue
(or raised subsidy) R, from the Pigou tax, is returned to all parties via a lump sum, LS:
R = (
P
k l)M()

HlHP
k l
wHwH +
LlLP
k l
wLwL +
vHqHP
m vq
 HH +
vLqLP
m vq
 LL

0 = R 
 X
k
lk +
X
m
qm
!
LS;
where (
P
k l)M()=N is the number of matches in the economy in equilibrium.
The after tax expected utility of a worker of type k is
Uk =  cw

zwk
M()wk

+ LS + (1  wk )zwk (41)
The lump sum, LS, enters the utility function of the worker additively and does not aect
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private behavior. The rst order condition of private optimization, with respect to intensity
of search, is
c0w(
~k) =M(
~)(1  wk )wk; (42)
where ~ and ~ denote the privately optimal search intensity and the decentralized equilibrium
market tightness in the presence of Pigou income taxes.
The Pigou income tax rate of a worker of type k sets ~= and ~= , and using (28), (29),
and (42), is determined by
(1  wk )E(m) kmykm = E(m)ykm   (1  )E(k)E(m)ykm: (43)
Analogously we can derive the conditions that determine optimal Pigou taxes on employers'
revenues
Proposition 5. The type specic Pigou income tax that decentralizes the socially optimal
search intensity of a worker of type k, and a vacancy of type m are
1  wk =
E(m)ykm   (1  )E(k)E(m)ykm
E(m) kmykm
1   m =
E(k)ykm   E(k)E(m)ykm
E(k)(1   km)ykm
for

~ =  Q 1;
~k = k > 0; ~vm = vm > 0
; (44)
wL =1
 L =1
for

~ =  Q 1;
~L = L = 0; ~vL = vL = 0
: (45)
Furthermore, for constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglass encounter function, the budget
is balanced, R=0.
See the proof to Proposition 5 in Appendix C. To interpret equations (44) and (45), consider
the Pigou tax on workers from equation (44). The tax rate: (1) decreases in the contribution
of the worker to the total output in the economy, E(m)ykm; increases in the bargaining power
of the worker, E(m) kmykm; and decreases in the ability of the worker to create matches, .
The tax rate controls for the ability of the worker to create matches, as well as for the abil-
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ity of the worker to change the distribution of worker productive skills among the actively
searching workers. Since a high type worker makes the partnership more productive, high
type worker is more desirable as a partner, and the latter aspect of the Pigou tax rate favors
workers of high type.
The intuition for the balanced government budget (see the proof to Proposition 5) is as
follows. With a CRS matching function, the output of the matches is exhausted exactly
in providing the correct marginal incentives to workers and vacancies; the tax policy only
redistributes income from agents with excessive bargaining power in the laissez fair market
equilibrium, to agents with not enough bargaining power. With decreasing returns to scale
agents are on average over-rewarded in the laissez fair market equilibrium, and Pigou taxation
generates positive revenue, which can be transfered back to workers and vacancies without
distorting their search incentives. With increasing returns to scale agents are on average
under-rewarded in the laissez fair market equilibrium, because the partnership output is not
enough to reward the searching parties for their eorts in creating a match. In this case
the government runs a decit, which can be nanced via the lump sum tax, LS, without
distorting incentives.
Note also that since low type agents are less desirable in the economy, the tax policy
forces them to subsidize the eorts of high type agents (g=0). With production functions
that generate minimal output when one of the partners is of low type, low type agents may
not be desirable in the economy at all. In this case all the income of low type agents is
extracted by the Pigou tax, wL =

L=1.
Hosios (1990) shows that when workers and vacancies are homogeneous in productive
skill, the hold up problem can be solved by equating the bargaining power of each side to
the elasticity of the matching function with respect to their intensity of search. Shimer
and Smith (2001) show that Hosios's condition can not be applied in a dynamic search-
and-matching model with heterogeneous in productivity workers. I conrm the Shimer and
Smith's (2001) result for the static model in this paper: externalities on imperfect labor
markets with heterogeneous in skill type workers and vacancies, can only be corrected by
taxation. To easily see this, rst note that we are particularly interested whether a type
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contingent output share specied as
 ji = 1   ij so that  HL = (1   LH)
 ii = 1   ii so that  HH =  LL = 1
2
(46)
can decentralize the social optimum. For a decentralized equilibrium to coincide with the
social equilibrium,  km must be chosen in such a way that the rst order conditions of the
laissez-fair private and social maximization problems coincide. However, when  LL =
1
2
and
yLL > 0, albeit very small, low type worker always searches with positive intensity in the
decentralized equilibrium, but is forced out of the market in the social optimum.
Proposition 6. When workers dier in productive skill, the social optimum can not be
always decentralized by carefully assigned bargaining power.
4.2 Optimal income taxes with positive government revenue
In this section I study the optimal income tax schedule, which simultaneously raises revenue
and decentralizes the socially optimal search intensities. For this purpose I introduce a
positive government revenue requirementR, which nances the production of a public good60.
The social planner chooses tax rates to maximize a Utilitarian welfare function
W =
(X
k
lkU
k +
X
m
qmV
m
)
;
a sum of the expected utilities of all participants in the economy per period.
Using (18), (19), (22), and (23), and re-arranging, we can write the welfare function as
W =
X
k
lk ( cw(k)) +
X
m
qm ( c(vm)) + (
P
k l)M()E(k)E(m)ykm;
where (
P
k l)M()=N is the number of matches in the economy in equilibrium.
Since the social planner does not observe the search intensity of each worker/vacancy, but
60The public good, even if valued by consumers, does not aect their choice on search intensity.
57
only observes income, the search intensities throughout this section must be substituted by
k=
zwk
M()wk
, and vm=
zm
M()

m
, where zwk and z

m are pretax income levels dened in Section 4,
and wk=E(m) kmykm, m=E(k)(1   km)ykm.
Throughout this section I will use the simple form of k and vm to reduce clutter, though
the reader must keep in mind that the social planner's optimization problem is set up in
terms of incomes, zwk and z

m, and not in terms of search intensities, k and vm, which are
unobservable by the social planner.
If the revenue requirement is R, output accrues to workers, employers and government
R  (Pk l)M()  HlHP
k l
wHwH +
LlLP
k l
wLwL +
vHqHP
m vq
 HH +
vLqLP
m vq
 LL

; (47)
where (
P
k l)M() =M is the total number of matches. Using equation (47), in its strict
equality form, the welfare function can be further expanded as
W =
X
k
lk ( cw(k)) +
X
m
qm ( c(vm))
+(
P
k l)M()

HlHP
k l
(1  wH)wH +
LlLP
k l
(1  wL )wL
+
vHqHP
m vq
(1   H)H +
vLqLP
m vq
(1   L)L

+R:
The social planner designs two separate tax rates, taking into account the eect of the
tax rates on the individual's choice of how intensively to search, and taking into account
the possible incentives of each worker/vacancy to pretend to be of a dierent productivity
type when she has to choose between two tax rates. The latter constraint is the incentive-
compatibility or self-selection constraint discussed in Stiglitz (1982, 1987). According to
Stiglitz the self-selection constraint that usually binds is the one of the high productivity
type.
Following Cooter (1978) and Diamond (1998), among others, who focus on characterizing
the optimal tax system, I assume that the dierent productivity types correctly self-select
into the designed for them tax structures; I assume that the self-selection constraint is not
binding. The social planner chooses the tax structures to maximizes the social welfare func-
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tion, subject to the government revenue constraint, and subject to the rst order conditions
for individual choice, equations (39).
Expanding , and substituting the rst order conditions (39) into the welfare function,
the maximization problem can be written as
max
wk ;

m
W =
X
k
lk ( cw(k)) +
X
m
qm ( c(vm))
+HlHc
0
w(H) + LlLc
0
w(L) + vHqHc
0
(vH) + vLqLc
0
(vL) +R
s.th. R  (Pk l)MPm vqP
k l

HlHP
k l
wHwH +
LlLP
k l
wLwL +
vHqHP
m vq
 HH +
vLqLP
m vq
 LL

;
(48)
and the Lagrangian is
max
wk ;

m
W =
X
k
lk ( cw(k)) +
X
m
qm ( c(vm))
+ HlHc
0
w(H) + LlLc
0
w(L) + vHqHc
0
(vH) + vLqLc
0
(vL) +R
+ 

(
P
k l)M()

HlHP
k l
wHwH +
LlLP
k l
wLwL +
vHqHP
m vq
 HH +
vLqLP
m vq
 LL

 R

;
(49)
where  is the marginal cost of public funds. Note that we do not impose non-negativity
constraints on optimal taxes because the full tax rates,  , incorporate a component that
raises revenue, and a component which controls for the uninternalized by the agent search
externalities. The rst order conditions to the maximization of the above Lagrangian are
derived in the proof to Proposition 8 (below) in Appendix C, and their nal forms are given
by equations (111)-(114).
Let "wk =
1=(zwk =M()wk)
c00w=c0w
denote the elasticity of search intensity (supply of labor) of a
worker of high type with respect to the rewards to search, and recall that the elasticity
(1  )= M 0()
M()
=1

measures the eectiveness of vacancies in generating matches.
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4.2.1 The marginal cost of public funds
To make the maximization problem tractable I make the following simplifying assumption:
Key Assumption 2: Assume that wHH
wH
= wLH
wL
(correspondingly HH
H
= HL
L
) and wHL
wH
= wLL
wL
(correspondingly LH
H
= LL
L
).
To easily interpret this assumption it is easier to use a derivative of Key Assumption 2:
wHH
wHL
= wLH
wLL
. The percentage increase in the wage of a high type worker from switching from
a match with a low type vacancy to a match with a high type vacancy is the same as the
percentage increase in the wage of a low type by doing the same thing. In other words,
switching to a match with a high type vacancy increases the income of a worker with a
specic, set percentage. The cost of making this assumption is signicantly outweighed by
the benets it brings in tractability of the proof of Proposition 7 and the subsequent results.
The next result characterizes the cost to raising public funds when the social planner
simultaneously controls for externalities.
Proposition 7. Under Key Assumption 2, when the social planner chooses optimal income
taxes to correct for the search externalities and raise a xed level of government revenue, R,
the marginal cost of funds is
 =
2666666666666666666664
1 
h
1 + E(m)
wLM
wL
"m
i24 E(k)wkwk "wk + E(k)E(m)km m"wk   E(k)wkE(k)"wk
 E(m)mE(k)"wk + E(k) KLL "wkE(m)m(1   m)
35
+
h
1 + E(m)
kL
L
"wk
i24 E(m)m m"m + E(k)E(m)wkmwk "m   E(k)wkE(m)"m
 E(m)mE(m)"m + E(m)wLmwL "mE(k)wk(1  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h
1 + E(m)
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wL
"m
i
+ E(m)m(1  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h
1 + E(m)
kL
L
"wk
i
3777777777777777777775
 1
(50)
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In a symmetric equilibrium where 61 and lH=qH, lL=qL,  is possibly less than 1 only
for income distributions where E(k)"
w
k is signicantly larger than E(k)
KL
L
"wk
62. In such income
distributions
HLL   1 is signicantly smaller than LLL   1, noting that the rst dierence
is positive and the second dierence is negative.
See the proof to Proposition 7 in Appendix C. The interpretation of this result is that
for income distributions where the penalty for signing with a low productivity type partner
is much stronger than the reward for signing with a high productivity type, a large portion
of the revenue that has to be generated by the government is generated by the Pigou tax; the
Pigou tax on low productivity types is larger than the Pigou subsidy to high productivity
types. In such cases not all of the government revenue is generated through distortionary
taxation.
This result only arises in a model with more than one productivity type, as it allows
for extreme income distributions. For example in Boone and Bovenberg (2002) the only
externality is generated via the discrepancy between the ability of a given agent to generate
the match, as measured by the elasticities  and , and his bargaining power in sharing the
joint income. In a world where +=1, the Pigou tax generated from the side of the market,
that has more market power than its ability to generate a match, exactly compensates the
other side of the market, whose incentives are distorted downwards without the Pigou tax.
The other important observations that can be made based on equation (50) are as follows.
The marginal cost of public funds depends on both the government revenue requirement,
through the average tax burden  , and the sensitivity of private behavior with respect to the
rewards to search, through the average level of elasticity of demand and supply of labor. In
particular, the marginal cost of public funds is increasing in the average tax burden and also
increasing in the average of the demand and supply elasticities. Intuitively, labor market
behavior is more sensitive to taxation when elasticities are large.
61This assumption is most likely not important as Boone and Bovenberg (2002) show that in a model with only one produc-
tivity type, the sign of (  1) does not depend on on the ratio =, and this result likely carries over to my model.
62In particular one can show that  could possibly be lower than one if approximately the following inequality holds:
"wL + "
w
H   E(k)"wk
"wL + "
w
H   E(k) KLL "
w
k
 (1  E(m)m); (51)
where both the numerator and denominator are positive.
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The marginal cost of public funds is unity i both demand and supply of labor are inelastic,
"wk = 0 and "

m = 0. In this case revenue generating taxation does not distort incentives. It
is not possible to say whether the marginal cost of funds approaches zero if the government
revenue requirement, R, approaches zero, by just considering equation (50). The equilibrium
tax rates are the rates that generate the government revenue. However, these rates are
dierent from the equilibrium tax rates in an economy where the search for partners does
not generate externalities. If the government revenue requirement is zero, the tax rates only
control for the externalities, and balance the government budget if the matching function,
M, is of constant returns to scale (see the proof to Proposition 5 in Appendix C). However,
it is not clear whether pure externality-controlling taxes set the marginal cost of funds to
unity, when the matching function is not characterized by constant returns to scale.
If demand elasticity of one of the sides of the market is innite, say "m=1, as it would
be with free entry of vacancies, then demand elasticity does not appear explicitly in the
marginal cost of funds function, . Intuitively it must be that income taxes are not distorting
employers' behavior. This is only possible if the revenue generating taxes for employers are
zero when "m=1, and revenue is raised only by taxing workers. The externality correcting
taxes for employers, however, must still be in eect so that employers face the correct search
incentives.
4.2.2 The optimal income tax structure
In this subsection I discuss the characteristics of the optimal income tax structure when the
government is raising revenue and is simultaneously correcting for search externalities. The
exact expressions for each tax rate are too complex to reveal any intuitions, however, the
rst order conditions to problem (49) reveal enough information to discuss the main charac-
teristics of the optimal tax system. The rst result is in line with Cooter (1984), and states
that an agent never chooses a search intensity such that more than her marginal income is
taxed away.
Proposition 8. The optimal marginal income tax rate is weakly lower than unity, 1.
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This result follows immediately from the rst order conditions determining search inten-
sity in the presence of income taxes, (39) and (40). In an income interval where  > 1, an
increase in search intensity leads to a decrease in the after-tax income. No one will choose
their search intensity in this interval. By conditions (39) and (40), and the denition of the
search cost function, the worst one can do is not search at all.
The second result shows that the optimal income tax system supports more actively
searching agents of high productivity type and a less actively searching agents of low pro-
ductivity type.
Proposition 9. In a symmetric equilibrium where    and lH = qH, lL = qL, the opti-
mal income tax system is such that, in the optimum, high type worker/vacancy searches with
higher intensity than low type worker/vacancy.
See the proof to Proposition 9 in Appendix C. The result in Proposition 9 is in line with
the literature on optimal income taxation, where the labor market is not explicitly modeled,
however, it is also in line with our results on the externalities imposed in the economy by
a high type agent, as discussed in Section 4.1. The self selection constraint, and the fact
that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labor is lower for the more
productive individual, generate an optimal tax schedule where a more productive worker
supplies labor more intensively and enjoys larger consumption (see Stiglitz (1987)). Our
model further suggests that on imperfect labor markets the search intensity of the more
productive worker is subsidized to reach the socially ecient level, which, as we know from
Section 3.1, is larger for the more productive worker.
Lemma 10High type worker/vacancy receives a larger utility than a low type worker/vacancy
in the presence of income taxes.
See the proof to Lemma 10 in Appendix C.
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The next result is in support of the Ramsey (1927) rule, that a more elastic behavior
should be taxed at a lower rate. In our model two comparisons can be made on how tax
rates associate with elasticities. The rst one relates the relative tax rates, faced by a high
type worker and a low type worker, to their relative elasticities. The second one relates
the relative tax rates on supply and demand to their relative elasticities. In our model
the relationship between relative tax rates and relative elasticities is not as exact as in
Ramsey (1927), because the tax rates also incorporate a term that controls for externalities.
However, the optimal marginal tax rate at some income level depends on the elasticity of
supply/demand at this income level (even if the skill level is not observed by the social
planner), since this is important for marginal distortions (see also Diamond (1998)). The
rst order conditions to the social planner's problem reveal that (Proposition 11i), when the
relative elasticity of supply of a high type worker increases, the relative marginal tax rate of
high type worker decreases.
Proposition 11 (below) also reveals that the optimal marginal tax schedule is such that
the tax burden is born by the side of the market whose labor market participation is less
elastic; when the elasticity of supply increases relative to the elasticity of demand, a larger
portion of the tax burden is allocated to the demand side. Furthermore, when demand for
labor is perfectly elastic, the whole burden is born by the supply side (see Proposition 8)63.
This is in contrast to the celebrated production eciency result of Diamond and Mirrlees
(1971) that the entire tax burden should be put on the supply side of the market. However,
it is in support of the ndings of Boone and Bovenberg (2002), that on imperfect labor
markets with homogeneous in productivity agents, the relative elasticities of demand and
supply of labor are inversely related to the relative tax rates on supply and demand.
Proposition 11. The optimal income tax system is such that in the optimum
63Such would be the case with free entry of vacancies.
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i) @
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wL
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
< 0 (52)
ii) @

w
 

= @

"w
"

< 0; (53)
where w,  , "w, and " are the tax rates on labor income and prot and the elastici-
ties of labor market participation, when the distributions of productivity types on each side
of the market are collapsed to a constant64.
See the proof to Proposition 11 in Appendix C. In general the elasticity of supply/demand
may be decreasing or increasing in search intensity. This depends on the third derivative of
the cost of search intensity with respect to search intensity. The form of the cost function
aects the progressivity of the tax system, as it relates to the rst part of Proposition 11.
The last two results discuss the externality-correcting components of the tax system. As
described in Proposition 5, there are two main uninternalized channels through which the
worker's choice on intensity of search aects vacancies: the rst is the eectiveness of the
worker in favorably altering the distribution of productivity types of workers, faced by a
vacancy; and, the second is the eectiveness of workers in creating matches as measured by
the elasticity of the matching function, .
Proposition 12. The optimal income tax system is characterized by
i) @

wH
wL

= @

E(m)Hm
E(m)Lm

< 0 (54)
ii) @

w
 

= @() < 0 (55)
See the proof to Proposition 12 in Appendix C. Because more productive workers change
64To determine the rule under which the tax burden is allocated to each side of the market we need not consider productivity
types, but only dierentiate between workers and employers.
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the distribution of productive skill among workers in a favorable for vacancies direction, the
externality correcting part of the optimal tax rates suggests a more regressive tax system
(as also suggested by Proposition 5). Whether the tax system is actually progressive or
regressive depends on the shape of the search intensity cost function (preferences), and on
the shape of the production function.
Proposition 12 also suggests that the more eective is a given side of the market in creating
matches, the more encouraged this side should be to participate. This result is in line with
Boone and Bovenberg (2002) and suggests that part of the tax should work to eliminate the
disparity between the bargaining power of an agent and her ability to create a match.
5 Conclusion
This paper develops a static model of search, where workers and vacancies of dierent pro-
ductivity types search and match to produce. In the process of search workers and vacancies
do not consider all the eects from their search activity. This leads to inecient levels of
the search intensities, and in particular, markets on which in equilibrium low productivity
agents are over-represented and high productivity agents are under-represented. I show that
optimal income taxes can be employed to correct for the arising ineciencies in search and
at he same time raise a positive government revenue. The optimal income tax schedule
is composed of an externality controlling element and a revenue raising element. These
elements usually work in opposite directions, making it dicult to determine the optimal
progressivity of the optimal income tax system. To complete the analysis, a study on the
eects of the optimal income tax schedule on equilibrium market tightness is necessary. This
will shed more light on equilibrium unemployment levels, and is considered as a next step
in the analysis.
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Chapter 3
Vertical Mergers and Vertical Exclusive Contracts on Two-sided Markets,
The Case of the Credit Card Industry
1 Introduction
A well known result in the literature on two-sided markets is that, due to network exter-
nalities, a `platform'65 that facilitates the transactions between two sides of the market, can
increase the volume of transactions by charging more to one of the sides of the market, and
proportionally less to the other side. The business model widely used by credit card providers
is to impose almost zero per transaction fees on cardholders, while charge the merchant a
positive per transaction fee, called a `discount' fee. The choice of a merchant on which
cards to accept aects her prot margins and demand for the retail good she sells. This is
especially true when the retail market for the good sold by the merchant is competitive. In
most retail sub-industries competing retailers accept all credit cards carried by consumers.
However in some retail sub-industries competing merchants signed exclusive contracts with
competing credit card service providers. For example Costco signed an exclusive contract
for credit card service provision with AmericanExpress (AMEX), while Sam's Club signed
an exclusive contract with Discover. This paper studies the motivations of merchants to
sign such exclusive contracts. The analysis shows that when merchants compete by selling a
dierentiated product on the retail market: (1) each merchant signing an exclusive contract
with a dierent credit card provider increases the dierentiation on the downstream retail
market; (2) the upstream credit card providers can not be convinced to sign such exclusive
contracts if the merchants can not credibly threat to expand into the credit card industry;
(3) merchants who sell ex-ante less dierentiated products benet the most from such exclu-
sive contracts, and so it is most likely to observe such exclusive contracts in industries where
ex-ante merchants are little dierentiated; and, (4) the sign of the welfare eect of signing
such exclusive contracts, compared to an outcome where competing merchants accept the
65`Platform' is the widely used in the literature of two-sided markets label for a for-prot or not-for-prot entity that courts
huge number of members from each side of a market to enhance their ability to match.
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cards of all competing credit card providers, is not clear.
The industry in focus in this paper is the retail sub-industry of Costco and Sam's club,
where each retailer signed an exclusive contract with a separate credit card provider; the
credit card provider who serves the customers of Costco does not serve the customers of Sam's
Club. Customers, in turn, are perfectly aware of which credit card provider is adopted by
each competing retailer before they decide which merchant to adopt.
The main contributions of this paper are that: (1) it introduces competition on the
upstream, credit cards market; (2) it studies the motivations of retailers to sign exclusive
vertical contracts or vertically integrate with upstream credit card providers; and, (3) it is
one of the rst papers to study vertical integration on two-sided markets.
Two-sided markets and the organization of credit card payment systems. Roughly
dened66 two-sided (or multiple-sided) markets are markets on which one or several plat-
forms enable interactions between two (or multiple) groups of users, and design the structure
of the access fees to attract each side of the market to the platform fast, and in large num-
bers. Examples of two-sided markets readily come to mind: operating systems, with the two
sides being consumers and developers; video game consoles - gamers and game developers;
credit card associations - buyers and sellers of goods and services; portals, TV networks,
newspapers - readers/watchers and advertisers, etc.
The theory of two-sided markets is closely related to the theories of network externalities
and multi-product pricing. From the former it borrows the notion that there are non-
internalized externalities between end-users, and from the later the focus on price structure.
Usually one of the sides in a two-sided market imposes a greater externality on the other
side than vice-versa. The platform uses specic price structure to `steer' the side of the
market that produces larger externalities by subsidizing it, while making prot on the other
66A good concise denition of a two-sided market is given by Rochet and Tirole (2004a):
A market is two-sided if the platform can aect the volume of transactions by charging more to one side of the
market and reducing the price paid by the other side by an equal amount.
More formally, a necessary (but not sucient condition) for a market to be two-sided is the failure of the Coase Theorem
(Coase (1960)); transaction costs do not allow cardholders and merchants to internalize the externalities they impose on each
other by signing with the platform. The platform designs its price structure to maximize the volume of transaction and
internalize the arising externalities.
An example when Coase theorem fails but the market is one-sided, is a market with asymmetric information.
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side by internalizing the externality that the former side imposes on the latter. The choice
of a business model is key to the success of a platform, and receives much corporate and
public policy attention. The price structure aects prots and economic eciency as well.
The market for credit card transactions is served by two types of institutions: for-prot
enterprises and not-for-prot associations of banks. For-prot enterprises as AMEX and Dis-
cover serve both consumers and merchants directly. Not-for-prot associations as Visa and
Master card, are associations of many banks, where some of the banks within the association,
called issuers, specialize in serving consumers, while other banks, called acquirers, specialize
in serving merchants; the not-for-prot association only governs the interconnection between
its members67.
Consider a transaction between a merchant and a consumer facilitated by a not-for-prot
association. Whenever a consumer uses a credit card as a payment method in merchant's
store, the merchant is charged a 'discount' fee m by the acquirer bank that represents the
merchant, and the consumer is charged a per-transaction fee h by the issuer bank that
represents the consumer/cardholder. As an internal rule accepted by all member banks
within the association, for each transaction the acquirer of the merchant is required to send
a special fee a, called an `interchange fee', to the issuer of the cardholder. If each bank
faces a per-transaction cost of c in serving her customer, and if acquirers market is perfectly
competitive, so that acquirers make no prots, while the issuers market is oligopolistic, so
that issuers make a symmetric prot of , the merchant discount and the cardholder fee are
respectively m = c+ a and h = c  a+ . For more clarity see Figure 1.
The association collectively determines only the interchange fee. Taking the interchange
fee as given, the member banks on each side of the market compete with each other for
business and set their fees non-cooperatively. Higher interchange fee lowers the cardholder
fee and allows issuers to attract more cardholders to the platform. A higher interchange
fee, however, also increases the discount fee and the resistance of merchants in accepting the
credit card provided by the particular association.
67Visa and Master Card are systems owned jointly by their member banks and overseen by an elected board. Neither system
sets fees for card-holders and merchants. Member banks cooperate in areas that generate eciencies, such as the operation of
the vast computer networks used for processing transactions, and limiting fraud. In all other cases banks compete with one
another.
69
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Figure 2: Flow of payments within an association
Credit card acceptance decisions. Card acceptance is associated with technological
benets enjoyed by both merchants and consumers. In particular, the consumer considers a
card only if the benet she enjoys from using it, bB, exceeds the fee she pays for the transac-
tion, h. A merchant considers a card only if the benet she enjoys from using it, bm, exceeds
the discount fee she pays for the transaction, m.
Consumers and merchants, however, accept credit cards strategically. When platforms
compete to serve cardholders and merchants, consumers may not adopt a card if the net
benet from using it, bB   h, is lower than the net benet from using the card of the
competing association. Furthermore, consumers may not adopt a card which is not accepted
by a signicant number of merchants. Correspondingly, when consumers carry more than
one card, a merchant is more resistant and selective in her decision to adopt credit cards.
Since cardholders enjoy benets from using a credit card over other payment methods,
they also take into account which cards are accepted by competing merchants before they
decide which merchant to adopt. Card acceptance, therefore, is also strategically important
for merchants when they compete for demand for the retail good.
The acceptance decision of a merchant has been an object of interest starting with Baxter
(1983), who assumes that merchants and consumers do not act strategically and merchants
accept a card as long as their technological benet from using it exceeds the fee they have
to pay for the transaction, bm m. However, studies after Baxter (Wright (2001), Wright
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(2003a,b), Rochet and Tirole (2002), Chakravorti and To (2007), Rochet and Tirole (2008))
take into consideration the strategic decisions of a merchant and show that Baxter over-
states the level of resistance projected by the merchant. In these models the credit card
provision market is monopolized, and the merchant accepts a credit card as long as the dis-
count fee is lower than the marginal convenience benet of the merchant, plus the expected
conditional convenience benet of cardholders (Rochet and Tirole (2002), Wright (2001),
Wright(2003a,b)). In essence, in an economy with a competitive retail market and monop-
olized credit card provision market, the credit card network chooses the discount fee at its
highest acceptable by the merchant level, and appropriates all the surplus generated by the
convenience benets from using a card enjoyed by cardholders and merchants.
The models of Rochet and Tirole (2002) and Wright (2001, 2003a,b) however do not
discuss the strategic acceptance decisions of competing merchants when the market for credit
card services is also competitive. On such markets the consumers of the retail good are of
three types. The rst type of consumers carries both cards but has at least a weak preference
over cards. If a certain merchant does not accept their preferred card such consumers still
prefer to use the second card to an alternative method of payment with that particular
merchant. The second type of consumers carry only one card and use the alternative method
of payment when a certain merchant does not accept the card they carry. The third group
of consumers prefers to use the alternative method of payment to any of the cards available
in the economy. In this paper I argue that by signing exclusive contracts with separate
credit card providers competing merchants can increase their prots over an outcome where
each merchant accepts all available on the market credit cards. Exclusive contracts not only
decrease the costs of accepting credit cards to each merchant but also increase the perceived
by consumers ex-post dierentiation between competing merchants. Specically cardholders
can not use their preferred method of payment with each of the merchants. Such exclusive
contracts, however, are only achievable when a merchant can credibly threat to expand into
the credit card industry.
In what follows I rst introduce the main model and assumptions, and then I study a
benchmark outcome where merchants accept all available on the market credit cards. In
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the next step I show that under certain conditions one of the merchants can protably
deviate by expanding into the credit card industry. It is, then, protable for the second
merchant to counteract by expanding into the card industry herself. Merchants, then, can
protably convince incumbent credit card networks to sign exclusive contracts such that each
merchant is only served by one of the networks and this network is not serving the competing
merchant. I nish the analysis with a discussion on the welfare eects of exclusive contracts,
a discussion on the robustness of the results to some of the assumptions in the main model,
and a discussion on the relationship of the main results to the classic literature on vertical
integration on one-sided markets.
All superscripts, in what follows, denote a credit card provider, and all subscripts denote
a player (M-merchant, B-buyer).
2 Main model and assumptions
In the economy two merchants sell dierentiated products on the downstream retail market
and compete for customers by non-cooperatively setting their retail prices and choosing the
cards of which platforms to accept. The upstream credit card market is served by two
not-for-prot associations who compete to serve merchants and cardholders. Cardholders
observe the vector of retail prices, the vector of cardholder fees, and the vector of merchants'
credit card acceptance strategies to decide which merchant and which credit card platform
to favor. The modeling of the upstream market is simplied by showing that under fairly
reasonable assumptions the interests of the upstream and downstream market are misaligned.
I focus on the incentives of retailers to sign exclusive contracts, and develop the main model
from the point of view of the competing merchants who choose card acceptance strategies
to maximize prots on the downstream market.
The framework of the model is in the lines of Rochet and Tirole (2002) who study the
behavior of competing merchants as it relates to the optimal setting of the interchange fee
by a monopolist incumbent platform. I extend the model by introducing competition on the
upstream market as well as exclusive contracts as a possible option in the strategy set of
each merchant. The rest of the section discusses the main assumptions of the model.
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The `upstream' (provider of input) market is served by two incumbent not-for-prot68,
credit card service providers, PLk, for k=1; 2. For brevity I refer to credit card providers as
networks, platforms, systems or associations.
The not-for-prot associations Visa and Master card have designed a system of bylaws to
govern the interconnection between their members:
 Interchange fee. The acquire transfers a collectively determined per-transaction fee a
to the issuer.
 Honor-all-cards(HAC) rule. Aliated merchants must accept any card of any issuing
member.
 No-surcharge rule. Merchants are not allowed to overcharge consumers who pay with a
card.
In a class action initiated by WalMart (and involving more than ve million U.S. mer-
chants) the Honor-all-cards rule has been attacked on the grounds that the credit and debit
card markets are separate markets and that the associations use their market power in the
credit card market to monopolize the debit card market. Visa and Master Card have agreed
to eliminate their HAC rules, however merchants are still not allowed to surcharge consumers
who choose credit cards over cash as a method of payment. Throughout the model I assume
that any payment card association prohibits merchants from overcharging customers paying
with cards, but allow the merchants to view the credit card market and the debit card mar-
kets as two separate markets. For example Costco and Sam's Club do not accept Visa credit
cards, but accept Visa debit cards.
Once the interchange fee is set collectively, the member banks compete with one another
for customers. For example, individual members set their own interest rates and fees, es-
tablish their own levels of service, and provide competing innovative oerings. Competition
to serve card-holders and merchants is extremely vigorous for two reasons: rst, because all
members support the system, it is costless for a bank to enter a system either as a card issuer
68This assumption is reasonable because: (1) 82% of the credit cards market is covered by the not-for-prot associations,
VISA and Master Card69; (2) the main focus of the paper is on merchant's acceptance decision and not-for-prot associations
impose, in general, lower discounts on merchants, which emphasizes the results; (3) though a for-prot enterprise does not
explicitly determine an interchange fee, it implicitly makes prot on one side of the market and subsidizes the other side.
73
or merchant acquirer; and, second, consumers and merchants alike can easily switch among
the players, changing banks and even systems, to take advantage of pricing and feature
changes.
Following Rochet and Tirole (2002) I make two simplifying assumptions. First, I assume
that acquirers' market is highly competitive, while the issuers have some market power (the
issuing side is not perfectly competitive): the acquirers' market involves little dierentiation
and low search cost, while the issuing side may have some market power due to innovation,
search costs or reputation; further, as noted by Schmalensee (2002), if the issuers' side was
perfectly competitive, issuers would have no preference over the interchange fee, and it was
going to be indeterminate. I further assume that issuers are not in the acquiring business:
because of the competitiveness of the acquiring business, issuers are indierent between
entering the business and staying out, at the chosen by them interchange fee; furthermore,
issuers would not benet from an interchange fee that creates a strict preference for them to
enter the acquirers business.
Second, I assume that customers have a xed volume of transactions with the merchant
(demand for the retail good is inelastic), normalized to one transaction. I further assume
that the good a consumer purchases is a necessity, so that each consumer purchases one unit
of the good and decides upon a payment method. The absence of uncertainty makes the
issuer and customer indierent between a xed yearly fee and a per-transaction customer
fee. Though a consumer purchases the marketed good with certainty, the volume of credit
card transactions is still endogenous, because a consumer may choose to not carry/use a
card or the merchant may decide to not accept the card. The decomposition of the payment
between a xed and a per-transaction fee is important for the issuer and consumer, and
expected to aect the merchant's acceptance decision. In an extension to the main model I
study how the equilibrium changes when the issuer is allowed to charge a two-part tari.
Issuer to an incumbent platform. The cost of serving a card transaction incurred
by each issuer and each acquirer, associated with any of the platforms, is normalized to
c. I focus on a symmetric oligopolistic equilibrium on the issuers side, in which all issuers
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associated with the same platform, PLk, charge the same customer fee hk, for k=1; 2.
Because the collectively determined interchange fee is transfered from the acquirer to the
issuer in each transaction, the net cost of serving a customer to the issuer is, (c  ak), where
ak is the interchange fee. The equilibrium customer fee with platform PLk is a function of
the net costs to the issuer, hk = hk(c  ak). Following Rochet and Tirole (2002) I make the
following regulatory assumption, which guarantees that the goal of issuers is to maximize
the number of transactions on the platform:
Assumption 1. The equilibrium cardholder fee, hk(c   ak), is dened for all values of
the interchange fee, even c   ak  0, and decreases with it. Each incumbent issuer's prot
increases with the interchange fee.
To understand Assumption 1, take an industry with N symmetrical rms with marginal
cost of c. Let h(c) be the oligopolistic equilibrium price and D(h(c)) denote the total
quantity demanded when all prices are equal to h(c). The industry's total prot is
(c) = [h(c)  c]D(h(c)):
The rst derivative with respect to marginal cost is
@
@c
= (h0(c)  1)D(h(c)) + (h(c)  c)D0(h(c))h0(c)
Given that the card holder fee increases with the marginal cost, prots are directly negatively
aected through the increase in input costs, as well as through the decrease in demand at the
old prot margin, and indirectly positively aected through the increase in the consumers'
fee (alleviating competition). As long as prices rise weakly slower than costs (issuers bear
some of the burden of the increased costs, and costs are partially absorbed), 0 h0(c) 1,
the direct eect dominates the indirect eect and Assumption 1 holds. This is not always
the case (see Seade (1987)). However, as Rochet and Tirole (2002) note, empirically we do
not observe industry associations to lobby for increased input costs or higher ad valorem
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taxes. In the credit card industry, in particular, the consumers' side is treated as a loss
leader. Given the assumption that acquirers' side of the market is perfectly competitive,
it appears that increasing acceptance among consumers is the leading channel in increasing
prots. There is also signicant theoretical support for Assumption 1. In standard models
of oligopolistic competition (except the Bertrand's case of perfect competition with constant
returns to scale) the prot strictly decreases with the marginal cost. Other examples when
Assumption 1 holds are:
Example 1: Monopoly Issuer. It is relatively easy to show, from the envelope theorem, that a
monopolist issuer's prot decreases in net costs and therefore increases in the interchange fee.
Example 2: Symmetric Cournot oligopoly. Seade (1987) shows that Assumption 1 is sat-
ised in a symmetric Cournot oligopoly whenever the elasticity of demand is larger than one.
Example 3: Hotelling model with outside goods. In the classic Hotelling model with a
covered market, prots do not depend on marginal costs. However, with outside goods (al-
ternative means of payment here), prots strictly increase with the interchange fee, as the
lower price allows issuers to gain market share from these alternative means of payment.
To further simplify the modeling of the governance structure, I assume that the prot mar-
gins of issuers, in the issuers' side oligopolistic equilibrium of incumbent platforms, are
constant. Any changes to costs of issuers are transfered one-to-one to the fees they charge.
Since acquirers' side is perfectly competitive, issuers and acquirers of incumbent associations
have aligned interests - to maximize the volume of transactions on the platform. The fees
to cardholders levied by an incumbent platform PLk can be composed of two parts
hk = hk0   ak = c+ k   ak; (56)
where k is the per-transaction prot enjoyed by an issuer to platform PLk at the oligopolistic
issuers market equilibrium. Once the oligopolistic equilibrium prot margin, k, is set, the
76
cardholder fee changes only with adjustments in the interchange fee.
The last assumption is satised if the members belong to a single association and are
dierentiated in a direction orthogonal to that of platform dierentiation. In a generalized
Hotelling model, the transportation cost to a cardholder, when selecting a platform/member
pair, is the sum of the transportation cost to the platform and that to the member. Members
on a given platform are little dierentiated. They take the number of cardholders served by
the platform (which is determined by the platform's interchange fee, given that the prot
margins of issuers are small) as a rst order approximation, and compete intensely a la
Hotelling.
Acquirer to an incumbent platform. The per-transaction cost to serve a merchant
for any system is c. The merchant faces a discount fee with an acquirer of system PLk of
mk = mk0 + a
k = c+ ak; (57)
assuming the acquirers side is perfectly competitive. The aquirer makes zero prot and just
passes along the pre-contracted interchange fee.
Brand platform. If the merchant expands into the credit card business, she establishes
a new credit card platform Bl, for l = 1; 2. Throughout the paper I call such a platform
a `brand' platform. The brand platform incurs a per-transaction cost of cB on each side of
the market, and I allow this cost to be larger70 than the cost faced by an issuer or acquirer
associated with an incumbent platform, cBc.
In determining their fees to each side, the brand platform issuer makes a prot of B=0
70The reason for such a dierence in technological costs could be justied by the fact that the incumbent issuer/acquirer is
a part of a large system of banks with an already established and jointly supported hardware network. Thus, the xed cost to
an incumbent issuer can be normalized to zero. In contrast if the merchant expands into the credit card business or integrates
with a non-incumbent, for-prot enterprise, then the brand platform has to cover the xed cost of setting up the technology.
These xed costs are not zero, and because the brand platform serves a far lower number of transactions, recovering these xed
costs is a slow and costly process.
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so that the fees faced by cardholders and merchants are
hB =hB0   aB = cB   aB + B = cB   aB
mB =mB0 + a
B = cB + aB:
(58)
In the last two denitions it is assumed that, although the brand platform is a for-prot en-
terprise, still there may be a preference for a non-zero implicit transfer of aB (a counterpart
to the interchange fee) from the acquirer side to the issuer side.
Consumers. Consumers dier in their convenience benet, bB, of using a credit card over
another payment method. For example some consumers have enough savings and/or have
fast access to cash, while others place high value on the convenience of using a card. The
cardholder's benet with platform k = 1; 2, bkB, depends on the platform that provides the
card and is continuously distributed on an interval [bkB;
bkB], with a cumulative distribution
function of F k(bkB), and density f
k(bkB). To assure concavity of the optimization programs I
assume that the hazard rate is increasing,
Assumption 2. d

fk(hk)
1 Fk(hk)

=d hk0.
Next, I assume that when both cardholders and merchants accept the cards of more than one
platform, in the language specic for the literature we say that each of them `multi-homes,'
the cardholder is the one who decides which card to use. This is a realistic assumption in
view of the well accepted practice. When a merchant accepts more than one card, the card
holder uses the card which gives him the larger net benet, bkB   hk, for k=1; 2. Through
out the paper this card is called the `prefered' by the cardholder card. I assume that the
cardholders' benet from her prefered card is continuously distributed on an interval [bB;
bB],
with a cumulative distribution function of F (bB), and density f(bB).
Suppose the merchant introduces her own brand credit card. I assume that the conve-
nience benet enjoyed by consumers from such a card is lower than the convenience benet
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enjoyed from paying with a card provided by an incumbent, well established system71. In
particular I assume that the consumer's benet experienced with a brand card is bBB con-
tinuously distributed on [bBB;
bBB] with a cumulative distribution function Y (b
B
B), and density
y(bBB). For simplicity, I assume that the cardholder i's convenience benet with brand card is
lower than the convenience benet experienced by the cardholder when using the `preferred'
by her incumbent card with a measure , bBBi= bBi   . This assumption helps to simplify
the relationship between the distributions of cardholder benets F and Y . In particular I
assume that all the parameters of the cumulative distribution functions F and Y coincide,
except for their location parameters. For example, the mean of the distribution Y is shifted
to the left of the mean of the distribution F by a parameter , which represents the loss in
benet from substituting an already established credit card with a branded credit card. For
a clear illustration of this assumption please refer to Figure 2.
distribution functions F and Y coincide except for their location parameters. For ex-
fy
bBi = b
B
Bi + b
B
Bi
Figure 3: Distributions of consumer benets from using card over cash as a payment method.
ample, the mean of the distribution Y is shifted to the left of the mean of the distribution
F by a parameter , which represents the loss in benet from substituting an already estab-
lished credit card with a branded credit card. Thus, the convenience benets, experienced
by a particular consumer i, with each type of card are in the following relation: bB = b
B
B + 
71This dierence in convenience benets stems from the fact that brand credit cards are not accepted by competing
merchants or by merchants from other industries (diminished network eects), that carrying a brand credit card signi-
cantly increases the number of bills a customer has to take care of while adding very little extra benet from carrying
one additional card, and that the quality of customers service is inferior compared to the one provided by a well estab-
lished association. Card holder reviews of the Monogram Credit Card Bank of Georgia's quality of service can be found at
http :==www.consumeraairs.com=credit cards=monogram bank.htm:
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and F (bB) = F (b
B
B + ) = Y (b
B
B). For a clear illustration of this assumption please refer to
Figure 1.
Assumption 3. The distributions of cardholder benets, F and Y , dier only in their lo-
cation parameters. All location parameters of the distribution Y are negatively shifted by a
measure  with respect to the location parameters of the distribution F : bB = b
B
B +  and
F (bB) = F (b
B
B + ) = Y (b
B
B).
Consumers of the retail good can usually use more than one payment method. With no
loss of generality I assume that the alternative payment method is cash and that consumers
and merchants enjoy a zero net benet when cash is used as a payment method in a mer-
chant's store. If both cards are accepted by the merchant, the cardholder uses the payment
method that provides the maximum net benet
max(b1B   h1; b2B   h2; 0):
Merchants. The `downstream' market (the retail market that uses the input of the
`upstream' market) is served by two merchants, M q, for q=1; 2. Each merchant is assumed
to incur an identical marketing cost, cm, which is normalized to include the transaction costs
related to cash payments, and to market her product at a price pq, for q=1; 2. A merchant
can oer two payment methods to her customers - cash payment or credit card payment72,
and enjoys a technological marginal benet of zero when a consumer uses cash as a payment
method, and bm  0 when a consumer uses a credit card as a payment method73. The
marginal benet bm is symmetric across merchants and is independent from the provider of
the credit card service (when there is more than one provider).
I further assume that merchants are big enough to nd the costs of establishing their
72The assumption that the alternative payment method is cash is a convenient simplication. Since the credit card associations
Visa and Master Card do not any longer require a merchant to accept debit cards, that carry the same logo, when she accepts
credit cards, this is a mild assumption.
73For example, the convenience benet for the merchant is a result of lower cash-transaction costs, lower level of fraud, and
the ability to collect more information on consumers' preferences.
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own-brand networks, B1 and B2, unforbidding. A merchant, then, can reject the cards of
both incumbent networks and introduce her own-brand card if she nds it protable.
For easy reference all parameters are summarized in Table 1.
Desirability of the card system. I assume that credit cards are socially desirable, or
bB + bM  2c: (59)
Table 1. Benets, costs and charges
Benets Costs Charges
Issuer c  a hk - cons
Acquirer w/ inc c+ a mk-merch
Brand 2cB hB;mB
Merchant w/ acq/inc bM m
k
w/ acq/brand bM m
B
w/ consumers cM p
Consumer w/ merch v > max p p
w/ inc bkB 2 [bkB;bkB], k=1; 2 hk
with cdf F k(bkB)
w/ brand bBB 2 [bBB;bBB], B=1; 2 hB
with cdf Y (bBB)
Timing. The timing is as follows:
Stage 1: The interchange fee is non-cooperatively set by the issuers (in case of incumbent
system) of competing platforms. The merchants' discount is determined automatically.
Stage 2: The issuers of incumbent systems set their card holder fees. Merchants non-
cooperatively decide whether to accept the cards of both incumbent systems or to
sign an exclusive contract with a brand system. Finally merchants set their retail prices
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non-cooperatively.
Stage 3 Consumers observe the cardholder fees, the retail prices, and the card acceptance
strategies of each store, and non-cooperatively choose a card and a merchant to favor.
3 Competing merchants
The modeling of the upstream market is simplied by ignoring the motivations of upstream
credit card service providers to sign exclusive contracts with downstream retailers. Rochet
and Tirole (2003) study platform competition in the credit card market, side-stepping the
strategic behavior of competing merchants. They nd that the level of multi-homing (inverse
to `loyalty') - where cardholders and/or merchants sign with more than one network - is an
important determinant of the price structure. In particular, when cardholders are more loyal
to their preferred network it is easier to attract cardholders, while the network has to work
harder to attract the merchant. Cardholders, then, are used as a prot generating side of the
market, while merchants face lower discount fees. In my model the per-transaction prots
of the issuers' oligopolistic sub-market within each network are xed, and the upstream
networks compete for customers by choosing the optimal level of the interchange fee. I
assume enough symmetry in the distributions of cardholder benets F 1(b1B) and F
1(b1B), so
that symmetric technological costs on the upstream market lead to a symmetric equilibrium
in prices.
I start the analysis by studying a benchmark where both merchants accept both incumbent
cards, and note the minimum cardholder fee that makes the merchant indierent between
accepting and turning down both cards when exclusive contracts are not feasible. Then I
study the conditions under which merchants can protably introduce their own brand credit
cards. I focus only on the eect exclusive contracts via integration have on the prots on
the downstream market, and show that prots increase compared to the benchmark only if:
(1) the number of transactions on the market is reduced; and, (2) each merchant is served
exclusively by the upstream provider within its own merged structure. Since exclusivity also
requires a reduced number of card transactions, it is not possible for the merchants to sign
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exclusive contracts with the incumbent credit card providers, Pl1 and Pl2, if merchants can
not credibly threaten to expand in the credit card industry.
The acceptance decision of M 1 is not independent from the acceptance decision of M 2.
The strategy set of each merchant freject all cards, accept both incumbent cards, integrateg,
leads to ve possible outcomes in the acceptance decisions of the competing merchants, as
described on Figure 3. In the rst outcome both merchants reject all cards. In the second
outcome both merchants accept all cards provided by the incumbent systems. In the third
outcome M 1 rejects all cards provided by the incumbent systems, while M 2 accepts both
cards provided by the incumbent systems. In the fourth outcomeM 1 expands into the credit
card business by introducing a brand card and rejecting all cards provided by the incumbent
systems, while M 2 still accepts all cards provided by the incumbent systems. In outcome
ve both merchants sign exclusive contracts with a brand platform.
M1
PL1 PL2B1 B1 B1PL1 PL2 PL1 PL2
M2M1
PL1 PL2
M2 M2M1M2M1
1. full rejection
M2M1
4. partial exclusivity3. partial rejection2. full acceptance 5. full exclusivity
Figure 4: Outcomes 1-5 of the acceptance decision game when merchants compete on the downstream
market.
Benchmark Case/Outcome 2. I start by noting that, when merchants compete a la
Hoteling, the payos in the full rejection Outcome 1 (Figure 3) are symmetric and equal to
t=2 (Tirole 1988), and proceed to show that merchants do not improve on the full rejection
outcome if they symmetrically accept both cards. If both merchants accept the cards of both
incumbent networks (0utcome 2) the consumers of the retail good are split in two groups
with respect to credit card adoption: consumers who prefer to use their `preferred' card to
cash; and consumers who prefer to use cash to any of the cards as a payment method. By
assumption the equilibrium on the upstream market is symmetric: both platforms charge
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the same fees, h1=h2=h and m1=m2=m.
Because each merchant accepts all incumbent cards, cardholders do not face any oppor-
tunity cost, related to card acceptance, from favoring one merchant over the other. Thus,
if the merchants charge marketing prices of p1 and p2 respectively, the demand for the good
purchased from M 1, within both the group of cardholders and the group of cash users, is
determined by p1 + tx1 = p2 + t(1   x1), where x1 denotes the demand for the retail good
faced byM 1, and t is the transportation costs faced by each customer, per unit of distance to
the merchant's store they favor. As usual the parameter t is interpreted as a dierentiation
parameter in the retail product space. The demand for the retail good sold by M 1 within
each group of customers is
x1 =
1
2
+
p2   p1
2t
: (60)
If D = 1   F (h) is the demand for the preferred by the cardholders credit card at the
equilibrium fee h, the prot function of M 1 is
1 = (1 D)(p1   cm)

1
2
+
p2   p1
2t

+D[p1   cm   (m  bm)]

1
2
+
p2   p1
2t

= [p1   cm  D(m  bm)]

1
2
+
p2   p1
2t

:
The prot function of M 2 is symmetrical
2 = [p2   cm  D(m  bm)]

1
2
+
p1   p2
2t

:
When a merchant serves a customer who pays with a card, the merchant pays the correspond-
ing fee, m, to her acquirer associated with the specic platform preferred by the consumer.
The volume of transactions with cash consumers is 1   D, and the volume of transactions
with customers who prefer to use a card over cash is D.
Each merchant maximizes her prot by choosing the price to charge, taking as given the
price charged by the competitor merchant. The equilibrium for outcome 2 is symmetric,
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with prices and prots respectively
pO21 = p
O2
2 = t+ cm +D(m  bm)
O21 = 
O2
2 =
t
2
; (61)
where the superscript O2 marks a downstream equilibrium in prices for Outcome 2.
Lemma 1. When merchants compete a la Hotelling, the full rejection outcome and the full
acceptance outcome bring the same payos of t=2 to each merchant.
To nd the minimum cardholder fee at which both merchants accept both cards in the
benchmark case suppose M 1 deviates from Outcome 2 and rejects both cards provided by
incumbent platforms, while M 2 still accepts both cards provided by incumbent platforms
(outcome 3). Since the customers who prefer to use cash over other payment methods are
served by both merchants, the demand for the retail good sold by M 1 to this group of cus-
tomers is still given by equation (60). Some of the cardholders may decide to adopt M 1 and
use cash, by which they incur an opportunity cost of bB   h. Merchant M 1 also incurs an
opportunity cost of bm for each rejected card transaction, but also saves in aquirer's fees,
m. Thus, it is likely that M 2 will enjoy larger demand for the good she markets, but also
may face higher average costs for serving each customer. Among the group of customers
who prefer to use a card as a payment method, each customer compares her eective costs
from favoring M 1 versus her eective costs from favoring M 2. The demand from a par-
ticular cardholder for the good sold by retailers is split by the merchants under the rule
p1+ tx1 = p2+ t(1 x1)  (bB h). Aggregating over all cardholders, M 1 serves a proportion
of
x1 =
1
2
+
p2   p1   (   h)
2t
; (62)
where
(h) = E(bBjbB  h) =
R bB
h
bBf(bB) dbB
1  F (h) : (63)
is the expected cardholder benet conditional on the equilibrium cardholder fee h.
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The prot functions of M 1 and M 2 are
1 = (1 D)(p1   cm)

1
2
+
p2   p1
2t

+D(p1   cm)

1
2
+
p2   p1   (   h)
2t

;
2 = (1 D)(p2   cm)

1
2
+
p1   p2
2t

+D[p2   cm   (m  bm)]

1
2
+
p1   p2 + (   h)
2t

;
so that M 2 incurs a net extra cost of m  bm when serving a cardholder. The optimal price
vector and maximum prots are
pO31 = t+ cm  
1
3
D[   h+ bm  m]
pO32 = t+ cM +
1
3
D[   h  2(bm  m)]:
2tO31 =

t  1
3
D(   h+ bm  m)
2
2tO32 =

t+
1
3
D(   h+ bm  m)
2
  (m  bm)(   h)D (1 D):
(64)
Since h + m = 2c +  (see equations (56) and (57)), comparing the merchants' prots in
Outcome 3 (equations (64)) to the prots in outcome 2 (equations (61)), we have the fol-
lowing result:
Proposition 2. Suppose exclusive contracts are not feasible. If h(a) is such that (h(a))=
2c +    bm, then: when the upstream market equilibrium cardholder fee is h  h, either
both merchants accept both cards or both merchants reject both cards; when the equilibrium
cardholder fee is such that h<h both merchants rejecting both cards is the unique equilibrium.
To see how hh can lead to a full rejection equilibrium, consider hh but just slightly.
Then, if M 1 rejects both cards, though not protable for him if M 2 accepts both cards, M 2
also rejects both cards because in the prot function O32 the positive term
1
3
D( h+bm m)
is too low to compensate for the negative term [ (m  bm)(   h)D (1 D)].
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For the rest of the analysis I assume that the two competing incumbent platforms oer
their cards at an equilibrium cardholder fee large enough that their service is not rejected
by merchants in the absence of exclusive contracts, hh.
Integration. Now consider an outcome when M 1 integrates with a brand platform, B1,
while M 2 accepts the cards of both incumbent platforms. This, again, is as though M 2
accepts the most `preferred' by cardholders incumbent card, while M 1 integrates. By As-
sumption 3 the cardholder's benet with a brand card is a  lower than the benet enjoyed by
the cardholder with the `preferred' incumbent card. Then, from Assumption 3 and equations
(58) it follows that the net benet to a consumer using the brand card is
bBB   hB = bB      (cB   aB): (65)
This is as though under the distribution of cardholder benets F (bB) the eective cost to a
cardholder from using the card oered by the brand platform B1 is cB aB+. Then under
the distribution of cardholder benets F (bB) the eective users' cost to both the merchant
and cardholder from a transaction with a brand card is CB=2cB+ (see equations (58) and
(65)), while the efective users' cost to both the merchant and cardholder from a transaction
with an incumbent card is CB=2c +  (see equations (56) and (57)). If the eective users'
cost to using the brand card is smaller than the eective users' cost to using incumbent card,
CBC, then to each equilibrium value of the interchange fee, a, corresponds an interchange
fees aB such that each cardholder is indierent to which card to use, bBB hB(aB)=bB h(a),
but M 1 faces a lower cost from accepting the brand card than M 2 from accepting the
incumbent cards, mB(aB)m(a). I next show that when CBC, M 1 can always protably
deviate from Outcome 2 towards Outcome 4, by setting aB=aB.
When CBC, and aB=aB the market for the retail good is split into two markets with
respect to the payment method favored by customers: a group that uses cash as a payment
method, and a group that uses the card accepted by the particular merchant, being indierent
as to which card exactly is accepted by the merchant. Therefore, among cardholders there
is no preference which merchant to favor, because there is no opportunity cost of favoring a
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merchant who does not accepts the payment method favored by the customer. Let D denote
the volume of card transactions in the economy. Then, the prot functions of each merchant
are
1 = (1 D)(p1   cm)

1
2
+
p2   p1
2t

+D(p1   cm   (mB   bm))

1
2
+
p2   p1
2t

;
2 = (1 D)(p2   cm)

1
2
+
p1   p2
2t

+D[p2   cm   (m  bm)]

1
2
+
p1   p2
2t

;
and the payos in the downstream market equilibrium of Outcome 4 are
2tO41 =

t+
1
3
D(m mB)
2
 t2
2tO42 =

t+
1
3
D(mB  m)
2
 t2:
(66)
The last result is only possible because the users of the brand card face a lower total users'
cost. If the total users' cost was symmetric across cards, or larger with the `preferred'
incumbent card, thenM 1 would not be able to achieve a prot larger than t=2 by integrating
with a brand platform while M 2 passively accepts the cards of both incumbent platforms.
Suppose now that the users' cost with brand card is lower than the one with incumbent
card, M 1 merges with B1, and M 2 counteracts by merging with B2. Suppose the consumers
benets with brand cards are, bB1B and b
B2
B respectively, continuously distributed on [b
B1
B ;
bB1B ]
and [bB2B ;
bB2B ], with cumulative distribution functions Y (b
B1
B ) and Y (b
B2
B ), respectively. Con-
sumers use a card over cash as a payment method when bBB hB>0 and, if a merchant accepts
both cards, use card B1 when bB1B   hB>0 and bB1B   hB1>bB2B   hB2. There are ve groups
of customers with respect to the payment method they use: customers who prefer B1 when
both cards are accepted by the merchant, but would not use B2 if B1 is not accepted by
the merchant, bB2B   hB2<0; customers who prefer B1 when both cards are accepted by the
merchant, but would use B2 if B1 is not accepted by the merchant; customers who prefer B2
when both cards are accepted by the merchant, but would not use B1 if B2 is not accepted
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by the merchant, bB1B   hB1 < 0; customers who prefer B2 when both cards are accepted
by the merchant, but would use B1 if B2 is not accepted by the merchant; and, customers
who always use cash, no matter if the merchant accepts any of the cards, bB1B   hB1<0 and
bB2B   hB2 < 0. The following demand functions, omitting the B superscript to eliminate
clutter, denote the volume of retail transactions within each of the payment-method groups
D11 = Pr(b1B   h1  0; b2B   h2 < 0)
D12 = Pr(b1B   h1  0; b1B   h1 > b2B   h2  0)
D21 = Pr(b2B   h2  0; b1B   h1 < 0)
D22 = Pr(b2B   h2  0; b2B   h2 > b1B   h1  0)
1 D11  D12  D21  D22 = Pr[max(b1B   h1; b2B   h2) < 0]:
(67)
The expected conditional benet enjoyed by the rst group of consumers, when card B1 is
accepted by a merchant, is 11 1=E(b1Bjb1B  h1; b2B < h2), and the net conditional benet is
11=11 1 h1. The expected conditional benet enjoyed by the second group of consumers
is 12 1 = E(b1Bjb1B   h1 > b2B   h2  0), when card B1 is accepted by a merchant, and
12 2 = E(b2Bjb1B   h1 > b2B   h2  0), when card B1 is rejected by the merchant, but card
B2 is accepted by the merchant. The net lost, expected conditional cardholder benet of
a member of the second group, when a merchant rejects card B1 but accepts card B2, is
12=12 1  h1  (12 2  h2). Similarly, we dene the net lost, expected conditional benet
to group three when a merchant rejects B2 but accepts B1, 21, and the net lost, expected
conditional benet to group four when a merchant rejects B2 but accepts B1, 22.
WhenM 1 rejects the preferred by a customer card, the customer loses some net cardholder
benet which has to be compensated by lower retail price, if that customer is to nd M 1
equally attractive as M 2. The share of the market served by M 1, within this group of
customers, is again given by equation (62). Some of the customers of M 1, who prefer to
use the card accepted by M 2, also prefer to use the card accepted by M 1 over cash, and
among these consumersM 1 incurs a net cost from accepting the card transaction. The prot
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functions of M 1 and M 2 are
1 = (1 D11  D12  D21  D22)(p1   cm)

1
2
+
p2   p1
2t

+D11(p1   cm   (m1   bm))

1
2
+
p2   p1 + 11
2t

+D12(p1   cm   (m1   bm))

1
2
+
p2   p1 + 12
2t

+D21(p1   cm)

1
2
+
p2   p1   21
2t

+D22(p1   cm   (m1   bm))

1
2
+
p2   p1   22
2t

;
1 = (1 D11  D12  D21  D22)(p2   cm)

1
2
+
p1   p2
2t

+D11(p2   cm)

1
2
+
p1   p2   11
2t

+D12(p2   cm   (m2   bm))

1
2
+
p1   p2   12
2t

+D21(p2   cm   (m2   bm))

1
2
+
p1   p2 + 21
2t

+D22(p1   cm   (m2   bm))

1
2
+
p1   p2 + 22
2t

:
Note again that, in the above prot functions, M 1 does not oer the option of credit card
payment to group D21, while M 2 does not oer the option of credit card payment to group
D11.
Assuming sucient symmetry in the distributions of cardholder benets with cards B1
and B2, and brand platforms that charge symmetric cardholder and merchant fees, so that
D11=D21, D12=D22, 11=21, 12=22, the merchants' prots in equilibrium are
2tO51 =

t+
1
3
(D21 +D22 +D12) (m2   bm)  1
3
(D11 +D12 +D22) (m1   bm) + 1
3

2
+ (m1   bm) [ (D11 +D12 +D22)  (D1111 +D1212  D2222)] ;
2tO52 =

t  1
3
(D21 +D22 +D12) (m2   bm) + 1
3
(D11 +D12 +D22) (m1   bm) + 1
3

2
  (m2   bm) [ (D21 +D22 +D12) + (D2121 +D2222  D1212)] ;
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where =D1111 +D1212  D2121  D2222. Then
O51 =
t
2
  D
11(m(hBV I)  bm)
2t
O52 =
t
2
  D
21(m(hBV I)  bm)
2t
:
(68)
I dene a `partial-loyalty-index' (partial as it does not account for cardholders who prefer
a card that is not accepted by a merchant, but would still use the card that is accepted)
as  =D11 =D21. If there is no cardholder loyalty towards the platform that provides the
preferred by the cardholder credit card, D11=D21=074, then the payos in outcome 5 are
again symmetric and equal to t=2. A positive `partial-loyalty-index' can increase the prots
of the merchants to a level above t=2 if the equilibrium card holder fee, hBV I, is such that
m(hBV I) < bm. When each merchant accepts only one card and rejects the card accepted
by the second merchant, and when the distributions of cardholder benets are symmetric
across cards, a positive `partial-loyalty-index' can increase the perceived by consumers level
of retail product dierentiation on the downstream market. This perceived by consumers
increase in dierentiation is more pronounced on markets where merchants are ex-ante little
dierentiated.
It is very likely that cardholders perceive the `partial-loyalty-index' of an upstream mar-
ket served only by incumbent networks to be larger than the `partial-loyalty-index' of an
upstream market served only by brand networks. If this is true merchants prefer to sign
exclusive contracts with incumbent platforms, M 1 with PL1, and M 2 with PL2.
Before we formulate our main result, note that from Proposition 2 it follows that if M 2
integrates while M 1 does not accept any card, M 2 can choose the cardholder fee so that her
prots are larger than t=2, while M 1's prots are lower than t=2.
Lemma 3. If M1 signs an exclusive contract with B1, it is not protable for the second
merchant to reject all cards on the market, if the cardholder fee oered by B1 is hhB , such
that B(hB ) = 2c
B   bm.
74If there is no cardholder loyalty, none of the cardholders of a given platform use cash as a payment method, when their
preferred card is not accepted but the less preferred card is accepted by the merchant.
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Proposition 4 When the eective users' cost with a brand credit card is larger than the
eective users' cost with an incumbent credit card, and incumbent platforms charge h>hk,
for k=1; 2:
a) When the `partial-loyalty-index' is zero, in equilibrium, either both merchants sign ex-
clusive contracts with an upstream brand platform, prots are symmetric and equal
to t=2, and the equilibrium cardholder fee, hB , is such that 
B(hB ) = 2c
B   bm, OR
both merchants sign exclusive contracts with an upstream incumbent platform, prots
are symmetric and equal to t=2, and the equilibrium cardholder fee is h, such that
(h) = 2c  bm + ,.
b) When the `partial-loyalty-index' is positive, in equilibrium, either both merchants sign
exclusive contracts with an upstream brand platform, prots are symmetric and equal to
1=2>t=2, and the equilibrium cardholder fee is h
B
V I>2c
B bm, such that m(hBV I)<bm,
or both merchants sign exclusive contracts with upstream incumbent platforms, prots
are symmetric and equal to 1 =2> t=2, and the equilibrium cardholder fee is h
k
V I >
2cB   bm + k, such that m(hkV I)<bm.
When the eective users' cost with a brand credit card is smaller than the eective users'
cost with an incumbent credit card, Proposition 2 applies.
When the eective users' cost with a brand credit card is larger than the eective users'
cost with an incumbent credit card, M 1 can protably deviate from outcome 2 (Figure 2) by
signing an exclusive contract with B1. M 2 is then forced to counteract and sign an exclusive
contract with B2. The equilibrium cardholder fee is set at the level where it will not be
protable for one of the merchants to deviate from this equilibrium.
The dierence between part a) and part b) of Proposition 4 is that merchants make
strongly larger than t=2 prots under exclusive contracts when the \partial-loyalty-index\
is positive. If the \partial-loyalty-index\ is larger when the market is served by incumbent
platforms than when the market is served by brand platforms, incumbent platforms may suc-
cessfully counteract the strategies of merchants in Outcome 5, by oering exclusive contracts
to the merchants themselves. The equilibrium cardholder fee is set so that m(hBV I)<bm when
merchants sign exclusive contracts with brand platforms, and m(hV I)<bm when merchants
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sign exclusive contracts with incumbent platforms.
In reality one would expect a positive \partial-loyalty-index.\ If the retail market is
strongly dierentiated, the payos in Outcome 5 are very close to t=2. In this case, when M 2
accepts both incumbent cards, M 1 does not prot by deviating from her strategy of accept-
ing both incumbent cards and signing an exclusive contract, since she knows that M 2 will
immediately counteract and sign an exclusive contract with another brand platform. This
may explain why highly dierentiated merchants like Macy's, Nordstrom, Gap and others
still accept all incumbent cards, and why markets with little dierentiation, as the bulk-food
market of Costco and Sam's Club, sign exclusive contracts.
The results of the analysis however say nothing about the food retail market represented
by big, almost undierentiated merchants as Safeway, Kingsoopers, and others. It is well
known that such merchants enjoy a much lower merchant discount, via specic contracts
between the merchant and the acquirer that represents a given platform. This preferential
treatment is due to the larger number of very small transactions. My model does not
incorporate a size of the transaction, which can be done in a next step.
To conclude the section, we found that with competition on the upstream market the
merchants' resistance to accept credit cards can be much stronger than the level of resistance
resulting from the analysis in Rochet and Tirole (2002), who assume that the upstream
market is monopolized. In particular the level of merchant resistance when the upstream
market is competitive and exclusive contracts are feasible is the same as the one suggested by
Baxter (1983); merchants accept a card if it oers a discount fee lower than the merchant's
per-transaction convenience benet from accepting a credit card as a payment method.
3.1 Social welfare analysis
The social welfare, introduced by the existence of the credit card system, is the sum of the
surpluses enjoyed by each party. Assuming that the more ecient system is the incumbent
system, the welfare from existence of the credit card system is
W (hk) =
Z bB
hk
(bB + bm   2c)f(bB) dbB; (69)
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and is maximized at the cardholder fee hW = 2c  bm.
Lemma 5. The cardholder fee that maximizes social welfare is hW = 2c  bm.
See the proof to Lemma 5 in Appendix A. Since the social welfare is a quasi-concave function
(see the proof in Appendix A), a cardholders' fee that is closer to the socially optimal one,
hW , improves welfare as compared to cardholder fees that are further away from hW .
It is indeterminate how the fee with no exclusive contracts hk relates to the socially opti-
mal cardholder fee. The equilibrium cardholder fee with exclusive contracts, hBV I>2c
B   bm,
applies to the distributions of cardholder benets with brand cards, Y 1 and Y 2. To make
this fee comparable to the socially optimal fee transform hBV I to apply it to the distri-
bution of cardholder benets with the `prefered' incumbent credit card, F . This fee is
hBV IjF =hBV IjY + >2cB   bm + , and for 2cB + >2c it is larger than the socially optimal
cardholder fee, hBV IjF >hW . When hk<hW exclusive contracts may or may not improve so-
cial welfare as compared to the level of social welfare achieved when exclusive contracts are
infeasible. However, when hk >h
W exclusive contracts decrease social welfare as compared
to the level of social welfare achieved when exclusive contracts are infeasible.
Proposition 6. In an economy with competing credit card associations and competing retail-
ers, when merchants sign exclusive contracts and the `partial-loyalty-index' is positive, the
equilibrium cardholder fee may or may not improve the social welfare over the one achieved
in an economy with infeasible exclusive contracts.
4 Extensions and robustness
Retail customers information set. We assumed that a customer is perfectly aware which
store accepts what cards. Suppose only a proportion  has perfect information on card ac-
ceptance before they go to a store. Then, only a proportion  of all customers will be aected
by the merchant's decision to accept or reject a card. In our model, this lowers the expected
conditional opportunity cost, faced by a customer who favors a merchant who rejects the
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credit card favored by that customer, from  to , and increases the merchant's resistance
to accept the credit cards provided by the competing incumbent platforms. However, it does
not change the merchant's decision to sign exclusive contracts and it does not alter the main
results of the analysis.
Assumption 2. The assumption that the distributions of cardholder benets F and Y
share the same parameters, except for the location parameters, has a signicant eect on the
resulting equilibrium. Alternatively, suppose that cardholders do not view brand cards as
inferior to incumbent cards, so that  is close to zero and some consumers prefer to use brand
card over incumbent card. With positive `partial-loyalty-index,' M 2 may nd it protable to
accept the credit cards of the competing incumbent platforms when M 1 signs an exclusive
contract with a brand platform. Furthermore, outcome 4 may be an equilibrium if the payo
of M 2 is larger in outcome 4 than in outcome 5.
Two-part tari charged to cardholders. In the main model I assumed that cardhold-
ers have a xed number of transactions, normalized to one, so that issuers and cardholders
are indierent between a yearly fee and a per-transaction fee. However, the merchants' resis-
tance to accept credit cards changes if cardholders use the card more than once per period
and the issuer charges both a yearly fee and a per transaction fee. Suppose issuers charge a
perfect two-part tari, a yearly fee plus a per-transaction fee75
h = H + (c  a)n;
where h is the total fee, H is the yearly fee, (c   a) is the per-transaction fee, and n is
the number of transactions per year. The issuer now can use two instruments to lower the
merchant's resistance. For the same total per transaction fee, h=n, the issuer can set the
xed part, H=n, high, and the variable part, c   a, low, even negative, so that when a
merchant rejects the card preferred by the cardholder, the cardholder not only losses her
convenience benet from using the card over cash, but also loses the reward c   a for the
particular transaction. This increases the rate at which merchants lose demand for the retail
good from cardholders, and forces the merchants to accept the card more often. For a more
75An issuer would be willing to charge a two-part tari because cardholders can not share credit cards; an arbitrage, where
one customer pays the yearly fee and then shares the card with other customers, is impossible.
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formal analysis of the merchants' resistance when issuers use a perfect two-part tari, see
Rochet and Tirole (2002).
A two-part tari, charged by issuers, does change the merchant's resistance when she can
not sign an exclusive contract with a brand platform. However, when exclusive contracts are
feasible, a brand issuer can also adopt a two-part tari, and, though the equilibrium card-
holder fee changes, the equilibrium acceptance strategies of the merchants will not change.
Elastic demand for retail goods. As noted by Rochet and Tirole (2002), the anal-
ysis of the eect of cardholder fee determination on social welfare is incomplete under the
assumption of inelastic demand for the retail goods. When the demand for the retail good
is elastic it is also aected by the level of cardholder fees. The sign of the eect, however, is
dicult to asses: the existence of credit card systems raises the average retail price faced by
both cardholders and cash users, however it also increases the demand for the retail good
among cash constrained users.
5 Discussion
The main dierence between the model in this study and the models of vertical integration
in more standard one-sided markets is that the downstream industry, the retailers, can do
without the input of the upstream industry, the credit card platforms. Retailers purchase the
input of the upstream industry not to resell it, but to inuence the volume of transactions
for the retail good supplied to them by third parties; in this sense merchants view the service
supplied to them by the credit card industry not as a substitute to the inputs provided to
them by third parties, but rather as a compliment. Many of the discovered motivations of
retailers to integrate, in standard input-output industries, are missing here:
 The double-marginalization (Spengler (1950), Machlup and Taber (1960)) of the ser-
vice/product produced by the upstream industry is missing because merchants are not
allowed to surcharge for card payments.
 In standard input-output industries it is argued that a downstream rm has no incentive
to integrate with an upstream producer when the upstream market is competitive (see
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Tirole (1988), p.175). However even if the credit cards market is competitive and
networks charge marginal cost, the downstream market may nd it protable to sign an
exclusive contract with an upstream industry to steal demand for the retail good from
the competing merchant.
 The standard arguments of transactional economies, incomplete contracts, asymmetric
information, market imperfections and uncertainties, and moral hazard (Arrow (1975),
Porter (1980), Hart and Holmstrom (1987), Tirole (1988), and Perry (1989) among
others), are also missing76, as are the motivations for complete control over assets of
Grossman and Hart (1986).
 The standard foreclosure motives, where a downstream rm integrates with an upstream
rm to make the product provided by the upstream rm scarce for her competitors
(Perry (1989), Ordover, Saloner, and Salop (1990), and Hart and Tirole (1990)), or
the argument in Chen (2001) that a downstream rm may integrate with an upstream
input provider, and increase prices on the downstream market to supply the competitor
downstream retailer with the input produced by the integrated rm, are also miss-
ing. Instead, to increase dierentiation on the downstream market, a downstream rm
prefers to not use the service of the integrated upstream provider.
 The concept of barriers to entry, popularized by Bain (1956) is also absent.
 A new motive for vertical integration arises from our model: competing merchants,
selling horizontally dierentiated products, may sign exclusive contracts with credit
card providers to further dierentiate in the product space of the downstream market.
There are, however some similarities, between our model and the literature on vertical
integration on one-sided markets.
 In the `backward integration' of Perry (1989, p.197), a downstream retailer integrates
with an upstream input provider and stops using the inputs of other providers to further
lower the price of the input. In our model merchants are eective in lowering the costs
76A downstream rm makes specic investments to eciently use the input provided by the upstream industry, and nds it
costly to purchase the good from a third party, in case of a shock in supply from the preferred supplier.
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they incur with the upstream industry through exclusive contracts. However, by doing
so merchants also eectively change the price structure on the upstream market, which
aects their market shares on the downstream market, when the downstream market is
competitive.
 In the classical literature a competitive downstream market may sell the services pro-
vided by the upstream market at a level not consistent with prot maximization of the
monopolized upstream market. In the credit card industry, merchants seek to maximize
users' surplus from the card service, which can be achieved by lowering the diusion of
cards through exclusive contracts.
 The eciency motive of a downstream merchant, integrating with an upstream input
provider to lower her marginal costs on the downstream market (see McGee and Bassett
(1976), and Chen (2001)), is also present. In our model a merchant may integrate with
a network that provides a larger users' surplus (but does not necessarily have lower
marginal costs of serving merchants and cardholders), to serve the same volume of card
transactions, but lower the per-transaction cost to the retailer.
6 Conclusion
I study the strategic credit card acceptance decisions of two competing merchants, in a
market where two credit card providers compete to serve the merchants but the merchants
also have an outside option of signing exclusive contracts with a credit card provider. All
participants on the market - merchants, credit card providers, and cardholders - act strate-
gically.With competition on the downstream market, when a merchant rejects a card she
looses part of the demand for the retail good from cardholders who nd it too costly to favor
a merchant who does not accept the credit card they carry. If exclusive contracts are not
feasible, the upstream competitive interchange fee is set at the highest level accepted by the
merchants. Assuming that both upstream and downstream markets are perfectly symmetric,
dierentiated merchants, competing a la Hotelling (1929), receive symmetric prots, equal
to half the transportation cost, t=2, no matter if they both reject all incumbent cards or
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both accept all incumbent cards. A non-incumbent platform that carries a lower eective
users' cost than an incumbent card (if such a non-incumbent card exists), allows a mer-
chant to protably deviate from accepting the set of incumbent cards by expanding into
the credit card industry. This lowers the prots of the second merchant below t=2, and
the second merchant counteracts by expanding into the credit card industry herself. When
each of the merchants is exclusively served by a separate platform in equilibrium, the ex-
istence of `partially-loyal' cardholders increases the perceived by consumers retail product
dierentiation on the downstream market, and boosts merchants' prots above t=2.
The equilibrium acceptance strategies of merchants also have signicant eects on the
social welfare generated by the existence of a credit card system. I nd that the decision of
a merchant to integrate with a credit card system has a mixed eect on social welfare.
In this model the upstream market has been assumed passive with respect to integration.
However, it may well be that upstream associations have similar (or other) motives to inte-
grate with downstream retailers. To conrm the robustness of results in this study, a more
complete model is due, where the upstream market has a wider set of strategies to choose
from.
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Appendices:
A Chapter 1: The Hazard function with observable explanatory
variables and unobserved heterogeneity
The exposition in Appendix A closely follows Wooldridge (2007).
The random variable T measures the length of time a person/household resides in a given housing
unit before they move out to relocate. One can easily show (see Wooldridge (2007)) that the cumulative
probability, the survival function and the density can be expressed as functions of the hazard rate:
F (t) = 1  exp

 
Z t
0
(s)ds

; t  0: (70)
S(t) = exp

 
Z t
0
(s)ds

(71)
f(t) = (t) exp

 
Z t
0
(s)ds

(72)
The shape of the hazard function is of primary interest. The simplest case is a constant hazard function,
(t) = , with T following an exponential distribution, with cdf F (t) = 1 exp( t). In this case the process
is memoryless, but the hazard rate can also be duration dependent. An often used distribution which allows
for duration dependence is the Weibull distribution with
F (t) = 1  exp( t); ;   0; (73)
f(t) = t 1 exp( t); (74)
(t) = t 1: (75)
When  >=< 1 the hazard is respectively monotonically increasing, constant, and monotonically decreasing
for all t.
For modeling purposes, the hazard function can be specied to depend on observable characteristics and
unobservable heterogeneity. The most widely used class of models, rst suggested by Cox (1972), is the
proportional hazard model
(t;x(t); v) = v k(x(t))0(t); (76)
where v > 0 represents the inuence of unobservable heterogeneity (independent from the observable factors)
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on the hazard, k(x(t)) > 0 is a function of the explanatory variables, which can be time varying or time-
invariant, and 0(t) is called the baseline hazard. The model is called proportional because 0(t) measures the
duration dependence, which is common for all households, while k(x(t)) serves to shift the hazard function
through the inuence of the regressors.
Typically k() is parametrised as k(x(t)) = exp(x(t)) (which is always positive), where  is a vector of
parameters to be estimated, and the error term v is assumed to be supported on v 2 [0;1].
If F (tjx(t); v;) is the cdf of T conditional on (x(t); v), the distribution of T conditional only on x(t)
can be obtained by integrating out the unobservable eect, v. Because v and x are independent, the cdf of
T given x(t) is
F (tjx(t);;) =
Z 1
0
F (tjx(t); v;)h(v;)dv (77)
where the density of v, h(v;), is assumed to be continuous and depends on the unknown parameters .
For a random draw i from the population, a Weibull hazard function, conditional on observed eects
xi(t) and unobserved heterogeneity vi is
(t;xi(t); vi) = vi exp(xi(t))t 1 (78)
Then, from equation (70)
F (tjxi(t); vi;) = 1  exp

 vi
Z t
0
exp(xi(s))s 1ds

: (79)
I assume gamma-distributed unobservable heterogeneity - that is, vi  Gamma(; ) - then E(vi) = 1,
V ar(vi) = 1= and
h(v; ) = v 1 exp( v)= (): (80)
Denoting (t;xi(t);) =
R t
0
exp(xi(s))s 1ds, and using equations (77) and (80), we can integrate out
the unobservable heterogeneity to nd the distribution of T conditional only on the observable explanatory
variables, xi(t)
F (tjxi(t);; ) = 1  [1  (t;xi(t);)=] : (81)
Further, assuming xi(t) = xi we can write
(t;xi;) = exp(xi)
Z t
0
s 1ds = exp(xi)t: (82)
and the cdf of Ti conditional on the observable explanatory variables xi is
F (tjxi;; ) = 1  [1  exp(xi)s=] : (83)
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Finally, another way to incorporate the unobservable heterogeneity is by parameterising k(x(t)) =
exp(xi(t) + vi). This allows to relax the assumption that v is independent of x.
B Chapter 1: Controlling for omitted variables and measurement
error in prices and income
In this section I describe the procedure I use to estimate the hazard rate when one of the explanatory
variables is correlated with the error term in the model. For the exposition in this section I assume this
variable is the tax savings, TS, but the derivations when income is measured with error are analogous.
In nonlinear estimation controlling for measurement error is a somewhat more complicated procedure
than the instrumental variables approach. We need to simultaneously estimate the hazard rate and a control
function for the variable correlated with the error term in the hazard rate. The two important equations in
our extended model are
(tjx1; TS; v;1; ) = exp(TS + x11 + v)t 1 (84)
TS = x121 + x222 + u = x2 + u; (85)
where x1 is the main vector of explanatory variables, x2 is the vector of `instrumental' variables, the vectors
1 and 2 are the vectors of parameters to be estimated for each equation, and u and v represent the
unobserved heterogeneity in each equation. The parameters of the two equations are identied when 22 6= 0.
Because TS is correlated with v we can not assume that u and v are uncorrelated. The standard approach
(Wooldridge (2002, p.472)) is to assume that u and v are jointly normally distributed
(u; v)  N(0;);  =
264 2u uv
uv 
2
v
375 ; (86)
where (u; v) is independent from x. Since u  N(0; 2u) then TSjx Normal. The model is applicable when
E(vjTS) 6= 0. Under joint normality of u and v we can write (Wooldridge (2007, p.473), Greene (2003,
p.868))
v =
Cov(u; v)
2u
u+ " =
v
u
u+ " = u+ "; (87)
where E("ju;x) = 0 and thus E("jTS) = 0. Since u and v are jointly normal then " is also normal
"  N(0; 2v(1  2)); (88)
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with a variance of:
V ar(") = V ar(v) 

Cov(u; v)
2u
2
V ar(u) = 2v(1  2):
Then we can write the hazard rate as
 = exp(x11 + TS + u+ ")t 1
= exp(x11 + TS + (TS   x2) + ")t 1
= exp(") exp(z )t 1 (89)
The model can be estimated in two steps, where in the rst step we estimate equation (85) by OLS or
ML, save the residuals, u^, and their standard error, ^u, and in the second step we estimate equation (84) by
ML, using the estimated in the rst step residuals and their standard error. To estimate standard errors for
the two-step procedure a correction to the standard errors in the second step is needed because in equation
(84) we do not use the true value of 2 but its estimate from the rst step, ^2, and in such cases the variance
of ^1 depends on the variance of ^2. The procedure for calculating the corrected standard errors of ^1 is
described in Greene (2003, p.510).
Once we estimate u^ and ^u in the rst step, we can use equation (73) to write the likelihood elements
for the censored and uncensored observations
f(T > cijz; u^; ^u) =
Z +1
 1
h
1  exp( ez  +"ci )
i
f(")d"; (90)
f(b  aij  T < ai0j   aij jz; u^; ^u) =Z +1
 1
h
exp( ez +"(b  aij))  exp( ez  +"(ai0j   aij))
i
f(")d"; (91)
where from equation (88) we have f(") = 1p
22v(1 2)
exp
n
  "2
2v(1 2)
o
.
The conditional probabilities (90) and (91) are usually averaged out for " through simulation (Train
(2003))77 or quadrature method (Waldman (1985)). Summing up the logs of the likelihood elements (90)
and (91) over all households and maximising gives the MLE of 1; ; "; ; . Once  and " are estimated,
one can easily derive ^ and ^v. Testing for the credibility of the instruments is done with an F-test on the
joint signicance of the instruments in the rst regression (Deaton (1997)). Testing for dependence between
TS and v can be easily achieved through a t-test on the signicance of the correlation coecient . For the
purposes of the t-test the variance of the correlation coecient is derived from the covariance matrix of 
and " using the Delta method (Greene (2003, p.913)).
Credible instruments must be used to control for the omitted variables and measurement error in prices
77Consistency and eciency of simulation assisted estimators are discussed in Train (2003 pp.241-242,246-247 ).
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and income. It is fairly dicult, however, to nd instruments that are correlated with the house value but
uncorrelated with any of the unobservable determinants of utility a household experiences from living in
their current house. To instrument for housing values I use some of the instruments suggested by Capozza
and Hesley (1990), Capozza and Sick (1994), and Capozza and Seguin (1995).
Appendix Table 1. Key instrumental-variables denitions and descriptive statistics.
Mean SD
INC average household income in MSA-YEAR (in 1,000s) (AHS,
BLS);
$24.758 $4.602
INCGR yearly average-income growth rate for MSA-YEAR (AHS,
BLS);
-0.006 0.030
POP total population of MSA-YEAR (in 1,000,000s) (AHS); 2.165 1.676
POPGR yearly population growth rate for MSA-YEAR (AHS); 0.004 0.030
QALIM =1 if income from alimony (AHS); 0.039 0.192
QBUS =1 if income from business (AHS); 0.144 0.351
QINT =1 if income from interest (AHS); 0.396 0.489
QRENT =1 if income from rent (AHS); 0.124 0.329
QSS =1 if income from social security (AHS); 0.301 0.459
QWELF =1 if income from welfare programs (AHS); 0.020 0.140
Note: All income variables deated using CPI (provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics). AHS stands for
the American Housing Survey. BLS stands for the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Since about 82% of the households relocate within the metro area, aggregate measures of characteristics
of the metro area should determine prices but not the decision to move. Four variables are calculated as
measures of metro area characteristics. The population variable POP is calculated by inating the number of
persons per household, using PWT, and then the numbers are summed within each MSA-YEAR to calculate
the population of the MSA for the given survey year. The variable INC is calculated by averaging out the
household income, using PWT to weight the income of each household. The growth rates, POPGR and
INCGR, represent average yearly growth rates between the year of the current survey and the year of the
previous survey78. To control for measurement error in income I use dummy variables that identify whether
a household has income from business, interest, rent, welfare programs, social security, and child alimony79.
These variables are based on questions asked separately from the questions calculating the total self-reported
income, and are hypothesized to be unrelated to the unobservable determinants of household utility. All
instrumental variables with their descriptive statistics are listed in Appendix Table 1.
78In most occasions consecutive surveys for a given metro area are taken each four years, but sometimes the gaps are longer
or shorter. To maintain consistency of the growth rates calculated for each MSA-YEAR, an average yearly growth rate is
calculated.
79Authors have used a variety of instruments for income depending on the nature of the problem they study. Some of the
widely used instruments are lagged income, educational level, and industry/occupation codes.
112
C Chapter 2: Proofs of the main results
Proof of Proposition 5.
To see the rst part, set equation (28) equal to equation (42), and equation (29) equal to equation (42). The
result follows immediately because Pigou taxes set ~= and ~= . Follow the same steps to determine the
tax rates for vacancies.
To see the second result, write the revenue function dropping the assumption of CRS matching function.
For that purpose write 1  =
R = N
266666664
H lHP
k l
[(1  )E(k)E(m)ykm   E(m)(1   Hm)yHm]
+ LlLP
k l
[(1  )E(k)E(m)ykm   E(m)(1   Lm)yLm]
+ vHqHP
m vq
[(1  (1  ))E(k)E(m)ykm   E(k) kHykH ]
+ vLqLP
m vq
[(1  (1  ))E(k)E(m)ykm   E(k) kLykL]
377777775
= N
266666664
H lHP
k l
[(1  )E(k)E(m)ykm   E(m)(1   Hm)yHm]
+ LlLP
k l
[(1  )E(k)E(m)ykm   E(m)(1   Lm)yLm]
+ vHqHP
m vq
[(1  )E(k)E(m)ykm   E(k) kHykH ]
+ vLqLP
m vq
[(1  )E(k)E(m)ykm   E(k) kLykL]
377777775
R = N [1  (+ )]
The government budget exactly balances when the matching function is characterized by constant returns
to scale; a decreasing returns to scale matching function generates some revenue that has to be redistributed,
and increasing returns to scale matching function requires the government to raise revenue to cover a net
subsidy. If the encounter function takes other functional forms the budget may not be balanced (for example
the budget is not balanced for the Leontief encounter function).2
Proof of Proposition 7.
In what follows I adopt the following notation: wk =E(m)wkm =E(m) kmykm is the expected pre-tax wage
rate of a worker of type k = H;L; wkm =  kmykm is the wage rate of a worker of type k = H;L match-
ing with a vacancy of type m =H;L; zwk = kM()wk is the expected pre-tax income of a worker of type
k=H;L; m=E(k)km=E(k)(1   km)ykm is the expected pre-tax prot rate of a vacancy of type m=H;L;
km= (1    km)ykm is the return to a vacancy of type m=H;L matching with a worker of type k=H;L;
and zm=vm
M()
 m is the expected pre-tax revenue of a vacancy of type m=H;L. I take a total derivative
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of the rst order conditions of private behavior in the presence of taxes, (39)
c0w

zwk
M()wk

=M() (1  wk )wk;
c0
 
zm
M()
 m
!
=
M()

(1  m)m;
with respect to zwH , zwL , zH , zL, wH , wL , H , L . The goal is to rst derive the rate of change of each
income/revenue level with respect to changes in each tax rate: dz
w
k
dwk
, dz
w
k
dm
, dz

m
dwk
, and dz

m
dm
, for k = H;L
and m = H;L. In the second step I substitute these rates of change in the rst order conditions for the
maximization of the welfare function with respect to tax rates. 80.
The problem is equivalent to taking the derivative of the rst order conditions:
c0w(k) =M() (1  wk )wk;
c0(vm) =
M()

(1  m)m;
with respect to H , L, vH , vL, wH , 
w
L , 

H , 

L in the rst step.
Total derivative of the private rst order conditions
From the rst order condition of a worker of high type we have
c0w(H) =M() (1  wH )wH ;
=M
P
m vmqmP
k klk

(1  wH )

vHqHP
m vmqm
wHH +
vLqLP
m vmqm
wHL

;
c00wdH =M
0()

qLdvL + qHdvHP
k l
  lLdL + lHdHP
k l


(1  wH )wH
 M()wHdwH
+M()(1  wH )

vHqHP
m vmqm
wHH
dvH
vH
+
vLqLP
m vmqm
wHL
dvL
vL
 wH

vHqHP
m vmqm
dvH
vH
+
vLqLP
m vmqm
dvL
vL

;
Rearranging, this is
1
"wH
dH
H
= (1  )

E(m)
dvm
vm
  E(k)dk
k

  d
w
H
1  wH
+
E(m)

dvm
vm
wHm

wH
  E(m)dvm
vm
; (92)
80This approach in deriving the rst order conditions for the optimal income tax schedule is suggested by Sheshinski (1972),
and Boone and Bovenberg (2002).
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where "wH is the elasticity of search intensity of a high type worker with respect to the rewards to search
"wH =
dH
H
=
d[M()(1  wH )wH ]
M()(1  wH )wH
=
M()(1  wH )wH
H
=
d[M()(1  wH )wH ]
dH
= c0w
M()wH
zwH
=c00w
=
1
H
=
c00w
c0w
; (93)
(1 )= M 0()M() = 1 is an elasticity that measures the eectiveness of vacancies in generating matches, and E(k)
and E(m) denote expectations with respect to the distribution of worker productive skills, and the distribution
of vacancy productive skills respectively. From the rst order condition (for optimal intensity of search in
the market equilibrium), for low type workers, we have:
1
"wL
dL
L
= (1  )

E(m)
dvm
vm
  E(k)dk
k

  d
w
L
1  wL
+
E(m)

dvm
vm
wLm

wL
  E(m)dvm
vm
: (94)
Similarly one can show that from the rst order conditions, for high and low type vacancies, for optimal
intensity of search in the market equilibrium we have
1
"H
dvH
vH
=   

E(m)
dvm
vm
  E(k)dk
k

  d

H
1  H
+
E(k)

dk
k
kH

H
  E(k)dk
k
; (95)
1
"L
dvL
vL
=   

E(m)
dvm
vm
  E(k)dk
k

  d

L
1  L
+
E(k)

dk
k
kL

L
  E(k)dk
k
: (96)
I next solve the system of equations (92), (94), (95),and (96) to derive the equations that relate changes
in each income/revenue level to the changes in each tax rate, dkdwk ,
dk
dm
, dvmdwk , and
dvm
dm
, for k = H;L and
m = H;L. To get the problem tractable I rst rewrite equations (92), (94), (95),and (96) and make a
relatively mild assumption.


HlHP
k klk
+
1
"wH

dH
H
=    LlLP
k klk
dL
L
  d
w
H
1  wH
+
vHqHP
m vmqm

wHH
wH
  1

+ 

dvH
vH
+
vLqLP
m vmqm

wHL
wH
  1

+ 

dvL
vL
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

LlLP
k klk
+
1
"wL

dL
L
=    HlHP
k klk
dH
H
  d
w
L
1  wL
+
vHqHP
m vmqm

wLH
wL
  1

+ 

dvH
vH
+
vLqLP
m vmqm

wLL
wL
  1

+ 

dvL
vL


vHqHP
m vmqm
+
1
"H

dvH
vH
=    vLqLP
m vmqm
dvL
vL
  d

H
1  H
+
HlHP
k klk

HH
H
  1

+ 

dH
H
+
LlLP
k klk

LH
H
  1

+ 

dL
L


vLqLP
m vmqm
+
1
"L

dvL
vL
=    vHqHP
m vmqm
dvH
vH
  d

L
1  L
+
HlHP
k klk

HL
L
  1

+ 

dH
H
+
LlLP
k klk

LL
L
  1

+ 

dL
L
Adopt the following notation as a result of Key Assumption 2:wHHwH  1= wLHwL  1=x; wHLwH  1= wLLwL  1=y;
HH
H
  1= HLL   1=z; and LHH   1= LLL   1=u. Note that in general z=x and y=u, however I prefer to
keep a slightly more cumbersome notation because z and x for example have dierent types of inuence on
dierent variables.
Using the newly introduced notation subtract equation (94) from equation (92):
dzwH
zwH
=

dzwL
zwL
1
"wL
+
dwL
1  wL
  d
w
H
1  wH

"wH : (97)
Substituting equation (97) in equation (94) gives
dL
L
1
"wL
=
1
1

( + x)
vHqHP
m vmqm
dvH
vH
+ ( + y)
vLqLP
m vmqm
dvL
vL

+
1
1

  d
w
L
1  wL
(1 + 
HlHP
k klk
)"wH +
dwH
1  wH

HlHP
k klk
"wH

; (98)
where 1=1+ (1+)E(k)"wk . Substituting equation (98) in equation (97) gives the counterpart to equation
(98) that relates to a worker of a high type
dH
H
1
"wH
=
1
1

( + x)
vHqHP
m vmqm
dvH
vH
+ ( + y)
vLqLP
m vmqm
dvL
vL

+
1
1

dwL
1  wL

LlLP
k klk
"wL + 
dwH
1  wH
(1 + 
LlLP
k klk
)"wL

; (99)
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The relevant conditions for low and high type vacancies are then
dvL
vL
1
"L
=
1
2

(+ z)
HlHP
k klk
dH
H
+ (+ u)
LlLP
k klk
dL
L

+
1
2

  d

L
1  wL
(1 + 
vHqHP
k vkqk
)"H) +
dH
1  H

vHqHP
k vkqk
"H

; (100)
dvH
vH
1
"H
=
1
2

(+ z)
HlHP
k klk
dH
H
+ (+ u)
LlLP
k klk
dL
L

+
1
2

dL
1  L

vLqLP
k vkqk
"L  
dH
1  H
(1 + 
vLqLP
k vkqk
"H)

; (101)
where 2 = 1 + E(m)"m. Next I solve the system of equations (98)-(101) to express the change in each
search intensity as a function of changes in all tax rates. The nal relevant equations that describe these
relationships are:
dL
L
1
"wL
3 =
dL
1  L

(x  y) vHqHP
m vmqm
vLqLP
m vmqm
"H"

L   ( + y)
vLqLP
m vmqm
"L

dH
1  H

 (x  y) vHqHP
m vmqm
vLqLP
m vmqm
"H"

L   ( + x)
vHqHP
m vmqm
"H

dwL
1  wL

 

1 + 
HlHP
k klk
"wH

2 +
HlHP
k klk
(+ z)[E(m)( + (x; y))"m]"
w
H

dwH
1  wH


HlHP
k klk
"wH2  
HlHP
k klk
(+ z)[E(m)( + (x; y))"m]"
w
H

; (102)
where E(m)(x; y) is the expected value of x+y under the indexm, and 3=12 [E(m)(+(x; y))"m][E(k)(+
(u; z))"wk ].
dH
H
1
"wH
3 =
dL
1  L

(x  y) vHqHP
m vmqm
vLqLP
m vmqm
"H"

L   ( + y)
vLqLP
m vmqm
"L

dH
1  H

 (x  y) vHqHP
m vmqm
vLqLP
m vmqm
"H"

L   ( + x)
vHqHP
m vmqm
"H

dwL
1  wL


LlLP
k klk
"wL2  
LlLP
k klk
(+ u)[E(m)( + (x; y))"m]"
w
L

dwH
1  wH

 

1 + 
LlLP
k klk
"wL

2 +
LlLP
k klk
(+ u)[E(m)( + (x; y))"m]"
w
L

; (103)
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dvL
vL
1
"L
3 =
dwL
1  wL

(z   u) HlHP
k klk
LlLP
k klk
"wH"
w
L   (+ u)
LlLP
k klk
"wL

dwH
1  wH

 (z   u) HlHP
k klk
LlLP
k klk
"wH"
w
L   (+ z)
HlHP
k klk
"wH

dL
1  L

 

1 + 
vHqHP
k vkqk
"H

1 +
vHqHP
m vkqk
( + x)[E(k)(+ (z;u))"wm]"

H

dH
1  H


vHqHP
k vkqk
"H1  
vHqHP
m vkqk
( + x)[E(k)(+ (z;u))"wm]"

H

(104)
dvH
vH
1
"H
3 =
dwL
1  wL

(z   u) HlHP
k klk
LlLP
k klk
"wH"
w
L   (+ u)
LlLP
k klk
"wL

dwH
1  wH

 (z   u) HlHP
k klk
LlLP
k klk
"wH"
w
L   (+ z)
HlHP
k klk
"wH

dL
1  L


vLqLP
k vkqk
"L1  
vLqLP
m vkqk
( + y)[E(k)(+ (z;u))"wm]"

L

dH
1  H

 

1 + 
vLqLP
k vkqk
"L

1 +
vLqLP
m vkqk
( + y)[E(k)(+ (z;u))"wm]"

L

(105)
From conditions (102)-(105) we derive the nal forms of the partial derivatives of each search intensity
with respect to each tax rate. For example with respect to wH these partial derivatives are
@L
@wH
1
L
=
"wL
3
1
1  wH


HlHP
k klk
"wH2  
HlHP
k klk
(+ z)[E(m)( + (x; y))"m]"
w
H

@H
@wH
1
H
=
"wH
3
1
1  wH

 

1 + 
LlLP
k klk
"wL

2 +
LlLP
k klk
(+ u)[E(m)( + (x; y))"m]"
w
L

@vL
@wH
1
vL
=
"L
3
1
1  wH

 (z   u) HlHP
k klk
LlLP
k klk
"wH"
w
L   (+ z)
HlHP
k klk
"wH

@vH
@wH
1
vH
=
"H
3
1
1  wH

 (z   u) HlHP
k klk
LlLP
k klk
"wH"
w
L   (+ z)
HlHP
k klk
"wH

(106)
Maximization of the welfare function with respect to taxes
I next maximize the welfare function with respect to taxes, subject to the positive revenue requirement, and
subject to the rst order conditions of private utility maximization as discussed in text. The Lagrangian
shown in equation (49), can be simplied for the maximization process to
max
wk ;

m
W =
X
k
lk ( cw(k)) +
X
m
qm ( c(vm))
+HlHc0w(H) + LlLc
0
w(L) + vHqHc
0
(vH) + vLqLc
0
(vL) (107)
+

(
P
k l)M()

HlHP
k l
wHwH +
LlLP
k l
wLwL +
vHqHP
m vq
HH +
vLqLP
m vq
LL

 R

; (108)
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where  is the marginal cost of funds. Denote
a =
HlHP
k l
wHwH +
LlLP
k l
wLwL and b =
vHqHP
m vq
HH +
vLqLP
m vq
LL:
Since, as it will be shown below, the marginal cost of funds is greater than one, the social planner chooses to
spend exactly R. To avoid clutter I assume this is so, and from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions I present only
the relevant case for >0. The rst order condition with respect to wH is
@L
@wH
=
=
X
k
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
 c0w
@k
@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
+
X
m
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
 c0
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Take the rst four rows from the above expression and re-arrange
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+ LlLc00w
@L
@wH
L
L
M() (1  wL )wL
c0w(L)
+vHqHc00
@vH
@wH
vH
vH
M()

(1  H)H
c0(vH)
+ vLqLc00
@vL
@wH
vL
vL
M()

(1  L )L
c0(vL)
+(
P
k klk)M()
24Pk

lk
@k
@wH

P
k klk
+ (1  )
P
m

qm
@vm
@wH

P
m vmqm
35 (a+ b);
where I used the rst order conditions for optimal search intensities for k=H;L, and m=H;L:
c0w(k) = (1  wk )kk
c0(vm) = (1  m)m
Further simplify:
= HlH
1
"wH
@H
@wH
1
H
M() (1  wH )wH + LlL
1
"wL
@L
@wH
1
L
M() (1  wL )wL
+vHqH
1
"H
@vH
@H
1
vH
M()

(1  H)H + vLqL
1
"L
@vL
@L
1
vL
M()

(1  L )L
+ (
P
k klk)M()
24Pk

lk
@k
@wH

P
k klk
+ (1  )
P
m

qm
@vm
@wH

P
m vmqm
35 (a+ b):
Substitute this back into the rst order condition (109). Divide the whole equation (109) by (
P
k l)M()
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and re-arrange, noting that a+ b=R=(
P
k l)M()= R,
@L
@wH
=
@H
@wH
1
H
HlHP
k l

1  wH
"wH
wH + (wHwH + E(m)Hm

m   (1  ) R)

+
@L
@wH
1
L
LlLP
k l

1  wL
"wL
wL + (wLwL + E(m)Lm

m   (1  ) R)

+
@vH
@wH
1
vH
vHqHP
m vq

1  H
"H
H + (HH + E(k)wkH
w
k    R)

+
@vL
@wH
1
vL
vLqLP
m vq

1  L
"L
L + (LH + E(k)wkL
w
k    R)

+
HlHP
k klk
wH
= 0: (110)
The rest of the partial derivatives of the Lagrangian with respect to wL , 

H , 

L dier from (110) only in the
last element of (110) where in @L=@wL this element is
LlLP
k klk
wL, in @L=@H this element is
vHqHP
m vmqm
H,
and in @L=@L this element is
vLqLP
m vmqm
L. Substituting the partial derivatives in (110), the four rst order
conditions to the maximization problem (107) are
@L
@wH
=
"wH
3
1
1  wH

 

1 + 
LlLP
k klk
"wL

2 +
LlLP
k klk
(+ u)[E(m)( + (x; y))"m]"
w
L


 HlHP
k l

1  wH
"wH
wH + (wHwH + E(m)Hm

m    R)

+
"wL
3
1
1  wH
HlHP
k klk
"wH [2   (+ z)[E(m)( + (x; y))"m]]
 LlLP
k l

1  wL
"wL
wL + (wLwL + E(m)Lm

m    R)

+
"H
3
1
1  wH
HlHP
k klk
"wH

 (z   u) LlLP
k klk
"wL   (+ z)


 vHqHP
m vq

1  H
"H
H + (HH + E(k)wkH
w
k    R)

+
"L
3
1
1  wH
HlHP
k klk
"wH

 (z   u) LlLP
k klk
"wL   (+ z)


 vLqLP
m vq

1  L
"L
L + (LL + E(k)wkL
w
k    R)

+
HlHP
k klk
wH
= 0: (111)
121
@L
@wL
=
"wH
3
1
1  wL
LlLP
k klk
"wL [2   (+ u)[E(m)( + (x; y))"m]]
 HlHP
k l

1  wH
"wH
wH + (wHwH + E(m)Hm

m    R)

+
"wL
3
1
1  wL

 

1 + 
HlHP
k klk
"wH

2 +
HlHP
k klk
(+ z)[E(m)( + (x; y))"m]"
w
H


 LlLP
k l

1  wL
"wL
wL + (wLwL + E(m)Lm

m    R)

+
"H
3
1
1  wL
LlLP
k klk
"wL

(z   u) HlHP
k klk
"wH   (+ u)


 vHqHP
m vq

1  H
"H
H + (HH + E(k)wkH
w
k    R)

+
"L
3
1
1  wL
LlLP
k klk
"wL

(z   u) HlHP
k klk
"wH   (+ u)


 vLqLP
m vq

1  L
"L
L + (LL + E(k)wkL
w
k    R)

+
LlLP
k klk
wL
= 0: (112)
@L
@H
=   "
w
H
3
1
1  H
vHqHP
m vmqm
"H

(x  y) vLqLP
m vmqm
"L + ( + x)


 HlHP
k l

1  wH
"wH
wH + (wHwH + E(m)Hm

m    R)

  "
w
L
3
1
1  H
vHqHP
m vmqm
"H

(x  y) vLqLP
m vmqm
"L + ( + x)


 LlLP
k l

1  wL
"wL
wL + (wLwL + E(m)Lm

m    R)

+
"H
3
1
1  H

 

1 + 
vLqLP
m vmqm
"L

1 +
vLqLP
m vmqm
( + y)[E(k)(+ (u; z))"wk ]"

L


 vHqHP
m vq

1  H
"H
H + (HH + E(k)wkH
w
k    R)

+
"L
3
1
1  H
vHqHP
m vmqm
"H [1   ( + x)[E(k)(+ (u; z))"wk ]]
 vLqLP
m vq

1  L
"L
L + (LL + E(k)wkL
w
k    R)

+
vHqHP
m vmqm
H
= 0: (113)
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1
1  L
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m vmqm
"L
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(x  y)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"H   ( + y)

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1  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"wH
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wH + E(m)Hm

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
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1  wL
"wL
wL + (wLwL + E(m)Lm

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 R)

+
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1  L
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m vmqm
"L [1   (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1  H
"H
H + (HH + E(k)wkH
w
k    R)
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+
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1  L
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 
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m vmqm
"H

1 +
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m vmqm
( + x)[E(k)(+ (u; z))"wk ]"

H


 vLqLP
m vq

1  L
"L
L + (LL + E(k)wkL
w
k    R)

+
vLqLP
m vmqm
L
= 0: (114)
To show that 1 add equations (111) through (114):
"wH [2 + [E(m)( + (x; y))"

m]]
HlHP
k l

1  wH
"wH
wH + (wHwH + E(m)Hm

m    R)

+"wL [2 + [E(m)( + (x; y))"

m]]
LlLP
k l
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1  wL
"wL
wL + (wLwL + E(m)Lm

m    R)

+"H [1 + [E(k)(+ (z;u))"
w
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vHqHP
m vq
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1  H
"H
H + (HH + E(k)wkH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 R)
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+"L[1 + [E(k)(+ (z;u))"
w
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vLqLP
m vq

1  L
"L
L + (LL + E(k)wkL
w
k    R)

= 3

HlHP
k klk
wH(1  wH ) +
LlLP
k klk
wL(1  wL ) +
vHqHP
m vmqm
H(1  H) +
vLqLP
m vmqm
L(1  L )

: (115)
Noting that:
1 = 1 + E(k)"wk
2 = 1 + E(m)"m
1 + [E(k)(+ (z;u))"wk ] = 1 +E(k)
KL
L
"wk
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2 + [E(m)( + (x; y))"m] = 1 + E(m)
wLM
wL
"m
3 = 1 + E(k)"wk + E(m)"

m + E(k)"
w
kE(m)
wLM
wL
"m
+ E(m)"mE(k)
KL
L
"wk   E(m)
wLM
wL
"mE(k)
KL
L
"wk ;
equation (115) can be rewritten as
 =
266666666666666666666664
1 
h
1 + E(m)wLMwL "

m
i264 E(k)wkwk "wk + E(k)E(m)kmm"wk   E(k)wkE(k)"wk
 E(m)mE(k)"wk + E(k) KLL "wkE(m)m(1  m)
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+
h
1 + E(m) kLL "
w
k
i264 E(m)mm"m + E(k)E(m)wkmwk "m   E(k)wkE(m)"m
 E(m)mE(m)"m + E(m)wLmwL "mE(k)wk(1  wk )
375
E(k)wk(1  wk )
h
1 + E(m)wLMwL "

m
i
+ E(m)m(1  m)
h
1 + E(m) kLL "
w
k
i
377777777777777777777775
 1
(116)
The goal here is to nd whether Q1. To procede I simplify equation (116), by assuming that (  1) does
not depend on the ratio =. This allows me to assume a symmetric equilibrium with   and lH = qH ,
lL=qL, and simplies equation (116) to
 =
26666666666666666666664
1 
h
1 + E(m)wLMwL "

m
i
266666664
E(k)wk
w
k "
w
k + E(k)E(m)wkm
w
k "

m + E(m)
wLm
wL
"mE(k)wk(1  wk )
 E(k)wkE(k)"wk
+E(m)mm"m + E(k)E(m)kmm"wk + E(k)
KL
L
"wkE(m)m(1  m)
 E(m)mE(k)"wk
377777775
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wk )
h
1 + E(m)wLMwL "

m
i
+ E(m)m(1  m)
h
1 + E(m) kLL "
w
k
i
37777777777777777777775
 1
:
(117)
From here the task is to show whether
E(m)m

m"

m + E(k)E(m)km

m"
w
k + E(k)
KL
L
"wkE(m)m(1  m)  E(m)mE(k)"wk T 0:
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Expanding the expectation operators this expression can be rewritten as
vHqHP
m vmqm
HlHP
k klk
HH

("H + "
w
H)

H   E(k)"wk + (1  H)E(k)
KL
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
+
vHqHP
m vmqm
LlLP
k klk
LH

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w
L)

H   E(k)"wk + (1  H)E(k)
KL
L
"wk

+
vLqLP
m vmqm
HlHP
k klk
HL

("L + "
w
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
L   E(k)"wk + (1  H)E(k)
KL
L
"wk

+
vLqLP
m vmqm
LlLP
k klk
LL

("L + "
w
L)

L   E(k)"wk + (1  H)E(k)
KL
L
"wk

:
By the assumed symmetry we can interchangably use E(k)"wH=E(m)"

H and E(k)"
w
L=E(m)"

L. Then
("H + "
w
H)

H   E(k)"wk + (1  H)E(k)
KL
L
"wk
= H(2"
w
H   E(k)"wk ) + (1  H)

E(k)
KL
L
"wk   E(k)"wk

;
and
("H + "
w
L)

H   E(k)"wk + (1  H)E(k)
KL
L
"wk
= H("
w
L + "
w
H   E(k)"wk ) + (1  H)

E(k)
KL
L
"wk   E(k)"wk

:
It is clear that ("wL + "
w
H   E(k)"wk > 0), and that
2"wH   E(k)"wk = "wH  
LlLP
k klk
("wH   "wL) > 0 (118)
(and similarly (2"wL E(k)"wk ) > 0). Then,  is possibly less than 1 only for income distributions where E(k)"wk
is signicantly larger than E(k) KLL "
w
k
81. In such income distributions
HLL   1 is signicantly smaller thanLLL   1, noting that the rst dierence is positive and the second dierence is negative. 2
Proof of Proposition 9.
Divide the rst order condition (111) by H lHP
k klk
and the rst order condition (112) by LlLP
k klk
. Subtract
(112) from (111).
81In particular one can show that  could possibly be lower than one if approximately the following inequality holds:
"wL + "
w
H   E(k)"wk
"wL + "
w
H   E(k) KLL "
w
k
 (1  E(m)m); (119)
where both the numerator and denominator are positive.
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
1  wH
"wH
wH   1  
w
L
"wL
wL

3 =
= [2 + E(k)"wk (2   (+ u)[E(m)( + (x; y))"m])]


1  wH
"wH
wH + (wHwH + E(m)Hm

m    R)

  [2 + E(k)"wk (2   (+ z)[E(m)( + (x; y))"m])]


1  wL
"wL
wL + (wLwL + E(m)Lm

m    R)

+ (1 + E(k)"wk )(z   u)(c+ d);
where
c+ d =
vHqHP
m vq
"H

1  H
"H
H + (HH + E(k)wkH
w
k    R)

vLqLP
m vq
"L

1  L
"L
L + (LL + E(k)wkL
w
k    R)

:
Rearranging this is
1  wH
"wH
wH [3  2   E(k)"wk (2   (+ u)[E(m)( + (x; y))"m])]
  1  
w
L
"wL
wL [3  2   E(k)"wk (2   (+ z)[E(m)( + (x; y))"m])] =
= [2 + E(k)"wk (2   (+ u)[E(m)( + (x; y))"m])] (wHwH + E(m)Hmm    R)
  [2 + E(k)"wk (2   (+ z)[E(m)( + (x; y))"m])] (wLwL + E(m)Lmm    R)
(1 + E(k)"wk )(z   u)(c+ d): (120)
I proceed by rst proving that the last expression in equation (120) is positive. First, note again that based
on equation (35) the eect of H on the search intensity of a vacancy can be decomposed to two eects. The
rst eect is the ability of a worker of high type to generate a match, which is represented by the element
M()=, and by equation (19) this eect is positive. The second eect is the thick market/congestion eect
which operates through the expectation of the pretax income of a vacancy, m, for m = L;H. This is a
distributional eect and a worker productivity type distribution with a larger number of workers of high
type and a lower number of workers of low type is perceived by the vacancy favorably as it increases the
expected pretax income of the vacancy. Thus, the overall eect of the increase of H on vm, for m=L;H, is
positive.
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The eect of increasing wH on the level of vm, for m=L;H, must be negative. From equation (106) it
follows that 3>0, because z>0 and z>u. Then, from equation (115) it follows that c+ d>0, and the last
element of equation (120) is positive because z>u.
Next note that in equation (120)
2 + E(k)"wk (2   (+ u)[E(m)( + (x; y))"m]) =
12   (+ u)E(k)"wk [E(m)( + (x; y))"m] > 0:
This last element is larger than 3 (and thus positive), which itself is
3 = 12   [E(m)(+ (u; z))"wk ][E(m)( + (x; y))"m]:
Similarly
2 + E(k)"wk (2   (+ z)[E(m)( + (x; y))"m]) =
12   (+ z)E(k)"wk [E(m)( + (x; y))"m]:
is smaller than 3. It follows that in (120)
3 2   E(k)"wk (2   (+ z)[E(m)( + (x; y))"m]) > 0 for  > 1;
however,
3 2   E(k)"wk (2   (+ u)[E(m)( + (x; y))"m]) > 0 for  > 1;
but only for larger levels of .
I prove that H>L by assuming that LH and reaching a contradiction.
First, note that from equation (120) directly follows that H 6=L, since z 6=u.
Suppose H < L. Then from the rst order conditions (39) it follows that wHwH > 
w
LwL. From this it
follows that: rst (in equation (120))
wH
w
H + E(m)Hm

m    R =
HlHP
k klk
+
LlLP
k klk

wH
w
H +
vHqHP
m vmqm
HH

H +
vLqLP
m vmqm
HL

L
  (1  )

HlHP
k klk
wH
w
H +
LlLP
k klk
wL
w
L +
vHqHP
m vmqm
H

H +
vLqLP
m vmqm
L

L

> 0;
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since also HL>L and HH>H ; and, second
wH
w
H + E(m)Hm

m    R > wLwL + E(m)Lmm    R:
Since
2 + E(k)"wk (2   (+ u)[E(m)( + (x; y))"m]) > 2 + E(k)"wk (2   (+ z)[E(m)( + (x; y))"m]) ;
it then follows that the right-hand side of equation (120) is always positive. The left-hand side must always
be positive and this is possible only when two conditions are met: rst
3 2   E(k)"wk (2   (+ u)[E(m)( + (x; y))"m]) > 0 for  > 1;
and, second
1  wH
"wH
wH >
1  wL
"wL
wL: (121)
The second condition is needed because
3  2   E(k)"wk (2   (+ u)[E(m)( + (x; y))"m]) <
3  2   E(k)"wk (2   (+ z)[E(m)( + (x; y))"m]) :
Equation (121) can only hold if H > L (see equations (39)). This last result holds irrespective of whether
@"=@T0, and leads to a clear contradiction to our assumption that L>H .
Lastly, note also that H  L when =1, because in this case the right-hand side of equation (120) is
strictly positive, while the left-hand side of the same equation is strictly negative.
Thus it must be true that H > L in the social optimum with Pigou and distortionary taxation. The
result must hold irrespective of whether @"=@T0, because in any of these cases HL. 2
Proof of Lemma 10.
In the presence of income taxes, the utility of a worker of type k is
Uk =  cw (k) + kM()(1  wk )wk
The partial derivative of the utility function with respect to productivity wk is
@Uk
@wk
= kM()
@[(1  wk )wk]
@wk
:
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As seen from Proposition 9, high productivity type searches more intensively in the social optimum with
taxes. Then from the rst order conditions (39) it follows that the after tax income, as well as the utility of
the worker, grows with the productivity type.2
Proof of Proposition 11.
The rst part of the proposition follows immediately from equation (120). If the cost functions of a high
and low type dier the tax code calls for dierent treatment based on the elasticity of participation. A more
elastic rate of participation is associated with a lower tax rate.
To see the second result rst note that we want to characterize the distribution of the tax burden between
workers and employers. Then, the productivity skill is not relevant for this comparison, and we can collapse
the rst order conditions (111) through (114) to describe a market where the distributions of productivity
skill on each side of the market collapse to a constant. The relevant rst order conditions in such a market
are only two, one that determines the optimal tax rate to a worker, and one that determines the optimal tax
rate to a vacancy.
To do the transformation note that in this simplied model x=y=z=u=0, and denote E(m)"m="
 and
E(k)"
w
k ="
w, similarly dropping all subscripts.
From equation (111) two elements have to be removed: the second element, and either the third or fourth
element. Note that the second element is just a multiple of @H=@wL , which is zero in this simplied model.
(1  w)w3 =
[12   ""w]

(1  w)w + (ww +     R)"w
+ "w

(1  ) + (ww +     R)" : (122)
From equation (113) two elements have to be removed: either the rst or second element, and fourth
element. Note that the forth element is just a multiple of @vL=@H , which is zero in this simplied model.
(1  )w3 =
"

(1  w)w + (ww +     R)"w
[12   ""w]

(1  ) + (ww +     R)" : (123)
Subtract equation (123) from equation (122), noting that
3 = 12   ""w = 1 + "w + "
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[(1  w)w + (1  )] =
1  "

1 + "w + "

(1  w)w + (1  ) R"w
 

1  "
w
1 + "w + "

(1  ) + (1  ) R"
Rearrange to get
(1  w)w[  1 + "

1 + "w + "
]  (1  )(  1 + "
w
1 + "w + "
) =
1  "

1 + "w + "

 R"w  

1  "
w
1 + "w + "

(1  ) R": (124)
When "w=" increases, the right-hand side of equation (124) increases and the left-hand side decreases. This
calls for an increase in (1  w)w=(1  ), and thus a decrease in w=.2
Proof of Proposition 12.
To prove the rst part of Proposition 12 consider again expression (120). An increase in z, or a decrease in
u, or a decrease in E(m)Lmm, or an increase in E(m)Hm

m all call for an increase in 
w
H=
w
L .
To prove the second part consider again equation (124). When = increases the right-hand side of the
equation decreases and the left-hand side of the equation increases. This calls for a decrease in (1 w)w=(1 
), and thus an increase in w=. When the ability of a vacancy to create a match increases, you need
to tax the vacancy less. 2
D Chapter 3: proofs of the main results
Proof of Lemma 5
I rst prove that the welfare function is a quasi-concave function. The rst derivative of the users' surplus is
@k
@hk
=  (hk + bm   2c)f(hk) Q 0 ; for 2c  bm Q hk (125)
The condition for quasiconcavity is that whenever (hk1)(hk2), then (hk1)(hk1+(1 )hk2), for 2[0; 1].
Take hk1hk22c  bm. Then, because the welfare function is increasing in hk in this range, it must be that
(hk1)(hk1 + (1   )hk2) if hk1  hk1 + (1   )hk2 , which is true. Similarly, the same result can be derived
for the domain of h where users' surplus is decreasing.
The main result in Lemma 5 follows from the rst order condition (125). 2
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